UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Asiddha hetu is a defective reason that has not been successfully shown to exist in the paksha. Because the foundational fact is missing or doubtful, no valid inference can proceed from it. Nyaya further distinguishes subtypes depending on why the reason is unestablished. The core problem is that the middle term fails at the very starting point.

Option A:
Option A, badhita, indicates a reason whose vyapti is contradicted by a stronger pramana, not one that is simply absent or unproved in the subject. The hetu might be present but epistemically defeated.

Option B:
Option B, satpratipaksha, involves a reason that is counterbalanced by an equally strong opposing reason, which is different from lacking initial establishment.

Option C:
Option C, savyabhicara, deals with irregularity across instances, where the reason is present but not constantly linked with the sadhya, rather than being missing in the paksha itself.

Option D:
Option D is correct because asiddha literally means "unaccomplished" and precisely marks the failure of the hetu to be verified where it is claimed to occur. This prevents the inferential chain from getting off the ground.

Asiddha hetu suffers from the foundational defect that it has not been successfully shown to exist in the paksha. Since the middle term is absent or doubtful at the very point where it is supposed to operate, no legitimate inference can proceed. Nyaya further distinguishes types of asiddha depending on whether the reason is impossible, located elsewhere or uncertain. The core idea remains that the reason is unproved.

Option A:
Option A is correct because asiddha literally means "unaccomplished" and signals that the first condition of trairupya, presence in the paksha, has not been met. Without this, the inferential chain cannot even begin.

Option B:
Option B, viruddha, describes a reason that proves the opposite of the intended sadhya rather than one whose presence is in doubt.

Option C:
Option C, savyabhicara, concerns irregular occurrence of the hetu across positive and negative instances, not its absence in the paksha.

Option D:
Option D, badhita, involves defeat of the supposed universal relation by stronger evidence, which presupposes that the hetu is at least present.

Statements A, B, C, D and E accurately describe standard types of hetvābhāsa in Indian logic, while F is false. Savyabhicāra points to irregular concomitance, viruddha reverses the intended conclusion, and asiddha is unestablished in the pakṣa. Bādhita is overridden by a stronger means of knowledge, and satpratipakṣa faces an equally strong counter-reason. A proper hetu must avoid, not exemplify, these defects, so F misstates the requirement. Therefore A, B, C, D and E only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E, leaving out the important case of satpratipakṣa where a counter-reason neutralises the original hetu. While A, B, C and D are true, they do not cover the full range of named fallacies in the list. Thus this option is not adequate.

Option B:
Option B is wrong because it includes F, which claims that a good reason should display one of these defects. In Indian logic, such defects mark the hetu as fallacious, not acceptable. Including F therefore contradicts the central idea of hetvābhāsa.

Option C:
Option C is correct since it assembles all five accurate descriptions of fallacious reasons and excludes the single statement that reverses the standard condition for a proper hetu. It offers a comprehensive view consistent with Nyaya accounts and exam expectations. Hence this is the right answer.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it omits A and instead includes F, thereby losing the description of savyabhicāra while endorsing the wrong requirement about valid hetu. This combination fails to reflect the recognised structure of Indian logical fallacies.

Statements A, B, D and E correctly characterise asiddha hetu as a middle term that is not properly established, either because it does not qualify the pakṣa or is itself impossible, and note its place in UGC NET questions. C is false because a hetu present in the pakṣa but absent in all sapakṣa cases is rather an example of asādhāraṇa or improperly restricted reason, not simply asiddha. Thus the true statements are A, B, D and E only.

Option A:
Option A is correct since it includes all the accurate descriptions and the exam-related remark, while excluding C which mislabels a different defect as asiddha. It reflects the standard Nyaya classification of hetvābhāsa.

Option B:
Option B is incomplete because it omits E, failing to mention that UGC NET often provides examples of such fallacious reasons in the options. Without E, the exam application of the concept is missing.

Option C:
Option C is incorrect as it drops A, losing the basic idea that asiddha hetu is unestablished in the pakṣa, and it also keeps an incomplete/incorrect mix. So it does not include all true statements.

Option D:
Option D is wrong because it keeps C (false) and omits B (true), so it cannot be the correct combination.

All six statements together give a coherent picture of fallacious and valid reasons in Indian logic, so A, B, C, D, E and F are correct. Hetvābhāsa is indeed an apparently sound but defective reason, and asiddha and viruddha are classic examples where the reason is unestablished or proves the opposite. Satpratipakṣa and bādhita identify reasons neutralised or overridden by equally strong or stronger knowledge. The final statement summarises the threefold condition for a valid hetu: presence in the pakṣa, presence in sapakṣa and absence in vipakṣa. Hence every statement listed is accurate, making this the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incorrect because it stops at A, B, C and D, leaving out E and F, which also state correct and important aspects of Indian inference theory. Without bādhita hetu and the positive conditions of a valid hetu, the account of reasons and fallacies is incomplete. Therefore A, B, C and D only cannot be accepted as correct.

Option B:
Option B is still incomplete since it omits F, the summary condition for a valid hetu, even though it adds E. While E is correct about contradiction by stronger pramāṇa, leaving out F fails to mention the standard threefold test for a proper reason. Thus A, B, C, D and E only does not capture the full set of true statements.

Option C:
Option C is correct because it includes all six accurate statements that together describe types of hetvābhāsa and the structural requirements of a valid hetu. There is no falsehood among A–F, so the only way to select all correct statements is to choose the option listing all of them. This makes Option C the right answer by matching the full, correct set.

Option D:
Option D is wrong because it leaves out A, which defines hetvābhāsa itself, and thus ignores the overarching concept under which the listed fallacies are grouped. Even though B, C, D, E and F are true, omitting A means the combination is not the complete set of correct statements in the question.

In an asiddha hetu, the middle term is not established as a property of the subject, so the very first condition of a proper hetu fails. The statement “the sky is fragrant because it is a lotus” presupposes that the sky has the property of being a lotus, which is obviously false. Since the subject does not possess the alleged hetu, no inference can legitimately proceed from it. This makes the hetu unproved in the pakṣa.

Option A:
Option A is the classic valid smoke–fire inference, assuming smoke is actually present on the hill; in that case the hetu clearly qualifies the pakṣa and is not asiddha.

Option B:
Option B correctly shows a middle term, “being a lotus,” that is entirely absent from the sky, so the reason fails at the level of pakṣadharmatā and becomes a textbook asiddha hetu.

Option C:
Option C presents a widely accepted reason, because pots are made of clay and that property supports their breakability; here the hetu is well established in the pakṣa.

Option D:
Option D uses a standard Nyāya argument that produced things are non eternal; “produced” is acknowledged as a property of sound, so the hetu is siddha rather than asiddha.

In an asiddha hetu, the middle term is not established as qualifying the pakṣa, so one of the trairūpya conditions fails at the outset. Saying “the sky is fragrant because it is a lotus” presupposes that the sky has the property of being a lotus, which is obviously false. Since the pakṣa does not possess the alleged hetu, the inference cannot legitimately proceed. The reason remains unproved in the subject and so is labelled asiddha.

Option A:
Option A clearly shows a middle term, “being a lotus,” that is not actually present in the subject, the sky, thus exemplifying the unproved middle defect.

Option B:
Option B presents the classic valid Nyāya inference where smoke is genuinely present on the hill, so the hetu is siddha, not asiddha.

Option C:
Option C gives a plausible causal generalisation; even if debatable empirically, the middle term “having water” is clearly present in the lake and so is not unproved in the pakṣa.

Option D:
Option D links breakability to being made of clay, a widely accepted connection where the middle term is present in the pot, so it does not illustrate asiddha.