UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Statements A, B, D and E correctly present naya as a theory of partial standpoints connected with anekāntavāda and syādvāda, whereas C is false. Each standpoint reveals only one facet of a many-sided reality and thus is incomplete by itself, requiring other nayas for a fuller picture. This supports the Jain doctrine of non-one-sidedness and conditional predication. UGC NET may ask candidates to relate naya to anekāntavāda, so E is true.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E, leaving out the explicit exam relevance about relating naya to anekāntavāda. A, B, D only therefore does not fully meet the requirements of the question.

Option B:
Option B is correct since it brings together all the correct statements and excludes C, which wrongly claims that each standpoint is absolutely complete. This option reflects the Jain emphasis on partial viewpoints and matches exam-style questions.

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it leaves out A, not mentioning that naya itself refers to such standpoints, and so B, D, E only provides an incomplete description. Missing A makes the set insufficient.

Option D:
Option D is also incorrect as it omits B, losing the idea that different nayas capture different aspects of the same object. A, D, E only therefore does not give the full set of true statements required.

Statements A, B, D and E correctly describe syādvāda as conditional predication rooted in many-sidedness, whereas C is false. Syādvāda does not deny meaningful discourse; it insists that meaningful statements be qualified by standpoint and respect, acknowledging the complexity of reality. The word “syāt” captures this conditionality, and its connection with anekāntavāda is a standard theme in Jain philosophy. UGC NET questions may explicitly contrast this with absolutist views that claim unqualified truth. So A, B, D, E only is the correct set.

Option A:
Option A is correct as it collects all accurate doctrinal and exam-related points while excluding C, which misinterprets syādvāda as sceptical silence rather than responsible qualification. This matches mainstream presentations in Indian logic materials.

Option B:
Option B is incomplete because it omits D, leaving out the crucial connection to anekāntavāda, and thus A, B, E only does not fully characterise syādvāda.

Option C:
Option C is wrong since it leaves out A and still does not identify C as false, and B, D, E only fails to mention that judgements are conditional from the outset, weakening the explanation.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect as it includes C, thereby suggesting that syādvāda negates meaningful discourse, which contradicts its actual aim. A, C, D, E only therefore mixes a false claim with true ones.

Jain thinkers distinguish between direct and indirect forms of valid knowledge. The direct form is called pratyaksha and the indirect form is called paroksha. This basic division underlies further sub-classifications such as empirical and transcendental perception. Thus, the pair mentioned in the stem is pratyaksha and paroksha.

Option A:
Option A is correct because pratyaksha literally means what is "before the eyes" and stands in contrast to paroksha, which is "beyond the eyes" or indirect. The Jaina framework of pramanas begins from this fundamental bifurcation.

Option B:
Option B, sabda, is verbal testimony and is usually counted as a kind of paroksha rather than as the direct counterpart to it. It cannot complete the basic dichotomy introduced in the question.

Option C:
Option C, anumana, is inference, which again belongs on the side of indirect knowledge rather than being placed opposite to it.

Option D:
Option D, upamana, is comparison-based cognition and, like anumana and sabda, is treated as a mediated form of knowing, not as the direct pole of the distinction.