UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Statements A, B, C, D and E correctly describe the threefold division of inference, whereas F is false. Pūrvavat and śeṣavat explicitly connect cause and effect in opposite directions, and sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa depends on regular associations not tied to a clear causal order. All three are grounded in vyāpti, the invariable relation between hetu and sādhya, even if the way we become aware of that relation differs. Exam questions may present familiar examples and ask which type is illustrated. Hence A, B, C, D and E only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E, failing to mention how these distinctions are used in UGC NET questions. Although A, B, C and D are conceptually correct, they lack the explicit exam connection. Therefore this option is not fully satisfactory.

Option B:
Option B is wrong since it includes F, which denies the role of vyāpti in these inferences. In Nyaya, the reliability of any anumāna depends on an underlying vyāpti, so claiming independence contradicts the theory. Including F makes the combination inconsistent.

Option C:
Option C is incorrect because it leaves out A and includes F, thus losing the description of pūrvavat while accepting the false claim about vyāpti. Without A, one of the three types is not represented, and with F, the relation to invariable concomitance is misdescribed.

Option D:
Option D is correct as it gathers all true statements about the threefold classification and its testing in exams while excluding the one statement that wrongly severs the link with vyāpti. It therefore matches the Indian logic account used in UGC NET.

A, B, C and E correctly describe vyāpti, its establishment via sapakṣa/vipakṣa considerations, and its role in Nyaya inference; the smoke–fire example is standard. D is false because one coincidence cannot justify a universal invariable relation. Hence A, B, C and E only are correct.

Option A:
Option A is correct because it includes all true statements and excludes D, which overclaims what one coincidence can establish.

Option B:
Option B is incomplete because it omits E (the common illustrative example used in exam contexts).

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it includes D (false).

Option D:
Option D is wrong because it omits B (the key sapakṣa/vipakṣa basis) and includes D (false).

Statements A, B, C and E present the standard Nyaya account of the three key elements of inference, whereas D is false. The pakṣa is the locus where something is to be demonstrated, sādhya is the probandum, and hetu is a pervaded sign that must be present in the pakṣa. If hetu fails to be present in the pakṣa, the inference collapses, so D contradicts a basic rule. UGC NET often asks candidates to identify these elements in classical examples, which makes E correct.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E, ignoring the explicit exam application mentioned in the stem. Although A, B and C are true, A, B, C only does not cover all the correct statements about the topic.

Option B:
Option B is wrong since it leaves out C, which specifies the relation of hetu to sādhya via vyāpti, an essential feature of inferential reasoning. A, B, E only therefore does not fully describe the triad.

Option C:
Option C is correct as it includes all accurate claims about the roles of pakṣa, hetu and sādhya and their importance in UGC NET questions while excluding D, which denies the requirement that hetu be present in the subject. This combination matches standard Indian logic presentations.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it omits A, failing to mention the pakṣa explicitly, and therefore gives only a partial picture. B, C, E only does not satisfy the requirement of listing all correct statements.

Anumana is inferential knowledge that proceeds from cognition of a sign to cognition of an unperceived fact based on their established universal concomitance. It is mediate because it requires prior awareness of vyapti linking the hetu and sadhya. Classical examples include inferring fire on a hill from the perception of smoke. Hence the mode of knowledge described in the stem is anumana.

Option A:
Option A, sabda, is verbal testimony and yields knowledge on the strength of a trustworthy speaker rather than on the recognition of a sign–probandum relation. It does not rely on universal concomitance in the sense required by inference. Therefore sabda cannot be the answer here.

Option B:
Option B, upamana, operates through comparison between an unknown object and a known one and uses similarity rather than a strict vyapti as in anumana. Although it can involve a kind of indirect reasoning, it is treated as a distinct pramana, not as inference proper.

Option C:
Option C is correct because anumana directly names knowledge grounded in linga and vyapti. It formalises the everyday practice of drawing conclusions from perceptible marks to imperceptible facts, making such reasoning available for systematic analysis.

Option D:
Option D, arthapatti, is postulation, where a new fact is hypothesised to reconcile apparently inconsistent data. While it can resemble inference, traditional schools distinguish it from ordinary sign-based anumana.

Anumana is defined as knowledge that follows from the recognition of a sign and its universal concomitance with what is to be proved. When we see smoke and recall that wherever there is smoke there is fire, we infer the presence of fire by anumana. It is therefore a mediate form of cognition depending on prior knowledge of vyapti. The description in the stem fits this inferential process exactly.

Option A:
Option A, upamana, yields knowledge by comparison and similarity, not by a sign–probandum relation grounded in vyapti. It relies on resemblance rather than on an established universal connection.

Option B:
Option B, sabda, is verbal testimony, a distinct pramana in which words of a reliable authority produce knowledge. It does not operate through a linga–sadhya relation.

Option C:
Option C is correct because anumana is the standard Indian term for inference based on a reason or sign. It captures the idea of drawing a conclusion about an unperceived entity from perceived evidence.

Option D:
Option D, arthapatti, or postulation, is a pramana recognised especially in Mimamsa where a new fact is posited to reconcile apparently conflicting data. It is not the same as ordinary sign-based inference.