UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Pramana is defined as the instrument or means that produces valid cognition. It connects the knower to the knowable object in a trustworthy way. Different systems list different numbers of pramanas, but all treat pramana as the technical term for a source of knowledge. Therefore the generic means of valid knowledge mentioned in the stem is called pramana.

Option A:
Option A is correct because pramana names the channel such as perception or inference through which knowledge arises. It focuses on the causal or justificatory route by which the cognition is obtained. Without pramana there would be no recognised basis for calling a cognition valid.

Option B:
Option B, prameya, is the object about which knowledge is obtained, like a pot or a cloth, not the means that produces the cognition. It is what is known, not the instrument of knowing. Hence it does not fit the description of a means.

Option C:
Option C, pramata, is the knowing subject who experiences the cognition. While essential to the knowledge situation, the subject is not termed the means of knowing. Thus pramata cannot fill the blank.

Option D:
Option D, pramiti, denotes the resultant valid cognition or knowledge produced by a pramana. It is the outcome in the epistemic process, not the instrument that yields it.

In Indian epistemology, pramāṇa denotes the reliable means through which valid cognition or true knowledge is obtained. Schools like Nyāya classify perception, inference, comparison and testimony as distinct pramāṇas. The focus is not on the object or the knower, but on the channels that justify a cognition as trustworthy. Thus, pramāṇa is central to debates about how we know what we claim to know.

Option A:
Option A confuses pramāṇa with prameya, which is the object that is known, not the means of knowing.

Option B:
Option B correctly identifies pramāṇa as the valid means of knowledge, emphasising the instrumentality and reliability that makes a cognition pramā.

Option C:
Option C aligns more with pramātṛ, the subject or knower, which is a different element of the knowledge situation.

Option D:
Option D wrongly restricts pramāṇa to inference alone; while anumāna is one pramāṇa, most classical systems acknowledge several distinct pramāṇas.

Vyāpti is the technical term in Nyāya logic that refers to the universal, invariable relation between the reason (hetu) and the probandum (sādhya). It is the guarantee that wherever the hetu is present, the sādhya is also present, as in the relation between smoke and fire in proper cases. This invariable concomitance is what justifies moving from the presence of the sign to the conclusion about what it signifies. Without established vyāpti, inference would lack logical force.

Option A:
Option A refers to nigamana, the concluding statement of the five-membered inference, not the relation between reason and probandum.

Option B:
Option B points to the middle term, hetu, which is the sign in the minor term, but vyāpti concerns the relation involving this term, not the term itself.

Option C:
Option C correctly identifies vyāpti as the pervading relation, often described as “wherever smoke, there fire,” which underlies the possibility of anumāna.

Option D:
Option D is dṛṣṭānta or udāharaṇa, the example that illustrates the universal relation, distinct from the relation itself.