UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Statements A, B, C, E and F correctly summarise the traditional conditions for a proper hetu, while D is false. The hetu must qualify the pakṣa, coincide with the sādhya in positive instances and be absent when the sādhya is absent, thereby supporting a reliable vyāpti. If any of these conditions fail, the middle term can become fallacious, which is what hetvābhāsa denotes. D is wrong because a sādhāraṇa hetu that spreads across vipakṣa as well is defective, not strong. UGC NET may test recognition of which condition is violated in sample inferences.

Option A:
Option A is correct since it includes the three core lakṣaṇas of a valid hetu, the connection to hetvābhāsa and the exam-oriented point about identifying violations. It excludes D, which elevates a defective sādhāraṇa hetu to a strong one, contradicting standard accounts. Thus this option accurately represents the set of correct statements.

Option B:
Option B is incomplete because it omits E and F, leaving out both the link to fallacious reasoning and the exam application. While A, B and C are true, they do not show what happens when the conditions fail or how they are tested. Therefore A, B and C only is not fully adequate.

Option C:
Option C is also incomplete as it leaves out F, the statement about UGC NET questions explicitly using these conditions. Without F, the answer does not reflect the way the topic appears in the syllabus. Hence A, B, C and E only cannot be the best choice.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it omits A and includes only B, C, E and F. Without A, the requirement that the hetu be present in the pakṣa itself is missing, which is fundamental. This omission means the option does not incorporate all the correct statements in the list.

Nyaya logic describes a five-membered inferential structure consisting of pratijñā (proposition), hetu (reason), udāharaṇa or dṛṣṭānta (example), upanaya (application) and nigamana (conclusion). Pramāṇa, meaning means of valid knowledge, is an important epistemological category in Indian philosophy but is not listed as one of these five components of a single inferential act. Therefore, it does not belong in the avayava sequence.

Option A:
Option A, pratijñā, is indeed the first member, stating the thesis that is to be proved.

Option B:
Option B, hetu, gives the reason or ground for the thesis and is a recognised member of the five-part structure.

Option C:
Option C, dṛṣṭānta, provides a familiar example to illustrate the universal concomitance and is also part of the classical scheme.

Option D:
Option D names a broader notion related to sources of knowledge, not a specific segment of the fivefold inferential form, so it is the one that does not fit.

In classical Indian logic, pratyaksha is the pramana that denotes direct perception. It is knowledge gained through immediate contact of the senses with their objects, free from error and distortion. This form of cognition is considered foundational for empirical awareness. Hence the type of knowledge described in the stem is called pratyaksha.

Option A:
Option A, anumana, refers to inference, where knowledge arises from reasoning based on signs or evidence. It is mediated, not direct, and therefore differs from sense perception. So anumana is not the right answer.

Option B:
Option B correctly identifies pratyaksha as sense perception or direct awareness of objects. It contrasts with inferential and testimonial sources of knowledge. Therefore pratyaksha is the most accurate term here.

Option C:
Option C, upamana, denotes knowledge by comparison or analogy, such as learning about an unknown object by comparing it with a known one. This is again different from immediate sensory contact. Thus upamana does not fit the description.

Option D:
Option D, sabda, is verbal testimony, especially authoritative or scriptural knowledge. It relies on trustworthy speakers rather than direct sensory experience. Therefore sabda cannot be the correct answer to this question.

Paksha refers to the subject about which something is to be inferred, such as the hill in "The hill is fiery because it has smoke". It is the locus where the reason is observed and where the property to be proved is asserted. Identifying the paksha makes clear the scope of the inferential claim. Hence the subject described in the stem is called paksha.

Option A:
Option A, sapaksha, is the collection of similar instances where both hetu and sadhya are present, used to support vyapti. These are positive examples, not the particular subject under direct consideration. Therefore sapaksha is not correct.

Option B:
Option B, vipaksha, denotes dissimilar instances where the sadhya is absent and typically the hetu should also be absent. They test the universality of the vyapti but are not the main locus of inference. Thus vipaksha does not fit the stem.

Option C:
Option C is correct because paksha explicitly names the individual case about which the inference is being made. It is central to understanding who or what the conclusion is intended to apply to.

Option D:
Option D, hetu, is the reason or middle term cited to justify the sadhya, such as "having smoke". It is a property of the paksha rather than the paksha itself, so it cannot be the answer here.

Vyāpti is the technical term in Nyāya logic that refers to the universal, invariable relation between the reason (hetu) and the probandum (sādhya). It is the guarantee that wherever the hetu is present, the sādhya is also present, as in the relation between smoke and fire in proper cases. This invariable concomitance is what justifies moving from the presence of the sign to the conclusion about what it signifies. Without established vyāpti, inference would lack logical force.

Option A:
Option A refers to nigamana, the concluding statement of the five-membered inference, not the relation between reason and probandum.

Option B:
Option B points to the middle term, hetu, which is the sign in the minor term, but vyāpti concerns the relation involving this term, not the term itself.

Option C:
Option C correctly identifies vyāpti as the pervading relation, often described as “wherever smoke, there fire,” which underlies the possibility of anumāna.

Option D:
Option D is dṛṣṭānta or udāharaṇa, the example that illustrates the universal relation, distinct from the relation itself.

Pratyaksha is the Nyaya term for perceptual knowledge obtained through immediate contact of the senses with their appropriate objects. It is regarded as a primary and direct means of knowledge, prior to inference and other mediate processes. Nyaya further analyses pratyaksha into ordinary and extraordinary forms depending on the manner of contact. Hence the kind of direct knowledge described in the stem is called pratyaksha.

Option A:
Option A, anumana, refers to inference as a means of knowledge where one moves from a perceived sign to an unperceived object through recognised concomitance. It is mediate, not direct, and so does not match the description of immediate sensory contact.

Option B:
Option B is correct because pratyaksha literally means perception and is defined in Nyaya as knowledge produced by the operation of sense organs on objects, free from defects and doubt. This aligns closely with the wording of the question.

Option C:
Option C, upamana, is knowledge gained by comparison or analogy, such as recognising an unknown animal by comparing it with a description of a known one. It is neither direct sensory contact nor simple inference.

Option D:
Option D, sabda, is verbal testimony, particularly from reliable or authoritative sources. It delivers knowledge through language rather than through direct perceptual contact with objects.

Nigamana is the concluding member of the Nyaya five-part inference in which the original thesis is reasserted as proved. It summarises the effect of hetu, drstanta and upanaya, affirming that the sadhya holds in the paksha. In this way it functions like the conclusion of a Western syllogism. Thus the restated and established thesis described in the stem is called nigamana.

Option A:
Option A, pratijna, is the initial assertion of the thesis before any support is provided. It introduces the claim rather than concluding it.

Option B:
Option B, hetu, supplies the reason or ground for the thesis but is not itself the final summarising statement.

Option C:
Option C, upanaya, applies the universal relation to the paksha, paving the way for the conclusion but not replacing it.

Option D:
Option D is correct because nigamana literally means “drawing together” and marks the completion of the inferential process with a confirmed statement.

Nyāya distinguishes prior non existence (prāgabhāva), posterior non existence (pradhvaṃsābhāva), mutual non existence (anyonyābhāva) and absolute non existence (atyantābhāva). Eternal absence of impossible entities such as “horns of a hare” is the standard example of atyantābhāva, since such things are absent in all places and at all times.

Option A:
Option A reverses the terms: the absence after destruction is pradhvaṃsābhāva, not prāgabhāva.

Option B:
Option B also reverses: absence before production is prāgabhāva, not pradhvaṃsābhāva.

Option C:
Option C correctly matches atyantābhāva with the eternal absence of “horns of a hare” on any real animal.

Option D:
Option D misuses anyonyābhāva; mutual non existence concerns, for example, “pot is not cloth and cloth is not pot,” not the temporal absence of a pot on a floor.

Statements A, B, C, E and F are correct, whereas D is false. Svarthānumāna is an internal inference process for oneself, while parārthānumāna is the externally presented inference to persuade others. The five-member Nyaya syllogism exemplifies parārthānumāna, and its clear stages help an audience track the reasoning, which is why UGC NET can test identification of these steps. D is wrong because svarthānumāna does not require verbal expression of all five members; the inferential process may remain implicit in the thinker’s mind. Thus A, B, C, E and F only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is correct because it includes all the true statements about the distinction between private and public inference while excluding D, which overstates the formality required in svarthānumāna. It reflects both the theoretical framework and its examination relevance. Therefore it is the best answer.

Option B:
Option B is incomplete as it omits F, ignoring the exam-oriented point that candidates may be asked to map sentences to steps of the Nyaya syllogism. Although A, B, C and E are true, leaving out F makes the combination less aligned with UGC NET practice. Hence it cannot be accepted.

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it omits A and includes only B, C, E and F. Without A, the nature of svarthānumāna as personal inference is not mentioned, which weakens the conceptual contrast. Thus B, C, E and F only does not represent all correct statements.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect since it accepts D, which incorrectly demands verbalisation of all five members in svarthānumāna, and omits B. This reverses the distinction between inner and outer inference and distorts the Nyaya account. Therefore A, C, D, E and F only cannot be chosen.

Kevalanvayi inference rests on vyapti that is affirmed solely through cases of joint presence; there is no instance where the hetu occurs apart from the sadhya. Thus only positive concomitance is used to secure the relation. A classic example is inferring “pot is nameable” from “pot is knowable” when all knowables are nameable. Hence the pattern described in the stem is kevalanvayi.

Option A:
Option A, kevalavyatireki, relies only on negative instances where both hetu and sadhya are absent together and has no positive sapaksha cases, the opposite emphasis from kevalanvayi.

Option B:
Option B, anvayavyatireki, uses both positive and negative instances together to establish vyapti and is broader than the purely positive case discussed here.

Option C:
Option C, samanyatodrsta, is a different classification based on general regularity, not on whether vyapti is known from positive or negative instances.

Option D:
Option D is correct because kevalanvayi literally means “only by affirmative concomitance,” which matches the condition of having no counter-instance of hetu without sadhya.

Hetvabhasa literally means “that which looks like a hetu” but is not genuinely connected to the sadhya by vyapti. Such a reason may resemble a valid hetu in form yet lacks the necessary conditions for successful inference. Recognising hetvabhasas helps one detect fallacies in argumentation. Therefore the deceptive reason described in the stem is called hetvabhasa.

Option A:
Option A, vyapti, is the genuine universal concomitance between hetu and sadhya and is a mark of validity, not fallacy.

Option B:
Option B, drstanta, is the illustrative example used to show the connection between hetu and sadhya; it may support or reveal a fallacy but is not itself the erroneous reason described.

Option C:
Option C is correct because hetvabhasa covers the standard categories of faulty reasons such as savyabhicara, viruddha and asiddha. Each instance looks like a reason but fails on closer analysis.

Option D:
Option D, paksha, is the subject of inference and cannot be equated with the defective reason used within the argument.

Statements A, B, D and E correctly characterise asiddha hetu as a middle term that is not properly established, either because it does not qualify the pakṣa or is itself impossible, and note its place in UGC NET questions. C is false because a hetu present in the pakṣa but absent in all sapakṣa cases is rather an example of asādhāraṇa or improperly restricted reason, not simply asiddha. Thus the true statements are A, B, D and E only.

Option A:
Option A is correct since it includes all the accurate descriptions and the exam-related remark, while excluding C which mislabels a different defect as asiddha. It reflects the standard Nyaya classification of hetvābhāsa.

Option B:
Option B is incomplete because it omits E, failing to mention that UGC NET often provides examples of such fallacious reasons in the options. Without E, the exam application of the concept is missing.

Option C:
Option C is incorrect as it drops A, losing the basic idea that asiddha hetu is unestablished in the pakṣa, and it also keeps an incomplete/incorrect mix. So it does not include all true statements.

Option D:
Option D is wrong because it keeps C (false) and omits B (true), so it cannot be the correct combination.

Paksha in Indian logic denotes the subject or locus where the hetu, the middle term, is affirmed. It is the specific case about which the inference is being made. Knowing the paksha helps identify where the conclusion is intended to hold. Therefore the term described in the stem is paksha.

Option A:
Option A correctly names paksha as the subject of inference in which the middle term is present. It is the focus of the inferential claim that the sadhya applies there. Hence this option matches the description.

Option B:
Option B, sapaksha, refers to similar instances where both hetu and sadhya are present, used to illustrate the universal relation. These are examples, not the primary subject of inference. Thus sapaksha is not the correct answer.

Option C:
Option C, vipaksha, denotes counter-instances where the sadhya is absent and typically the hetu should also be absent. It serves to test the universality of vyapti rather than naming the subject of inference. Therefore vipaksha is not appropriate here.

Option D:
Option D, sadhya, is the property to be proved in the paksha, such as “fiery” in “the hill is fiery”. It is the predicate to be established, not the subject itself. Hence sadhya cannot be the correct answer.

Pratijna is the first member of the Nyaya inference that clearly states what is to be proved. It combines the paksha and sadhya into a single assertion, guiding the listener to the intended conclusion. Subsequent steps supply reasons and examples to support this thesis. Hence the initial statement described in the stem is called pratijna.

Option A:
Option A, upanaya, is the fourth step that applies the general rule to the paksha and therefore cannot be the opening thesis.

Option B:
Option B is correct because pratijna explicitly names the declarative starting point of the argument. Without stating the pratijna, the inferential chain would lack direction and purpose.

Option C:
Option C, nigamana, is the final step where the thesis is restated as established, not the initial proposal.

Option D:
Option D, hetu, is the reason given in favour of the pratijna, usually introduced as the second member of the inference.

Kevalavyatireki anumāna relies purely on negative instances to establish vyāpti. We see that in all cases where the probandum is absent, the middle term is likewise absent. From this consistent absence, the presence of the hetu in a new case is taken to imply the presence of the sādhya. It is thus an absence based counterpart to the purely positive kevalānvayi pattern.

Option A:
Option A describes kevalānvayi, which uses only positive cases and no observed negatives.

Option B:
Option B correctly states that kevalavyatireki is grounded in negative concomitance where every sādhya negative case is also hetu negative.

Option C:
Option C outlines anvayavyatireki, which combines both positive and negative instances to establish vyāpti.

Option D:
Option D shifts attention to scripture; that may provide content for inferences, but it is not what distinguishes kevalavyatireki as a logical pattern.