UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Jnanalaksana pratyaksha occurs when an earlier cognition leaves an impression that later functions as a medium for awareness of an object, often across sensory modalities. For example, recognising fire by seeing only the glow after previously perceiving both flame and heat involves this kind of perception. The new awareness is not due to fresh, full sense contact but to the residual trace of past knowledge. Thus the perception described is jnanalaksana.

Option A:
Option A, yogaja, is yogic perception whose distinctive feature is its origin in yogic discipline rather than reliance on prior ordinary cognitions; it is not defined by the role of memory-impressions in the same way.

Option B:
Option B is correct because jnanalaksana literally points to cognition as the mark through which something is perceived, highlighting the mediating role of previous knowledge. It belongs to the alaukika class for Nyaya.

Option C:
Option C, samanyalaksana, deals with perception of universals through many particulars and does not primarily explain cases where a single earlier cognition conditions a later awareness.

Option D:
Option D, sabda, is verbal testimony and does not directly involve perception based on prior sense impressions.

Statements A, B, C and E are correct, while D is false. Sāṃkhya defends satkāryavāda by arguing that effects pre-exist in causes and only manifest through change, while Nyaya–Vaiśeṣika typically adopts asatkāryavāda, treating effects as new entities produced by combinations. Satkāryavāda emphasises transformation rather than creation ex nihilo, so it suggests no entirely new properties arise. These causal theories underpin many logical arguments in Indian philosophy, and UGC NET often tests matching of schools with these positions. Hence A, B, C, E only is the correct set.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E, disregarding the exam-focused part of the question about matching schools with doctrines. A, B, C only thus does not fully answer the stem.

Option B:
Option B is wrong as it leaves out C, dropping the explanation that satkāryavāda stresses transformation rather than novelty, and therefore A, B, E only under-explains the doctrine.

Option C:
Option C is incorrect since it omits A and substitutes only B, C, E, which fails to mention explicitly that Sāṃkhya is the main satkāryavāda exponent. B, C, E only thus provides an incomplete association.

Option D:
Option D is correct because it includes all true doctrinal and exam-related statements and excludes D, which wrongly disconnects causal theories from logical reasoning. This matches standard textbook treatments of these views.

Samanya is the universal that is instantiated in many individual substances and allows us to group them under a common name. It is numerically one yet present in multiple loci, such as pot-ness in all pots. Nyaya-Vaisheshika treats universals as real entities distinct from both particulars and purely mental constructs. Thus the common nature described in the stem is samanya.

Option A:
Option A, dravya, refers to substances like earth or water that serve as substrata for universals and qualities but are not themselves the unifying properties.

Option B:
Option B, guna, denotes qualities such as colour or taste that inhere in substances and may vary from one instance to another, unlike universals which are shared.

Option C:
Option C is correct because samanya literally means "commonness" and explains how many individuals can fall under a single class-concept. It plays a central role in realist accounts of universals in Indian metaphysics.

Option D:
Option D, vishesha, stands for ultimate particularity that differentiates entities rather than unifying them, so it is conceptually opposite to samanya.

Samavaya is the special relation that connects entities which cannot exist separately, such as a substance and its qualities or a whole and its component parts. Ordinary relations like contact are considered too weak to capture this intimate ontological tie. Nyaya-Vaisheshika therefore treats samavaya as a distinct, eternal category. The inseparable bonding described in the stem is precisely this relation of samavaya.

Option A:
Option A, samanya, denotes universals or common properties shared by many individuals and is not itself a relation of inherence between different entities.

Option B:
Option B is correct because samavaya literally connotes "co-existence" in a particularly strong sense and is explicitly defined as the relation that explains why certain items cannot be separated without destruction.

Option C:
Option C, abhava, refers to non-existence or absence and thus cannot function as the glue that unites substances with their qualities or parts.

Option D:
Option D, vishesha, is the category of ultimate particularity that individuates entities rather than the relation that holds them together.

Analogical reasoning proceeds by comparing a target case with a source case and arguing that because they share relevant similarities, the target likely shares additional properties possessed by the source. Its strength depends on the number, relevance and systematic nature of these similarities and on the absence of important differences. This form of reasoning is widely used in law, ethics and everyday decision-making. Therefore the reasoning described in the stem is analogical reasoning.

Option A:
Option A, deductive, involves deriving conclusions that follow necessarily from premises, often using general principles applied to specific cases. While analogies may appear in deductive arguments, deduction is not defined by similarity between cases.

Option B:
Option B, inductive, is a broader category of non-deductive reasoning that includes generalisations and causal inferences; analogical reasoning can be seen as a type of induction, but the specific description in the stem focuses on similarity between cases, which is captured more precisely by the term analogical.

Option C:
Option C, causal, aims at identifying cause–effect relations and may use experiments or statistical data. Although causal reasoning can use analogies, it is not itself defined by case-to-case similarity.

Option D:
Option D is correct because analogical reasoning explicitly uses resemblance between cases as the basis for inference. The stem’s emphasis on similarity and inference from one case to another fits this concept exactly.

Pratijna is the opening statement of the thesis in the Nyaya five-limbed argument. It clearly announces the claim that will later be justified by the reason, example and application. By specifying both paksha and sadhya, it frames the entire inferential enterprise. Therefore the member described in the stem is called pratijna.

Option A:
Option A, upanaya, is the fourth step that applies the general rule to the paksha and comes much later in the sequence. It does not introduce what is to be proved.

Option B:
Option B is correct because pratijna provides the target proposition around which the rest of the reasoning is organised. Without a clear pratijna, listeners would not know which claim the arguer intends to establish.

Option C:
Option C, nigamana, is the concluding restatement of the thesis after it has been supported and is logically distinct from the initial proposal.

Option D:
Option D, hetu, names the reason that supports the pratijna and is presented as the second limb, not the first.

A, B and E are correct; C and D are false. Some schools accept anupalabdhi as a distinct pramāṇa for absence cognition under suitable perceptual conditions. It is not unanimously rejected, and it concerns absence rather than presence.

Option A:
Option A is correct because it includes the true statements (A, B, E) and excludes C and D (false).

Option B:
Option B is incorrect because it includes C (false unanimous rejection).

Option C:
Option C is incorrect because it includes D (false focus on presence).

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it includes D (false) and omits the correct focus of anupalabdhi.

Statements A, B and C state the basic features of arguments correctly, while D and E misrepresent them. An argument involves at least one premise supporting a conclusion, and the conclusion is what the premises are meant to support. Identifying the conclusion helps evaluate support. Unrelated statements do not form an argument, and a conclusion need not be the last sentence. Hence D and E are false.

Option A:
Option A is correct because it includes exactly the correct statements (A, B, C) and excludes D and E, which are false.

Option B:
Option B is incorrect because it includes D, but unrelated statements do not form an argument; there must be an inferential link.

Option C:
Option C is incorrect because it omits A and still includes D (false), so it cannot represent the correct set.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it includes D and E, both false, so it does not distinguish correct from incorrect claims.

Conjunction is the compound statement formed by joining two propositions with “and”. It is defined to be true only when each of its component propositions is true. This truth-functional behaviour is central to classical propositional logic. Therefore the connective described in the stem is correctly called conjunction.

Option A:
Option A, disjunction, is formed using “or” and is usually true when at least one of its components is true. It does not require both components to be true simultaneously. Hence disjunction does not match the condition specified in the question.

Option B:
Option B correctly identifies conjunction as the connective that yields truth only when both conjuncts are true. This exclusive requirement distinguishes it from other connectives. Thus conjunction is the most appropriate answer here.

Option C:
Option C, implication, represents a conditional of the form “if p, then q”. Its truth conditions do not restrict both parts to be true. Therefore implication is not the connective being described.

Option D:
Option D, negation, simply reverses the truth value of a single proposition. It does not join two propositions and so fails to fit the description given in the stem.

A, B and C correctly define pakṣa, sapakṣa and vipakṣa; E matches exam patterns. D is false because sapakṣa consists of other similar instances (not the same individual as the pakṣa). Therefore A, B, C and E only are correct.

Option A:
Option A is correct because it includes all true definitions and excludes D (false).

Option B:
Option B is incomplete because it omits E (exam identification usage).

Option C:
Option C is incorrect because it includes D (false) and omits A (true).

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it omits B (sapakṣa) and thus is incomplete.

Statements A, B, C and E are correct, whereas D is wrong. A standard categorical syllogism uses two premises and one conclusion, and validity is determined by logical form, not by the physical order of premises. The major premise contains the major term, but it may or may not be written first in exam questions. UGC NET items often shuffle the order, so insisting that the major premise must always appear first, as D does, is mistaken.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E, which highlights the exam practice of presenting premises in different orders. A, B, C only therefore does not entirely answer the question as framed.

Option B:
Option B is incorrect since it leaves out C, losing the information about what the major premise normally expresses, and so A, B, E only misses an important conceptual detail.

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it omits A, failing to mention the basic structure of a syllogism as involving two premises and one conclusion. B, C, E only therefore does not provide the full set of correct statements.

Option D:
Option D is correct as it gathers all the true statements and excludes D, which wrongly ties validity to the written order of premises. This option reflects how exam questions actually present syllogistic arguments.

Statements A, B, C, D and E correctly summarise the main pramāṇas in Indian thought, while F is false. Perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony are widely accepted as distinct means of valid knowledge. Some schools, such as Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta, add arthāpatti (postulation) and anupalabdhi (non-cognition) as further pramāṇas. It is therefore wrong to claim that only perception is recognised everywhere; different schools endorse different sets. Thus A, B, C, D and E only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it stops at A, B and C and does not acknowledge śabda or the later additions of arthāpatti and anupalabdhi. While perception, inference and comparison are important, verbal testimony and additional pramāṇas play significant roles in many systems. Therefore A, B and C only cannot be accepted.

Option B:
Option B is also incomplete, since it includes D but omits E, thereby leaving out the fact that some traditions recognise further pramāṇas beyond the main four. Without E, the description of pramāṇa theory across schools remains partial. Hence A, B, C and D only is not the full set of correct statements.

Option C:
Option C is incorrect because it treats F as true by including it with A, B, C and D. F claims that all schools accept only pratyakṣa, which contradicts the wide use of inference, testimony and other pramāṇas in many systems. Including F makes the combination logically inconsistent with Indian epistemology.

Option D:
Option D is correct since it assembles A, B, C, D and E, capturing both the standard pramāṇas and the additional ones recognised by some schools, while excluding F’s overgeneralisation. This option therefore matches the set of correct statements presented in the item.

A particular negative proposition has the form “Some S are not P”. It claims that there is at least one member of the subject class that falls outside the predicate class. In traditional logic this is known as an O-type proposition and combines particular quantity with negative quality. Thus the statement described in the stem is correctly called a particular negative.

Option A:
Option A, universal affirmative, asserts that all S are P and therefore rules out the possibility that any S are not P. It is incompatible with the existence of an exception and so does not fit the description.

Option B:
Option B, universal negative, denies that any S are P and thus claims universal exclusion, not the existence of at least one exception. It is different in both strength and form from the proposition in the stem.

Option C:
Option C, particular affirmative, states that some S are P, which is the exact opposite in quality of the particular negative. It cannot represent a claim about some S not belonging to P.

Option D:
Option D is correct because particular negative captures exactly the idea that there is at least one subject that does not have the predicate. This form is used to express limited but important exceptions.

Vishesha is introduced to account for how fundamentally similar entities, such as atoms of the same element or individual selves, remain numerically distinct. It is an ultimate, non-shareable particularity that marks each entity as this one rather than that one. Without vishesha, the theory fears a collapse of multiplicity into undifferentiated sameness. Therefore the individuating factor mentioned in the stem is vishesha.

Option A:
Option A, samanya, is the universal that unites many individuals into a class and so performs the opposite function of highlighting sameness rather than difference.

Option B:
Option B, samavaya, is the relation of inseparable inherence and does not serve as a principle of individuation among qualitatively similar entities.

Option C:
Option C, abhava, denotes types of non-existence and cannot furnish a positive differentiator that grounds individuality.

Option D:
Option D is correct because vishesha literally means "particularity" and is proposed precisely to secure numerical diversity at the atomic and spiritual levels in Nyaya-Vaisheshika ontology.

An analogical argument compares two cases and infers that what is true of one is likely true of the other. The argument becomes stronger when the cases share many relevant similarities. These similarities must bear on the conclusion and not be superficial. Therefore the factor described in the stem is the number of relevant similarities.

Option A:
Option A correctly identifies relevant similarities as the key feature that supports a strong analogy. When similarities are numerous and closely connected to the property inferred, the reasoning gains force. Hence this option is the best answer.

Option B:
Option B, irrelevant differences, if numerous, actually weaken an analogy by highlighting disanalogies. Differences that have no bearing on the conclusion cannot support the inference. Thus they do not strengthen the argument as described.

Option C:
Option C, emotional appeals, may influence acceptance of an argument but are not logical grounds for its strength. They relate to persuasion rather than to the structural quality of the analogy. Therefore emotional appeals are not the factor mentioned.

Option D:
Option D, rhetorical questions, are stylistic devices that may accompany arguments. They do not determine the underlying similarity relations between cases. Consequently rhetorical questions are not the correct answer.