UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Statements A, C, D and E correctly capture the contrast between deductive and inductive reasoning, while B and F are false. Deductive arguments aim at certainty under true premises, and inductive arguments offer degrees of probability. Inductive generalisation moves from particular observations to broader claims, and even strong inductive conclusions remain open to revision. Analogical reasoning is typically classified as inductive because it infers from similarity in some respects to likely similarity in others. Hence the correct set of statements is A, C, D and E.

Option A:
Option A is incorrect because it omits E, ignoring the fact that analogical reasoning is usually treated as a type of inductive reasoning in exam contexts. While A, C and D are true, leaving out E makes the description of inductive forms incomplete. Therefore A, C and D only cannot represent the full set of correct statements.

Option B:
Option B is correct since it gathers A, C, D and E, all of which align with standard textbook distinctions between deductive and inductive reasoning. It excludes B, which wrongly suggests that adding premises can destroy deductive validity, and F, which wrongly claims that content-preserving transformations can always make induction deductive. This combination therefore accurately reflects accepted logical theory.

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it adds F to the otherwise correct trio C, D and E. F falsely suggests that every inductive argument can be turned into a deductively valid one without changing its content, which is not possible because inductive support is probabilistic, not necessary. Including F makes the option logically inconsistent.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect since it includes B along with A, C and D. B incorrectly asserts that adding a new premise can make a valid argument invalid, but validity is preserved when additional premises are simply conjoined. Therefore this combination, which accepts a false claim about validity, cannot be chosen as correct.

An analogical argument compares two cases and infers that what is true of one is likely true of the other. The argument becomes stronger when the cases share many relevant similarities. These similarities must bear on the conclusion and not be superficial. Therefore the factor described in the stem is the number of relevant similarities.

Option A:
Option A correctly identifies relevant similarities as the key feature that supports a strong analogy. When similarities are numerous and closely connected to the property inferred, the reasoning gains force. Hence this option is the best answer.

Option B:
Option B, irrelevant differences, if numerous, actually weaken an analogy by highlighting disanalogies. Differences that have no bearing on the conclusion cannot support the inference. Thus they do not strengthen the argument as described.

Option C:
Option C, emotional appeals, may influence acceptance of an argument but are not logical grounds for its strength. They relate to persuasion rather than to the structural quality of the analogy. Therefore emotional appeals are not the factor mentioned.

Option D:
Option D, rhetorical questions, are stylistic devices that may accompany arguments. They do not determine the underlying similarity relations between cases. Consequently rhetorical questions are not the correct answer.

Inductive arguments aim to make their conclusions probable rather than certain. An inductive argument is considered strong when the truth of its premises would make the conclusion very unlikely to be false. This probabilistic standard fits the principle stated in the stem. Hence the description mainly applies to inductive arguments.

Option A:
Option A, symbolic, simply refers to a way of representing arguments using symbols and can apply to many forms. It does not specify a particular probabilistic standard of strength. Therefore symbolic is not the correct answer.

Option B:
Option B, deductive, is evaluated by validity, where it is impossible for true premises to yield a false conclusion. Deduction does not usually talk of degrees of probability or strength. Thus deductive arguments are assessed differently from what the stem describes.

Option C:
Option C, fallacious, denotes arguments containing errors in reasoning. A fallacious argument is weak or invalid by definition and does not satisfy the stated condition. Hence fallacious cannot be correct here.

Option D:
Option D correctly identifies inductive arguments as those judged by how unlikely it is for the premises to be true while the conclusion is false. Strong induction therefore fits the standard mentioned in the question.

Disanalogies are relevant differences between the cases being compared in an analogical argument. When numerous or weighty disanalogies exist, the inference that what is true of one case is also true of the other becomes doubtful. The argument’s strength depends not only on similarities but also on the absence of such critical differences. Therefore the factor that weakens an analogy as described is the presence of disanalogies.

Option A:
Option A, shared features, typically strengthen an analogy when they are relevant to the conclusion. More relevant similarities make it more plausible that the property in question will also be shared. Thus shared features do not weaken the argument and are not appropriate here.

Option B:
Option B, examples, refer to specific instances used to illustrate a point. While examples may be used within analogies, they are not themselves the differences that undercut comparative reasoning. Hence examples are not the correct answer.

Option C:
Option C, causes, may be part of the explanation of why something occurs, but they are not uniquely associated with weakening analogical arguments. Differences in causal structures can be a type of disanalogy, but the broader concept mentioned in the stem is more precisely named disanalogies.

Option D:
Option D is correct because disanalogies directly undermine the assumption that what holds in the source case will also hold in the target case. Recognising them is crucial to critically evaluating analogical reasoning.

A strong analogical argument highlights similarities that are relevant to the property being inferred rather than piling up many trivial or unrelated likenesses. The more closely the cited similarities are connected to the conclusion, the stronger the analogy. It does not require the cases to be identical, but it does require that relevant respects be shared in a way that supports the projected claim.

Option A:
Option A relies on superficial similarities, which may look impressive but do not actually support the specific conclusion, weakening the analogy.

Option B:
Option B focuses on relevance and connection to the conclusion, which is the hallmark of a persuasive analogical inference.

Option C:
Option C demands total identity, which is rarely achievable and is not necessary for analogical reasoning; analogy works precisely because the cases are not identical.

Option D:
Option D suggests that a good analogy can never be challenged, which is incorrect; analogical arguments remain defeasible and open to counterexamples.

Inductive reasoning is used when the premises are intended to make the conclusion likely rather than certain. In this kind of argument, even if all the premises are true, the conclusion can still possibly be false. Inductive arguments are evaluated in terms of strength and weakness, not validity. Thus the probabilistic support described in the stem is characteristic of inductive reasoning.

Option A:
Option A, necessary, is not a type of reasoning but a property of conditions or truths that must hold. It does not name a method of drawing conclusions from premises. Therefore it cannot fill the blank appropriately.

Option B:
Option B, deductive, aims at arguments where the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion. Deductive reasoning seeks certainty, not mere probability, and so does not match the description in the question.

Option C:
Option C is correct because inductive reasoning allows us to infer generalisations, predictions or explanations that are more or less probable based on observed evidence. Everyday scientific and statistical inferences are typically inductive in this sense.

Option D:
Option D, demonstrative, is often used as a synonym for strictly proved or deductive reasoning, which again clashes with the idea of probabilistic support. It is therefore not the best term here.

Statements A, B, D and E are correct, while C and F are false. Analogical reasoning does infer further properties from recognised similarities, and the relevance of those similarities is crucial for strength. Differences between cases can weaken an analogy, and UGC NET tests both verbal and non-verbal analogies. C is wrong because a single superficial similarity rarely makes an analogy strong, and F is wrong because in strong analogies, similarities are more central than differences. Hence A, B, D and E only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E, ignoring the fact that analogies are tested in both verbal and non-verbal formats. Although A, B and D are true, leaving out E means an important exam-oriented point is missing. Therefore this option does not capture all correct statements.

Option B:
Option B is incorrect since it drops A and includes only B, D and E. Without A, the general idea of analogical reasoning as inference from similarity is not explicitly stated. This omission makes the description of analogy conceptually thinner than the full list of correct statements.

Option C:
Option C is correct because it lists exactly A, B, D and E, which jointly define analogical reasoning, its evaluation and its appearance in the UGC NET syllabus. It excludes C, which exaggerates the sufficiency of any similarity, and F, which misdescribes the role of differences. Thus Option C matches the set of correct statements.

Option D:
Option D is wrong because it adds C, a false statement about superficial similarity always being enough, to an otherwise correct group. Including C promotes a misunderstanding about how analogies should be evaluated. As a result, A, B, C, D and E only cannot be the correct answer.

Statements A, B, C and E correctly capture key features of inductive generalisation, whereas D and F are false. Larger and more representative samples support stronger generalisations, and a single genuine counterexample can overturn a universal claim built inductively. Inductive arguments are evaluated on a scale of strength rather than strict validity, and many survey or data-based Paper 1 questions require inductive thinking. D is wrong because true premises only make the conclusion probable, not certain, and F ignores the central role of induction in scientific practice.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete as it leaves out E, failing to note the explicit role of inductive reasoning in UGC NET data and survey questions. While A, B and C are true, they do not connect the theory to exam practice. Therefore A, B and C only is not an adequate answer.

Option B:
Option B is incorrect because it omits A, which emphasises sample size and representativeness, a crucial consideration in evaluating inductive strength. Without A, the picture of generalisation is less accurate. Hence B, C and E only cannot be the correct combination.

Option C:
Option C is wrong since it includes F, which denies the importance of induction in science, and omits E. Scientific hypotheses are often proposed and refined on inductive grounds, so F is clearly false. Including it invalidates the combination A, B, C and F only.

Option D:
Option D is correct because it brings together A, B, C and E, the true statements that describe both the conceptual and exam-related aspects of induction, while excluding D and F, which overstate certainty and understate scientific practice. Thus this is the appropriate answer.

A strong inductive argument is one in which the truth of the premises would make the falsity of the conclusion very unlikely. Unlike valid deductive arguments, inductive arguments do not aim at absolute necessity but at high probability. When the premises give robust support to the conclusion, the argument is said to be strong. Thus the criterion described in the stem corresponds to inductive strength.

Option A:
Option A, invalid, is a label used for deductive arguments in which it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. It is not a measure of inductive support and therefore does not match the probabilistic description in the question.

Option B:
Option B, weak, refers to an inductive argument whose premises provide little support for the conclusion. In a weak argument, the conclusion could easily be false even if the premises are true. This is the opposite of the condition noted in the stem.

Option C:
Option C is correct because strong inductive arguments specifically aim to make the conclusion unlikely to be false given the premises. This standard prepares the ground for the notion of cogency when the premises are also true.

Option D:
Option D, circular, indicates a flawed structure where the conclusion is essentially assumed in the premises. Such reasoning is not characterised by probability relations between distinct premises and conclusion, so it does not fit the stem.