UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Statements A, B, C, D and E correctly describe the threefold division of inference, whereas F is false. Pūrvavat and śeṣavat explicitly connect cause and effect in opposite directions, and sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa depends on regular associations not tied to a clear causal order. All three are grounded in vyāpti, the invariable relation between hetu and sādhya, even if the way we become aware of that relation differs. Exam questions may present familiar examples and ask which type is illustrated. Hence A, B, C, D and E only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E, failing to mention how these distinctions are used in UGC NET questions. Although A, B, C and D are conceptually correct, they lack the explicit exam connection. Therefore this option is not fully satisfactory.

Option B:
Option B is wrong since it includes F, which denies the role of vyāpti in these inferences. In Nyaya, the reliability of any anumāna depends on an underlying vyāpti, so claiming independence contradicts the theory. Including F makes the combination inconsistent.

Option C:
Option C is incorrect because it leaves out A and includes F, thus losing the description of pūrvavat while accepting the false claim about vyāpti. Without A, one of the three types is not represented, and with F, the relation to invariable concomitance is misdescribed.

Option D:
Option D is correct as it gathers all true statements about the threefold classification and its testing in exams while excluding the one statement that wrongly severs the link with vyāpti. It therefore matches the Indian logic account used in UGC NET.

Sesavat anumana proceeds from the experience of a current effect to the conclusion that an appropriate cause has already occurred. Seeing a river in spate, one infers that heavy rain has fallen upstream. The temporal order here goes from later effect back to earlier cause. This is precisely the pattern Nyaya calls sesavat inference.

Option A:
Option A is correct because sesavat suggests "like the remainder", implying that what is now present points back to something previously existing that explains it. It captures the explanatory move from observed consequence to unobserved origin.

Option B:
Option B, purvavat, is the opposite pattern, where one infers a future effect from a present cause, and so does not match the example in the stem.

Option C:
Option C, samanyatodrsta, rests on general uniformities of co-existence that may not involve a clear causal sequence, which is different from the strongly causal flavour of the swollen river case.

Option D:
Option D, kevalanvayi, describes a pattern of vyapti based solely on positive instances and is not a temporal classification of inference.

Sesavat anumana moves from a known effect to an unknown cause, as when one sees a flooded field and infers that it must have rained earlier. The conclusion concerns a prior event that explains the present state. Nyaya highlights such reasoning as a distinct type because the temporal order runs from later to earlier. Thus the inference described in the stem is sesavat anumana.

Option A:
Option A, purvavat, runs in the opposite direction from cause to future effect and does not fit cases where the cause is inferred after the effect.

Option B:
Option B is correct because sesavat literally means “like the remainder” and is used for inference where an unseen cause is posited to explain a presently experienced effect.

Option C:
Option C, samanyatodrsta, deals with general regularities not necessarily grounded in specific causal chains and so does not capture the effect-to-cause structure.

Option D:
Option D, kevalavyatireki, classifies inference by the pattern of vyapti, relying only on negative concomitance, which is a different basis of division.

Sesavat anumana moves from the experience of a current effect to the conclusion that an appropriate cause must have occurred earlier. Seeing a swollen river and inferring that there has been heavy rain upstream exemplifies this pattern. The temporal direction is from later effect back to prior cause. Thus the type of inference described in the stem is sesavat.

Option A:
Option A is correct because sesavat traditionally stands for inference "like the remainder," where what is now present implies something previously existing that accounts for it. It captures the explanatory move from observed consequence to unobserved origin.

Option B:
Option B, purvavat, infers future effects from present causes and thus cannot represent the effect-to-cause reasoning at issue.

Option C:
Option C, samanyatodrsta, draws on general correlations not necessarily tied to a specific causal sequence, which is different from the cause–effect structure here.

Option D:
Option D, kevalavyatireki, concerns how vyapti is established (only through negative instances) and does not directly specify temporal direction.