Q: Which of the following statements about pramāṇa acceptance in Advaita Vedānta are correct?
(A) Advaita Vedānta commonly accepts six pramāṇas, including perception, inference and scripture;
(B) These six usually include arthāpatti and anupalabdhi in addition to Nyaya’s four;
(C) All Vedānta schools reduce arthāpatti and anupalabdhi to inference and perception;
(D) UGC NET questions may ask which schools accept more than four pramāṇas;
(E) Nyaya accepts exactly the same list of pramāṇas as Advaita Vedānta;
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Q: Which of the following statements about Cārvāka (Lokāyata) view are correct?
(A) Cārvāka is often described as a materialist school emphasising this-worldly enjoyment;
(B) It accepts perception as the primary means of valid knowledge;
(C) It uncritically accepts Vedic ritual and sacrifices as sources of knowledge;
(D) It shows scepticism toward inference that goes beyond direct experience;
(E) In UGC NET syllabus, Cārvāka appears under Indian logic and epistemology topics;
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Q: Which of the following statements about Jaina syādvāda (doctrine of conditional predication) are correct?
(A) Syādvāda holds that any metaphysical statement is true only under certain conditions or standpoints (naya);
(B) It emphasises that reality has many aspects, so no single, unconditional assertion captures it fully;
(C) The use of “syāt” (“from a certain standpoint, it is”) reflects a logical caution in making claims;
(D) Syādvāda denies that any statement can be meaningful, since all are equally false;
(E) UGC NET questions may ask which school is associated with syādvāda and anekāntavāda (non-one-sidedness);
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Q: Which of the following statements about satkāryavāda and asatkāryavāda are correct?
(A) Sāṃkhya supports satkāryavāda, the view that the effect pre-exists in its material cause;
(B) Nyaya–Vaiśeṣika generally supports asatkāryavāda, the view that the effect is a new creation;
(C) Satkāryavāda implies that nothing genuinely new ever appears, only transformation of what is already there;
(D) In Indian philosophical debates, causal theories like satkāryavāda and asatkāryavāda have no relation to logical reasoning;
(E) UGC NET Indian philosophy questions sometimes ask to match schools with satkāryavāda or asatkāryavāda;
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Q: Which of the following statements about anupalabdhi (non-perception) are correct?
(A) Anupalabdhi is accepted by some schools as an independent pramāṇa for knowing absence;
(B) It allows us to cognise that a pot is absent on the floor when we fail to perceive it under suitable conditions;
(C) All schools of Indian philosophy unanimously reject anupalabdhi as redundant;
(D) Anupalabdhi is mainly used to establish the presence of objects, not their absence;
(E) UGC NET Indian logic questions may directly mention anupalabdhi in options;
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Q: Which of the following statements about naya (standpoint theory) in Jaina logic are correct?
(A) Naya refers to partial standpoints from which reality is described;
(B) Different nayas capture different aspects of the same complex reality;
(C) Each naya is absolutely complete and needs no supplementation from other standpoints;
(D) Naya doctrine supports the broader Jaina ideas of anekāntavāda and syādvāda;
(E) UGC NET Indian philosophy questions may ask to identify the relation between naya and anekāntavāda;
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Q: Which of the following statements about viruddha and bādhita hetu in Indian logic are correct?
(A) A viruddha hetu is a middle term that actually establishes the opposite of the intended sādhya;
(B) In bādhita hetu, the supposed reason is contradicted (bādhita) by stronger evidence such as perception or scripture;
(C) Both viruddha and bādhita hetu are classified as hetvābhāsa (fallacious middle) in Nyaya;
(D) A viruddha hetu is considered ideal because it proves more than what the arguer originally claimed;
(E) UGC NET questions may provide examples and ask which defect is illustrated by a given hetu;
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Q: Which of the following statements about arthāpatti (postulation) as a pramāṇa are correct?
(A) Arthāpatti is a kind of inference where the middle term is always directly perceived in the pakṣa;
(B) A classic example is: seeing that Devadatta is stout but never eats during the day, we postulate that he must be eating at night;
(C) Arthāpatti is often described as postulating a fact that, if true, would make an otherwise inexplicable observation intelligible;
(D) Some Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta authors treat arthāpatti as an independent pramāṇa distinct from inference;
(E) UGC NET Indian philosophy questions may ask which schools recognise arthāpatti or to identify its example;
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Q: Which of the following statements about the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness (kṣaṇikatvāda) are correct?
(A) According to the doctrine of momentariness, all conditioned things exist only for a moment;
(B) The doctrine is used to argue that enduring substances are ultimately unreal;
(C) Nyaya fully agrees with Buddhist momentariness without objection;
(D) The doctrine influences Buddhist accounts of causation and self;
(E) UGC NET Indian philosophy questions may link momentariness to logical reasoning about change;
Choose the correct answer from the options given below:
Q: Which of the following statements about padārtha (categories) in classical Nyaya–Vaisheshika are correct?
(A) Padārtha refers to what can be named and known, broadly “object of knowledge”;
(B) Classical lists include categories like substance (dravya), quality (guṇa) and motion (karma);
(C) Universal (sāmānya) and particularity (viśeṣa) are also counted among padārthas;
(D) Cognition (buddhi/jñāna) is never treated as a padārtha in any Indian system;
(E) UGC NET questions may ask which of the listed items is a Nyaya–Vaisheshika padārtha;
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Q: Which of the following statements about pramāṇas in Nyaya and other schools are correct?
(A) Nyaya recognises perception, inference, comparison (upamāna) and verbal testimony (śabda) as four independent pramāṇas;
(B) In Nyaya, comparison (upamāna) involves knowing the relation between a word and its object through similarity;
(C) Verbal testimony in Nyaya is confined only to sacred scriptures and is never extended to ordinary trustworthy persons;
(D) Some other schools, such as Mīmāṃsā, add arthāpatti and anupalabdhi to the list of pramāṇas;
(E) Cārvāka accepts all four Nyaya pramāṇas along with additional sources of valid knowledge;
(F) UGC NET questions on pramāṇas may provide lists and ask which belong specifically to Nyaya;
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Q: Which of the following statements about Buddhist logic and apoha theory are correct?
(A) Many Buddhist logicians, such as Dignāga, accept only two main pramāṇas: perception and inference;
(B) In the Buddhist apoha theory, a general term signifies an object by excluding what it is not;
(C) Buddhist logicians often emphasise momentariness (kṣaṇikatva) of dharmas, which influences their analysis of inference;
(D) According to Buddhist epistemology, verbal testimony (śabda) is treated as an entirely independent pramāṇa separate from inference;
(E) Some Buddhist texts critically engage with Nyaya views on perception and inference;
(F) UGC NET questions may test awareness that Buddhist logic differs from Nyaya in both ontology and epistemology;
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Q: Which of the following statements about perception (pratyakṣa) in Nyaya are correct?
(A) In Nyaya, pratyakṣa (perception) is considered a direct means of knowledge produced by sense-object contact;
(B) Savikalpa perception is determinate awareness where the object is cognised along with its name and properties;
(C) Nirvikalpa perception is sometimes described as indeterminate awareness prior to conceptualisation;
(D) Illusion (mithyājñāna) is counted as a separate valid pramāṇa in Nyaya;
(E) UGC NET questions may ask which among given options count as types of perceptual cognition;
(F) All Indian schools deny that perception can ever be erroneous;
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Q: Which of the following statements about the Buddhist trairūpya (three marks of a valid reason) are correct?
(A) The hetu must be present in the pakṣa (subject of inference);
(B) The hetu must be present in all sapakṣa cases where the sādhya is present;
(C) The hetu must be absent in all vipakṣa cases where the sādhya is absent;
(D) The hetu may freely occur in vipakṣa cases without affecting validity;
(E) UGC NET questions on Indian logic may test recognition of these three conditions in examples;
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Q: Which of the following statements about theories of illusion (khyāti) in Indian epistemology are correct?
(A) In Nyaya, illusion is often explained by misapplying a remembered property to a present perceptual content, as in seeing silver in mother-of-pearl;
(B) This explanation is sometimes described as anyathā-khyāti, where something is presented as something else;
(C) Advaita Vedānta explains illusion differently, often through anirvacanīya-khyāti, claiming the illusory object is indescribable as real or unreal;
(D) Both schools agree that illusions are genuine pramāṇas in the sense of yielding true knowledge;
(E) UGC NET questions may compare these theories as part of Indian logic and epistemology;
(F) Khyāti-vāda as a topic concerns theories of erroneous cognition;
Choose the correct answer from the options given below:

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