UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Statements A, B, C, E and F are correct, while D is incorrect. Pakṣa is indeed the subject where the probandum is to be shown, and vyāpti states the invariable relation between hetu and sādhya. Sapakṣa are positive instances with both reason and probandum, and a proper hetu must appear in all such cases and in none of the negative instances, vipakṣa. If hetu appears in vipakṣa, its exclusiveness is broken, making the reason fallacious. Statement D is wrong because vipakṣa are cases where the sādhya is absent and, for a proper hetu, the reason should also be absent there.

Option A:
Option A is incorrect because it omits F, thereby ignoring the important consequence that hetu’s presence in vipakṣa leads to a fallacy. While A, B, C and E describe key concepts, they do not mention what happens when the exclusiveness condition is violated. Thus A, B, C and E only cannot be the full set of correct statements.

Option B:
Option B is correct since it combines A, B, C, E and F, reflecting the standard Nyaya account of pakṣa, vyāpti, sapakṣa, vipakṣa and the condition of a proper hetu. It excludes D, which wrongly describes vipakṣa as places where hetu is present but sādhya is absent. The option therefore matches the real structure of Indian inference theory.

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it accepts D along with the other statements. By treating D as correct, it suggests that hetu is present in vipakṣa, which is the very situation that undermines the validity of the reason. Including D therefore makes this option inconsistent with the conditions for a proper hetu.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect since it drops B, a central explanation of vyāpti, and keeps A, C, E and F only. Without acknowledging vyāpti explicitly, the picture of inference is incomplete, and the presence of D’s error in other options confirms that this reduced set does not accurately represent all true statements.

Statements A, B, C, D and E accurately describe standard types of hetvābhāsa in Indian logic, while F is false. Savyabhicāra points to irregular concomitance, viruddha reverses the intended conclusion, and asiddha is unestablished in the pakṣa. Bādhita is overridden by a stronger means of knowledge, and satpratipakṣa faces an equally strong counter-reason. A proper hetu must avoid, not exemplify, these defects, so F misstates the requirement. Therefore A, B, C, D and E only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E, leaving out the important case of satpratipakṣa where a counter-reason neutralises the original hetu. While A, B, C and D are true, they do not cover the full range of named fallacies in the list. Thus this option is not adequate.

Option B:
Option B is wrong because it includes F, which claims that a good reason should display one of these defects. In Indian logic, such defects mark the hetu as fallacious, not acceptable. Including F therefore contradicts the central idea of hetvābhāsa.

Option C:
Option C is correct since it assembles all five accurate descriptions of fallacious reasons and excludes the single statement that reverses the standard condition for a proper hetu. It offers a comprehensive view consistent with Nyaya accounts and exam expectations. Hence this is the right answer.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it omits A and instead includes F, thereby losing the description of savyabhicāra while endorsing the wrong requirement about valid hetu. This combination fails to reflect the recognised structure of Indian logical fallacies.

Vyapti expresses the universal, exceptionless relation between the reason (hetu) and the property to be proved (sadhya). It states that wherever the hetu is present, the sadhya is also present, and this relation underwrites the legitimacy of inference. Recognising vyapti is thus crucial for establishing that the observed sign reliably indicates the inferred property. Therefore the relation described is called vyapti.

Option A:
Option A, paksha, is the subject or locus in which the sadhya is to be established, such as the hill in the classic smoke–fire example. It is not the relation between hetu and sadhya themselves. Thus paksha does not match the description.

Option B:
Option B is correct because vyapti specifically denotes the invariable concomitance that connects reason and probandum. Without such a universal linkage, anumana would not yield reliable knowledge. This aligns exactly with the statement in the question.

Option C:
Option C, drstanta, is the example that illustrates the vyapti, such as a kitchen where smoke and fire are observed together. It helps make the underlying relation clear but is not itself the relation.

Option D:
Option D, nigamana, is the concluding statement in the five-membered form of inference and represents the final step of asserting the proved thesis. It does not name the universal connection that licenses the inference.

Udaharana combines a general statement of vyapti with an illustrative case, making the universal relation between hetu and sadhya vivid. It typically reads like “wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in a kitchen.” This step helps the listener see that the relation claimed is grounded in familiar experience. Therefore the member described in the stem is called udaharana.

Option A:
Option A is correct because udaharana is explicitly defined as the third avayava that presents both the rule and an example, bridging abstract vyapti and concrete observation.

Option B:
Option B, paksha, is the subject of inference like the hill, and it appears in the thesis and other steps but is not itself the rule-with-example component.

Option C:
Option C, vyapti, is the underlying universal relation stated in more abstract terms; udaharana expresses this relation but also includes an illustrative instance.

Option D:
Option D, pramana, is a general term for means of knowledge and not the specific step in the Nyaya syllogism.

Drstanta is the illustrative instance cited in a Nyaya inference to make the vyapti between hetu and sadhya clear. It typically refers to a familiar case where the reason and the probandum are known to co-occur, such as a kitchen where smoke and fire are always found together. By presenting this example, the arguer helps the listener grasp and accept the universal concomitance underlying the inference. Thus the example described in the stem is called drstanta.

Option A:
Option A, paksha, is the subject in which the property is to be established, such as the hill said to be fiery. It is the locus of inference, not the illustrative case demonstrating the general relation.

Option B:
Option B is correct because drstanta literally means “seen example” and functions to support the step from general rule to the specific case by reminding the audience of known instances. It is a distinct member of the five-part Nyaya argument.

Option C:
Option C, upanaya, is the application step that explicitly connects the general vyapti shown by the drstanta to the paksha, stating that the reason present in the subject falls under that universal relation.

Option D:
Option D, nigamana, is the final concluding statement that restates the thesis as established, not the example used to clarify the inference.

Vyapti denotes the universal and exceptionless relation connecting the reason (hetu) with the probandum (sadhya). It states that wherever the hetu is present, the sadhya is also present, and wherever the sadhya is absent, the hetu is absent. Establishing vyapti through positive and negative instances is what justifies moving from a perceived sign to an unperceived conclusion in anumana. Therefore the relation described in the stem is called vyapti.

Option A:
Option A, paksha, is the subject or locus in which the sadhya is to be established, such as the hill in the classic smoke–fire example. It is not the relation between hetu and sadhya.

Option B:
Option B, hetu, is the reason or middle term that indicates the presence of the sadhya, like smoke indicating fire. While hetu participates in vyapti, it is not the name of the universal relation itself.

Option C:
Option C is correct because vyapti captures the pattern “wherever this, there that” which gives inferential force to anumana. Without vyapti, the step from observed sign to unobserved property would lack rational justification.

Option D:
Option D, drstanta, is the illustrative example that shows the vyapti in a familiar case, such as a kitchen where smoke and fire always go together. It is evidence for vyapti, not the relation itself.

Upanaya is the step where the previously stated universal relation between hetu and sādhya, illustrated in the example, is explicitly applied to the subject under consideration. After establishing that “wherever there is smoke, there is fire,” upanaya asserts that “there is smoke on this hill,” thereby linking the universal vyāpti to the particular pakṣa. This bridging move paves the way for the concluding nigamana.

Option A:
Option A corresponds to nigamana, the concluding restatement of the thesis in light of the reason, not to the application step.

Option B:
Option B is largely the work of dṛṣṭānta, where a familiar example is used to state and illustrate the universal concomitance, not its application to the case at hand.

Option C:
Option C properly locates upanaya as the moment where the general rule is connected to the specific subject, making the inference fully anchored in the given situation.

Option D:
Option D introduces the idea of counterexamples, which would undercut the inference rather than support it; this is not the purpose of upanaya.

Vyapti expresses the pervasion relation that underwrites inference: the hetu is found only where the sadhya is found. Knowing vyapti allows one to move securely from the presence of the hetu in the paksha to the presence of the sadhya there. It is established through observing positive and negative instances or through reliable testimony. Thus the universal connection described in the stem is called vyapti.

Option A:
Option A, paksha, is the individual subject where the inference is applied and cannot denote a general relation between two properties.

Option B:
Option B, hetu, is the specific reason or sign used in a given inference, such as smoke, not the general concomitance between smoke and fire.

Option C:
Option C, drstanta, is the example that illustrates vyapti in a familiar case like a kitchen. It helps show the relation but is not itself the relation.

Option D:
Option D is correct because vyapti is technically defined as the invariable concomitance of hetu with sadhya. Without vyapti, inference would lack its justificatory basis.

Nyāya insists that vyāpti between hetu and sādhya must be grounded in both positive and negative correlated instances. For smoke and fire, this means repeatedly seeing smoke accompanied by fire in similar loci (sapakṣa) like kitchens, and not finding smoke where there is no fire in dissimilar loci (vipakṣa) such as lakes or open spaces. This combined pattern supports the conviction that wherever there is smoke there is fire, establishing invariable concomitance.

Option A:
Option A is too weak, because mere repetition of a single example may be accidental and does not rule out exceptions.

Option B:
Option B confines observation to a single type of positive instance and ignores negative cases, so it cannot eliminate possibilities of smoke without fire elsewhere.

Option C:
Option C captures the need for both anvaya (co-presence) and vyatireka (co-absence), which together underpin robust knowledge of vyāpti in Nyāya epistemology.

Option D:
Option D overstates the role of scripture; while śabda is an accepted pramāṇa, vyāpti for empirical inference like smoke–fire is not usually taken from testimony alone.

A savyabhicāra hetu is one that appears both where the sādhya is present and where it is absent, making the middle term unreliable. Horns are found not only in cows but also in goats, buffaloes and other animals. Thus “having horns” does not uniquely signal “being a cow,” and many counter instances exist. This irregularity is what makes the hetu anaikāntika or inconclusive.

Option A:
Option A clearly uses “having horns” as a middle term to prove “cow,” but this hetu occurs widely in non cow cases, so it is a textbook savyabhicāra example.

Option B:
Option B uses the smoke–fire relation, which Nyāya typically treats as a well established and regular vyāpti rather than an irregular one.

Option C:
Option C links being made of clay to breakability, which is usually seen as a strong and reliable connection with few counter instances.

Option D:
Option D presents a case where dyeing generally does explain colour in cloth; this does not display the same irregularity and is not the standard example for savyabhicāra.

Statements A, B, C and E present the standard Nyaya account of the three key elements of inference, whereas D is false. The pakṣa is the locus where something is to be demonstrated, sādhya is the probandum, and hetu is a pervaded sign that must be present in the pakṣa. If hetu fails to be present in the pakṣa, the inference collapses, so D contradicts a basic rule. UGC NET often asks candidates to identify these elements in classical examples, which makes E correct.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E, ignoring the explicit exam application mentioned in the stem. Although A, B and C are true, A, B, C only does not cover all the correct statements about the topic.

Option B:
Option B is wrong since it leaves out C, which specifies the relation of hetu to sādhya via vyāpti, an essential feature of inferential reasoning. A, B, E only therefore does not fully describe the triad.

Option C:
Option C is correct as it includes all accurate claims about the roles of pakṣa, hetu and sādhya and their importance in UGC NET questions while excluding D, which denies the requirement that hetu be present in the subject. This combination matches standard Indian logic presentations.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it omits A, failing to mention the pakṣa explicitly, and therefore gives only a partial picture. B, C, E only does not satisfy the requirement of listing all correct statements.

Kevalavyatireki inference draws on a vyapti known only through joint absence of hetu and sadhya; there is no case in which both are present together that can be cited. The relation is captured purely by statements like “wherever there is no sadhya, there is no hetu.” Nyaya treats such reasoning as a special pattern where negative concomitance does all the justificatory work. Thus the inference described in the stem is kevalavyatireki.

Option A:
Option A is correct because kevalavyatireki literally means “only by negative concomitance,” matching the condition that the relation is confirmed through absences alone.

Option B:
Option B, kevalanvayi, is based solely on positive instances of joint presence and therefore stands in contrast to the pattern specified in the question.

Option C:
Option C, anvayavyatireki, uses both joint presence and joint absence, relying on a richer set of instances than the purely negative case.

Option D:
Option D, purvavat, classifies inference according to temporal cause–effect direction rather than by the positive or negative character of vyapti instances.

Anumana is defined as knowledge that follows from the recognition of a sign and its universal concomitance with what is to be proved. When we see smoke and recall that wherever there is smoke there is fire, we infer the presence of fire by anumana. It is therefore a mediate form of cognition depending on prior knowledge of vyapti. The description in the stem fits this inferential process exactly.

Option A:
Option A, upamana, yields knowledge by comparison and similarity, not by a sign–probandum relation grounded in vyapti. It relies on resemblance rather than on an established universal connection.

Option B:
Option B, sabda, is verbal testimony, a distinct pramana in which words of a reliable authority produce knowledge. It does not operate through a linga–sadhya relation.

Option C:
Option C is correct because anumana is the standard Indian term for inference based on a reason or sign. It captures the idea of drawing a conclusion about an unperceived entity from perceived evidence.

Option D:
Option D, arthapatti, or postulation, is a pramana recognised especially in Mimamsa where a new fact is posited to reconcile apparently conflicting data. It is not the same as ordinary sign-based inference.