UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Statements A, B, C and E are correct, while D and F are false. Nyaya does define perception as arising from sense-organ contact, and it distinguishes indeterminate nirvikalpa and determinate savikalpa perception. Some traditions also speak of yogaja pratyakṣa as an extraordinary type of perception. Illusory perceptions like shell-silver are taken as examples of error, not of valid pratyakṣa, and many schools explicitly accept perception as a pramāṇa, so F is clearly wrong. Thus A, B, C and E only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E, ignoring the reference to special forms of perception discussed in certain schools. Although A, B and C are true, they do not reflect the full range of pratyakṣa types mentioned in the item. Therefore A, B and C only cannot be the right answer.

Option B:
Option B is incorrect since it adds D, which wrongly treats illusion as valid perception. In Indian epistemology, such experiences are usually analysed as erroneous cognitions, not as paradigms of valid knowledge. Including D makes this combination inconsistent with the standard account.

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it omits A and includes D. Without A, the basic Nyaya definition of perceptual knowledge is missing, and accepting D confuses error with valid cognition. So B, C, D and E only cannot be chosen.

Option D:
Option D is correct as it groups A, B, C and E, capturing both the standard definition and the main subtypes of perception without conflating error with knowledge. It excludes D and F, both of which conflict with mainstream Indian logical theory. Hence this option matches the set of correct statements.

Anekantavada is the Jaina principle of non-one-sidedness, asserting that reality possesses many facets and can be viewed from different valid standpoints. It challenges dogmatic claims that describe things in purely absolute terms. This doctrine undergirds the Jaina emphasis on intellectual humility and tolerance. Therefore the many-sidedness doctrine in the stem is anekantavada.

Option A:
Option A, syadvada, is the doctrine of conditional predication that gives a linguistic and logical expression to the spirit of anekantavada, but it is not the more fundamental metaphysical thesis itself. Syadvada shows how statements should be qualified, whereas anekantavada explains why such qualification is needed.

Option B:
Option B is correct because anekantavada literally means "doctrine of not-one-sidedness" and is explicitly introduced by Jainas to account for the complexity and diversity of real objects. It anchors their broader logical and ethical outlook.

Option C:
Option C, saptabhangi, refers to the sevenfold scheme of predication used within syadvada and is even more specific in scope. It does not name the overarching doctrine of many-sided reality.

Option D:
Option D, paroksha, denotes indirect knowledge and belongs to Jaina epistemology rather than to their metaphysical view of the structure of reality.

Statements A, B and C give core structural rules of valid categorical syllogisms, and E and F correctly name the fallacies arising from breaking the first two rules. D is false because two particular premises do not guarantee a valid conclusion in general. Therefore A, B, C, E and F only forms the correct combination of true statements.

Option A:
Option A is correct since it includes all the true rules and their associated fallacies, and excludes D.

Option B:
Option B is incomplete as it omits F, leaving out illicit major/minor.

Option C:
Option C is incomplete because it omits A (distribution of middle term).

Option D:
Option D is incorrect since it includes D, which is false.

Statements A, B, C, D and E correctly describe the threefold division of inference, whereas F is false. Pūrvavat and śeṣavat explicitly connect cause and effect in opposite directions, and sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa depends on regular associations not tied to a clear causal order. All three are grounded in vyāpti, the invariable relation between hetu and sādhya, even if the way we become aware of that relation differs. Exam questions may present familiar examples and ask which type is illustrated. Hence A, B, C, D and E only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E, failing to mention how these distinctions are used in UGC NET questions. Although A, B, C and D are conceptually correct, they lack the explicit exam connection. Therefore this option is not fully satisfactory.

Option B:
Option B is wrong since it includes F, which denies the role of vyāpti in these inferences. In Nyaya, the reliability of any anumāna depends on an underlying vyāpti, so claiming independence contradicts the theory. Including F makes the combination inconsistent.

Option C:
Option C is incorrect because it leaves out A and includes F, thus losing the description of pūrvavat while accepting the false claim about vyāpti. Without A, one of the three types is not represented, and with F, the relation to invariable concomitance is misdescribed.

Option D:
Option D is correct as it gathers all true statements about the threefold classification and its testing in exams while excluding the one statement that wrongly severs the link with vyāpti. It therefore matches the Indian logic account used in UGC NET.

In logic, to say that p implies q is to assert that whenever p is true, q must also be true. This relation is captured formally by the conditional "if p, then q". The guarantee of truth transfer from p to q is the essence of implication. Thus the relation described in the stem is that p implies q.

Option A:
Option A, contradicts, would mean that p and q cannot both be true at the same time, which is the opposite of what is stated. Contradiction signals incompatibility, not guaranteed co-truth. Therefore contradicts is not appropriate.

Option B:
Option B, equals, suggests identity rather than a directional truth-preserving relation. Logical equivalence does require mutual implication, but simple equality does not capture the idea of one truth ensuring another. Hence equals is not the right term here.

Option C:
Option C is correct because implies is the standard expression for a relation where the truth of one statement ensures the truth of another. It is central to conditional logic and validity.

Option D:
Option D, excludes, implies mutual incompatibility or inability to coexist, which again contradicts the idea that the truth of one statement forces the truth of another. Consequently excludes is not suitable.

Sadhya is the intended probandum or target property that the argument seeks to demonstrate about the paksha. In the example, the aim is to show that the hill possesses fire, so "fiery" is the sadhya. All the inferential machinery of hetu, vyapti and example is mobilised to support this claim. Hence the property referred to in the stem is sadhya.

Option A:
Option A is correct because sadhya literally means "that which is to be established" and is used in Nyaya precisely for the attribute whose presence is concluded through inference. It marks the goal of the reasoning.

Option B:
Option B, paksha, is the subject "hill" in which the sadhya is to be proved and cannot itself be the property being predicated.

Option C:
Option C, hetu, denotes the reason "smoke" that supports the conclusion and thus has a different logical role from the probandum.

Option D:
Option D, drstanta, is the illustrative example employed to clarify the hetu–sadhya relation, usually a familiar case such as a kitchen where both smoke and fire co-occur.

Statements A, B, D and E are correct, whereas C and F are false. Simple statements have no smaller statement parts, and compound statements are built from them with connectives. Negation does flip truth values in classical logic, and each atomic statement gets its own column in a truth table. C is wrong because connectives also determine how component truth values combine, and F is wrong because UGC NET questions frequently use compound statements.

Option A:
Option A is incorrect because it leaves out statement E, which accurately describes how truth tables are constructed. While A, B and D are true, omitting E means the answer does not include all correct statements. The description of truth-table practice is therefore incomplete in this option.

Option B:
Option B is correct since it brings together A, B, D and E, the four statements that match standard propositional logic. It excludes C, which ignores the role of connectives, and F, which falsely denies the presence of compound statements in exam questions. This combination therefore reflects both theory and examination practice.

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it includes C along with otherwise correct statements. C claims that connectives do not matter for truth values, which contradicts the whole idea of truth-functional operators. Adding a false statement makes the entire combination unacceptable.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it omits A, the basic definition of a simple statement, and it starts from B. Although B, D and E are true, without A the picture of the distinction between simple and compound statements is incomplete. Thus this option fails to represent the full set of correct statements.

Statements A, B, C and D correctly relate “if”, “only if” and necessary conditions to their symbolic forms, and F is also true, while E is false. The biconditional is true exactly when p and q share the same truth value, not when they differ. Treating “only if” carefully is crucial for distinguishing what is necessary from what is sufficient. Hence the correct set of statements is A, B, C, D and F only.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits D and F, leaving out both the explicit link to necessary conditions and the exam relevance of misreading “only if”. Although A, B, C and E mention some relationships, they include E, which wrongly states the truth pattern of the biconditional. This makes the option incorrect.

Option B:
Option B is wrong because it includes E, which claims that “p if and only if q” is true when p and q differ in truth value. That is the truth condition for exclusive disjunction, not for the biconditional. Including E makes the combination logically inconsistent.

Option C:
Option C is correct as it gathers A, B, C and D, which correctly express equivalences and necessary condition symbolism, and F, which notes the importance of reading these connectives properly in exams. It excludes E, avoiding the confusion between biconditional and exclusive or. This matches standard logical teaching.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect since it omits A and replaces it with B, C, D, E and F. Without A, the equivalence of “p only if q” with “If p then q” is not stated, and including E still misrepresents the truth conditions of the biconditional. Therefore it cannot be the right answer.

Statements A, B, C, D and F are correct, whereas E is false. Looking at differences or ratios is a standard strategy, and some series do mix patterns, making B true. Letter positions and trend recognition also guide solution strategies, and regular practice builds both speed and accuracy. E is wrong because series patterns are not fixed in advance and are part of what examinees must discover. Hence A, B, C, D and F only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits F, which correctly states the value of practice in mastering series questions. While A, B, C and D describe pattern-finding strategies, they do not mention performance improvement through practice. This omission makes the option less comprehensive than the full set of true statements.

Option B:
Option B is correct because it includes all the strategy-related statements along with the point about practice and excludes E, which mischaracterises the nature of test items. It provides both conceptual guidance and exam-related insight. Therefore this option best matches the intended set of correct statements.

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it includes E, which suggests patterns are announced in advance, and it omits A. Accepting E would undermine the challenge of series questions, and leaving out A removes a key analytic technique. As such, B, C, D, E and F only cannot be the right answer.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect since it contains E and omits B and F. Without B, it ignores the possibility of mixed patterns, and without F it misses the role of practice. Including E’s false claim further weakens the combination. Thus A, C, D, E and F only is not acceptable.

Samanya represents the shared nature or universal that is instantiated in many particular objects, enabling us to group them under a common class name. For example, cow-ness is the samanya present in all individual cows. Nyaya-Vaisheshika treats universals as real entities distinct from both individuals and mental constructs. Hence the universal described in the stem is samanya.

Option A:
Option A is correct because samanya literally means “commonness” and designates that which is one in many, grounding our ability to recognise kinds.

Option B:
Option B, vishesha, is the category of particularity that differentiates ultimate entities from one another; it is the opposite of the unifying role of samanya.

Option C:
Option C, dravya, refers to substances that serve as substrates for qualities and universals; universals reside in them but are not identical with them.

Option D:
Option D, guna, denotes qualities such as colour or taste, which inhere in substances but are not the universals under which many individuals are classified.

Statements A, B, C and E correctly contrast reasoning with heavy computation and reflect typical strategies for Paper 1, while D and F are false. Reasoning items emphasise structure, form and pattern rather than formula-heavy calculations, and some are embedded in short data contexts. Managing time by prioritising clearer questions is a sensible exam tactic. D exaggerates the role of memorising formulas, and F is wrong because reasoning can appear in short passages or caselets. Thus A, B, C and E only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it leaves out E, which conveys an important practical strategy for handling reasoning sections efficiently. Without E, the advice on how to approach questions under time pressure is missing. Therefore A, B and C only is not fully adequate.

Option B:
Option B is incorrect since it omits B, one of the core statements about the importance of logical form in syllogisms, and includes only A, C and E. Without B, the nature of syllogistic reasoning is under-described, so the option does not reflect all correct statements.

Option C:
Option C is correct as it combines conceptual and strategic points relevant to UGC NET Paper 1 while excluding D and F, which misrepresent the nature of reasoning items. It aligns with how the exam is designed and taught in coaching materials. Hence this is the right answer.

Option D:
Option D is wrong because it accepts F and omits A, treating passage-based reasoning as non-existent and leaving out the central idea that patterns and structures matter. This mixture of omission and error prevents the option from being correct.

Proof by contrapositive exploits the logical equivalence between a conditional and its contrapositive. Instead of proving "if p, then q" directly, one proves "if not q, then not p". Because these two statements share the same truth conditions, demonstrating the contrapositive suffices to establish the original conditional. Thus the method described is called proof by contrapositive.

Option A:
Option A, proof by cases, involves dividing a problem into exhaustive possibilities and proving the desired conclusion in each case. While also a valid strategy, it does not focus on transforming a conditional into its contrapositive. Hence cases is not correct.

Option B:
Option B, proof by contradiction, proceeds by assuming the negation of what is to be proved and deriving a contradiction, thereby showing the assumption must be false. This is a distinct method and does not necessarily proceed via contrapositive structure.

Option C:
Option C is correct because proof by contrapositive explicitly names the strategy of proving the contrapositive to justify the original "if p, then q". It leverages the equivalence relation discussed earlier and is particularly useful when the direct approach is difficult.

Option D:
Option D, proof by example, at most shows that a statement is true in one or some instances and is usually insufficient to establish universal claims. It does not relate to the contrapositive transformation.

Statements A, B, C, D and E accurately describe the core roles of pakṣa, sādhya, hetu, sapakṣa and vipakṣa, whereas F is false. The hill–smoke–fire example neatly illustrates how these roles work together in an inference. Nyaya insists that the hetu must actually qualify the pakṣa; if the reason is absent there, the inference collapses. Sapakṣa and vipakṣa then help to test the reliability of the connection between hetu and sādhya in other cases. Hence F contradicts a basic requirement of Indian inference theory.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E, failing to mention the important supporting notions of sapakṣa and vipakṣa that appear in many exam items. While A, B, C and D are correct, they do not fully capture the wider inferential context. Therefore A, B, C and D only is not a complete answer.

Option B:
Option B is wrong as it leaves out A and includes only B, C, D and E. Without A, the definition of pakṣa as the locus of inference is missing, even though it is central to the question. This omission means B, C, D and E only cannot be the correct combination.

Option C:
Option C is correct since it gathers all five true statements and excludes F, which wrongly allows a hetu that does not apply to the pakṣa. It presents the standard structure of Indian inference as taught in UGC NET syllabi. Hence A, B, C, D and E only is the appropriate answer.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it omits B, leaving out the definition of sādhya as the probandum, and includes only A, C, D and E. Without B, the description of the inferential triad is incomplete. As such, this option does not represent all the correct statements.

A universal negative proposition has the standard form “No S are P”. It asserts that there is no overlap between the subject class and the predicate class. In traditional terminology this is an E-type proposition, combining universal quantity with negative quality. Thus the complete denial described in the stem is characteristic of a universal negative proposition.

Option A:
Option A, particular affirmative, states that some S are P and thus allows at least one member of the subject class to belong to the predicate class. This is incompatible with the idea that no members belong. Therefore it cannot be correct.

Option B:
Option B is correct because universal negative precisely captures a statement that excludes every subject from the predicate class. This form is central to syllogistic reasoning and to the square of opposition.

Option C:
Option C, universal affirmative, asserts that all S are P, which is the opposite in quality and cannot describe a total denial. It would contradict the kind of proposition mentioned in the question.

Option D:
Option D, particular negative, says that some S are not P, leaving open the possibility that other S might be P. It denies the predicate only of some members, not of all, and so does not fit the stem.

Kevalavyatireki inference obtains vyapti from observations that wherever the sadhya is absent, the hetu is also absent, without finding any positive instance of their co-presence. The relation is thus supported solely by negative concomitance. Nyaya treats this as a distinctive pattern of inferential support. Therefore the type of inference mentioned in the stem is kevalavyatireki.

Option A:
Option A, kevalanvayi, depends exclusively on positive instances and does not appeal to joint absences, making it structurally different from what is described.

Option B:
Option B, anvayavyatireki, integrates both affirmative and negative cases and is more inclusive than the purely negative evidence scenario here.

Option C:
Option C, purvavat, classifies inference by its cause-to-effect temporal direction rather than by the pattern of positive or negative instances used to establish vyapti.

Option D:
Option D is correct because kevalavyatireki literally means "only by negative concomitance" and is defined in Nyaya precisely in terms of reliance on shared absences for establishing the universal relation.