UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Sadhya is the term for what is to be established in the paksha by means of inference. It is the target property whose presence is indicated by the hetu under the guidance of vyapti. Once the inference is completed, the sadhya is asserted of the paksha in the conclusion. Therefore the property mentioned in the stem is called sadhya.

Option A:
Option A, paksha, is the subject in which the sadhya is to be proved and so cannot name the property itself. The example “hill” clearly designates the locus, not the probandum.

Option B:
Option B, hetu, is the reason or sign that points to the sadhya, like smoke, rather than what is finally concluded.

Option C:
Option C is correct because sadhya literally means “that which is to be proved” and captures the goal of the inferential process. Nyaya analyses much of inference in terms of how sadhya is connected to paksha through hetu.

Option D:
Option D, drstanta, is the illustrative example that shows the hetu–sadhya relation, not the property to be proved in the subject.

Statements A, B, C and E correctly summarise Nyaya’s account of perception and its exam relevance. Illusion is not treated as a separate pramāṇa in Nyaya; rather, it is an erroneous cognition analysed within its theory of error, so D is false. Statement F is also false since many schools explicitly discuss perceptual error and its explanations. Therefore the correct combination of true statements is A, B, C and E only.

Option A:
Option A is correct because it brings together the core Nyaya claims about perception, distinguishes determinate and indeterminate types and notes that UGC NET may test these distinctions. It rightly excludes D and F, which misrepresent Nyaya and other Indian views on error and pramāṇa classification.

Option B:
Option B is incorrect as it accepts D, wrongly elevating illusion to an independent source of valid knowledge. In Nyaya, illusory cognition is not pramāṇa because it does not yield truth. Including D makes this option inaccurate.

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it omits A and includes F, thereby losing the definition of pratyakṣa as direct sense contact and adding the false claim that all schools deny perceptual error. This creates a distorted picture of Indian epistemology.

Option D:
Option D is also incorrect since it adds F and omits B, dropping the account of savikalpa perception and endorsing a false universal denial of error. For these reasons, it does not present the full set of correct statements.

Modus tollens is a valid form of argument that denies the antecedent by denying the consequent of a conditional. It proceeds from “if p, then q” and “not q” to the conclusion “not p”. This preserves truth because if p were true, q could not be false. Therefore the pattern described in the stem is known as modus tollens.

Option A:
Option A, affirming the consequent, argues from “if p then q” and “q” to “p”. This pattern is invalid because q might be true for other reasons. Thus affirming the consequent is a fallacy, not the valid form in the question.

Option B:
Option B correctly names modus tollens as the rule that infers “not p” from “if p then q” and “not q”. It is a central tool in deductive proof and refutation. Hence this option accurately answers the question.

Option C:
Option C, denying the antecedent, moves from “if p then q” and “not p” to “not q”. This is also invalid because q could still be true for other causes. Therefore denying the antecedent cannot be the form intended by the stem.

Option D:
Option D, reductio error, is not a standard label for this precise conditional pattern. While reductio arguments sometimes use similar ideas, the technical name of the form in the question is modus tollens.

Statements A, B, C and E correctly capture key features of inductive generalisation, whereas D and F are false. Larger and more representative samples support stronger generalisations, and a single genuine counterexample can overturn a universal claim built inductively. Inductive arguments are evaluated on a scale of strength rather than strict validity, and many survey or data-based Paper 1 questions require inductive thinking. D is wrong because true premises only make the conclusion probable, not certain, and F ignores the central role of induction in scientific practice.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete as it leaves out E, failing to note the explicit role of inductive reasoning in UGC NET data and survey questions. While A, B and C are true, they do not connect the theory to exam practice. Therefore A, B and C only is not an adequate answer.

Option B:
Option B is incorrect because it omits A, which emphasises sample size and representativeness, a crucial consideration in evaluating inductive strength. Without A, the picture of generalisation is less accurate. Hence B, C and E only cannot be the correct combination.

Option C:
Option C is wrong since it includes F, which denies the importance of induction in science, and omits E. Scientific hypotheses are often proposed and refined on inductive grounds, so F is clearly false. Including it invalidates the combination A, B, C and F only.

Option D:
Option D is correct because it brings together A, B, C and E, the true statements that describe both the conceptual and exam-related aspects of induction, while excluding D and F, which overstate certainty and understate scientific practice. Thus this is the appropriate answer.

Statements A, B, C and E present the standard Nyaya account of parāmarśa, whereas D is false. Parāmarśa is the key reflective cognition that recognises the hetu in the pakṣa under a universal vyāpti, and only when such a cognition arises does inference yield true knowledge. It explicitly links pakṣa, hetu and sādhya via vyāpti, making it more than just vyāpti itself. UGC NET may ask for this role in the inferential chain, which is why E is also true.

Option A:
Option A is correct because it includes all true statements and excludes D, which mistakenly identifies parāmarśa with vyāpti alone and ignores its connection to the pakṣa. This combination reflects classic Nyaya epistemology and exam-style questions.

Option B:
Option B is incomplete as it omits E, failing to mention that parāmarśa is a topic directly tested in UGC NET Indian logic questions. A, B, C only therefore does not fully answer the question.

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it leaves out A, losing the explicit formulation of parāmarśa as the reflection that unites hetu, pakṣa and vyāpti. B, C, E only thus does not present the complete picture.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it omits B, losing the key Nyaya claim that parāmarśa is required for inferential knowledge. A, C, E only therefore cannot be accepted.

Statements A, B, C, E and F correctly distinguish tautologies, contradictions and contingencies and relate them to argument validity, while D is false. A tautological conclusion is always true, so any argument with such a conclusion is at least logically valid, though possibly uninformative. Contradictory premises render an argument vacuously valid because there is no case where all premises are true, and recognising logical status helps in judging equivalence and validity in exams. D is wrong because it asserts the opposite about tautological conclusions. Therefore A, B, C, E and F only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E and F, leaving out the role of contradictory premises and the exam-related significance of these distinctions. Although A, B and C are true definitions, they do not connect to argument validity. Thus this option is not complete.

Option B:
Option B is also incomplete, adding E but still omitting F, which summarises the practical usefulness of these categories in UGC NET. Without F, the option lacks an explicit link to reasoning tasks. Hence it cannot be the best answer.

Option C:
Option C is correct since it combines the basic definitions with a key fact about arguments from contradictions and the exam relevance of recognising logical status. It excludes D, which mischaracterises arguments with tautological conclusions. This makes the option logically consistent.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it includes D, thereby accepting the false view that tautological conclusions always make arguments invalid, and it omits A, the central definition of tautology. This combination cannot be taken as correct.

Statements A, C and D are correct, whereas B and E are false. Reasoning from sign moves from an observed symptom or indicator to an unobserved state, as in medical diagnoses where doctors infer conditions from test results. Such inferences are typically inductive and not deductively certain, so B is wrong. Sign-based arguments may be weaker or stronger than authority-based arguments depending on evidence, so E’s blanket comparison is also incorrect. UGC NET data interpretation and reasoning items often embed this kind of pattern, making D true. Therefore A, C, D only is the correct set.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits D, not recognising the explicit exam link mentioned in the stem. A, C only therefore does not fully answer the question.

Option B:
Option B is correct as it includes all the true statements while excluding B and E, which mischaracterise the certainty level and comparative strength of sign reasoning. This matches how such arguments are evaluated in reasoning courses.

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it leaves out A and takes E as true, even though sign reasoning is not inherently weaker than appeals to authority and must be judged case by case. C, D, E only therefore mixes a false claim with true ones.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect as it includes B, thereby claiming that all sign–inferences are deductively valid, which conflicts with their generally inductive nature. A, B, C, D only cannot be accepted.

A strong inductive argument is one in which the truth of the premises would make the falsity of the conclusion very unlikely. Unlike valid deductive arguments, inductive arguments do not aim at absolute necessity but at high probability. When the premises give robust support to the conclusion, the argument is said to be strong. Thus the criterion described in the stem corresponds to inductive strength.

Option A:
Option A, invalid, is a label used for deductive arguments in which it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. It is not a measure of inductive support and therefore does not match the probabilistic description in the question.

Option B:
Option B, weak, refers to an inductive argument whose premises provide little support for the conclusion. In a weak argument, the conclusion could easily be false even if the premises are true. This is the opposite of the condition noted in the stem.

Option C:
Option C is correct because strong inductive arguments specifically aim to make the conclusion unlikely to be false given the premises. This standard prepares the ground for the notion of cogency when the premises are also true.

Option D:
Option D, circular, indicates a flawed structure where the conclusion is essentially assumed in the premises. Such reasoning is not characterised by probability relations between distinct premises and conclusion, so it does not fit the stem.

In a conditional of the form “if p, then q”, the part that follows “if” is called the antecedent. It represents the condition under which the consequent is asserted to hold. Understanding which part is the antecedent is crucial for analysing implication, contrapositive and related logical forms. Thus the component p in the stem is correctly termed the antecedent.

Option A:
Option A is correct because antecedent literally means “that which goes before” and in conditional statements it precedes the “then” clause. It is the assumed or hypothetical part whose truth is taken as the basis for asserting the consequent.

Option B:
Option B, consequent, is the part that follows “then” and expresses what is said to follow from the antecedent. It corresponds to q, not to p, so it cannot be the answer here.

Option C:
Option C, premise, is a general term for any statement offered as a reason in an argument, and both antecedent and consequent can appear as premises in broader reasoning. However, premise does not specifically identify the first part of a conditional.

Option D:
Option D, conclusion, is the statement that the argument as a whole is trying to establish. A single conditional may express a premise or a conclusion, but p itself is not called the conclusion by definition.

Pararthanumana is inference presented for the benefit of another, typically in debate or teaching. It lays out each avayava, from pratijna to nigamana, so that the listener can clearly follow the reasoning. Nyaya stresses this form to ensure transparency and communicability of arguments. Therefore the inferential mode described in the stem is pararthanumana.

Option A:
Option A is correct because pararthanumana literally means "inference for another" and is defined by Nyaya as the public, discursive version of inference. It differs in purpose and presentation from merely private reasoning.

Option B:
Option B, svarthanumana, is inference for oneself where the mind need not spell out every limb, since the thinker already grasps the connections. It does not necessarily employ the full five-part format.

Option C:
Option C, anvaya, refers to agreement in presence used in establishing vyapti and is not itself a type of inference aimed at others.

Option D:
Option D, vyatireka, indicates agreement in absence and again describes a pattern used within inference rather than the communicative use addressed in the question.

Pramiti is the knowledge-event or cognition that arises when a pramana successfully operates on a prameya for a pramata. It is characterised as true, non-contradicted and useful for practical purposes. Nyaya analyses errors by contrasting them with genuine pramiti. Thus the product of successful knowing mentioned in the stem is pramiti.

Option A:
Option A, prameya, is the external object that is known, not the cognitive state that knows it. It cannot therefore be the resultant cognition.

Option B:
Option B, pramana, is the route or instrument, such as perception or inference, which produces the cognition but is not identical with it.

Option C:
Option C, pramata, is the knowing subject who undergoes the cognitive state, not the state itself.

Option D:
Option D is correct because pramiti is precisely the awareness “this is such-and-such” that counts as valid knowledge. It completes the fourfold structure of knower, means, object and knowledge.

Vishesha is posited to account for the numerical distinctness of entities that are otherwise qualitatively identical, such as atoms of the same element or individual selves. It is an ultimate, non-shareable feature that prevents their collapse into a single entity. Without vishesha, the world would lack multiplicity at the fundamental level. Therefore the differentiating factor described in the stem is vishesha.

Option A:
Option A, samanya, is the universal that unites many individuals into one class and so plays the opposite role of highlighting commonality rather than difference.

Option B:
Option B is correct because vishesha literally means “particularity” and is used precisely to secure the individuality of basic entities. It ensures that there are many distinct selves and atoms instead of just one.

Option C:
Option C, samavaya, is the relation of inherence between entities like substance and attribute, not the differentiator of individuals.

Option D:
Option D, abhava, denotes types of non-existence and cannot serve as a positive principle of individuation.

Statements A, B, C, D and E correctly describe the five members of the Nyaya parārthānumāna, whereas F is false. Pratijñā presents the thesis about the pakṣa, hetu gives the reason, udāharaṇa supplies a universal example, upanaya applies that universal relation to the pakṣa and nigamana concludes the inference. The ordered presentation is meant to clarify both the general vyāpti and its specific application, so it is neither arbitrary nor insignificant. Therefore F must be rejected.

Option A:
Option A is correct because it includes the full and accurate description of each step in the five-member syllogism and excludes F, which denies the significance of their order. It aligns with standard Nyaya accounts used in UGC NET Indian logic questions. Hence A, B, C, D and E only is the right choice.

Option B:
Option B is incomplete as it omits E, thereby failing to mention nigamana, the final restatement of the conclusion. Without E, the overall structure of the syllogism is left unfinished. Therefore A, B, C and D only cannot be accepted.

Option C:
Option C is wrong since it omits A and includes only B, C, D and E. Without A, the role of pratijñā as the thesis about the pakṣa is absent, leaving the syllogism without its starting claim. This omission makes B, C, D and E only an inadequate combination.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it omits B and presents only A, C, D and E. Without B, the explicit statement of hetu as the reason is missing, which is central to the syllogistic structure. Thus A, C, D and E only cannot represent all the correct statements.

All statements A to E are correct: conversion swaps subject and predicate (with limits), E and I are simply convertible (A and O are not), obversion changes quality and complements the predicate, and the A-form obverse given in D is equivalent. These tools help decide equivalence in exam questions.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E, the explicit exam-use point.

Option B:
Option B is incomplete because it omits D, a key example showing obversion preserves equivalence for an A-proposition.

Option C:
Option C is correct because it includes all five true statements and matches the stem fully.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it omits A, the basic definition of conversion.

Statements A, B, C, D and F correctly describe major types of reasoning and their role in UGC NET questions, while E is false. Analogical, causal and authority-based arguments, as well as statistical generalisations, are all recognised and commonly tested reasoning patterns. Exam questions often ask candidates to identify which of these patterns is being used. E is incorrect because it ignores the widespread use of causal and statistical reasoning in both theory and test practice.

Option A:
Option A is correct because it includes all the true statements and excludes E, which wrongly narrows the class of acceptable arguments. It draws attention to the diversity of reasoning types and to the requirement in Paper 1 to distinguish among them. Thus this option is consistent with both logical classification and exam design.

Option B:
Option B is incomplete since it omits F, overlooking the explicit connection between these reasoning types and the format of UGC NET questions. While A, B, C and D are true, without F the answer fails to mention how such distinctions are tested. Therefore this combination is not fully adequate.

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it leaves out A, which gives the definition of an analogical argument, and includes only B, C, D and F. Without A, the set does not cover all the listed reasoning types, so it cannot be the complete collection of correct statements. Hence this option is insufficient.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it admits E, which dismisses causal and statistical arguments as unrecognised, contradicting standard logical and methodological practice. Including E alongside otherwise accurate descriptions undermines the overall correctness of the combination.