UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Negation is the unary operation that takes a proposition and forms a new proposition that is true exactly when the original is false and false when the original is true. In symbolic logic, it is often represented by a tilde or a bar. Negation allows us to express denial or refusal within formal systems. Therefore the operation described is correctly called negation.

Option A:
Option A, implication, relates two propositions in a conditional structure "if p, then q" and does not simply reverse a truth value. It is a binary connective rather than a single-place operation. Thus implication does not fit the stem.

Option B:
Option B, equivalence, concerns a relation between two propositions that have the same truth value. It is not an operation that individually flips a truth value. Consequently equivalence is not appropriate here.

Option C:
Option C is correct because negation captures precisely the idea of truth-value reversal expressed in the question. The operation is fundamental in constructing logical opposites and in formulating contradictions.

Option D:
Option D, disjunction, joins two propositions with "or" and has truth conditions based on at least one disjunct being true. It does not operate on just one statement, so it cannot be the operation sought in the stem.

Statements A, B, D and E correctly capture the idea of logical entailment, whereas C is false. Entailment guarantees that there is no model in which all premises are true and the conclusion false, and in that sense it preserves truth from premises to conclusion. This is much stronger than mere observational correlation, and understanding this link is crucial for evaluating validity in UGC NET questions. A true conclusion does not have to follow from any set of true premises, which is why C is incorrect. Hence A, B, D, E only is the right set.

Option A:
Option A is correct because it collects all the central features of entailment and excludes C, which confuses “actually true” with “logically following from”. It reflects the standard semantic definition used in introductory logic and in exam preparation.

Option B:
Option B is wrong as it includes C, wrongly suggesting that any true conclusion is automatically entailed by any true-premise set, which denies the possibility of independent truths. A, B, C, D only therefore misstates how entailment works.

Option C:
Option C is incorrect since it omits D, and so it fails to highlight that entailment is stronger than correlation, a point often stressed when separating logical from empirical connections. A, B, E only is thus incomplete.

Option D:
Option D is also wrong because it leaves out A, dropping the precise semantic condition on entailment, and so B, D, E only does not provide the full set of correct statements requested.

Statements A, C, D and E correctly characterise assumptions and inferences in exam-style passages. Assumptions are often unstated but necessary for the statement or argument to be reasonable, and inference questions focus on what follows necessarily from the given information. B is false because assumptions are frequently implicit, and F is false because not every possible supportive idea is presupposed by the argument. Thus the true statements are A, C, D and E only.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete since it omits E, ignoring the important point that assumptions may be unstated yet taken for granted. Without E, the description of assumptions is not fully accurate. Therefore A, C and D only cannot be the right combination.

Option B:
Option B is correct because it gathers all the true statements and leaves out B and F, which misrepresent how assumptions function. It ties conceptual understanding to the way UGC NET questions are structured. This makes it the appropriate answer.

Option C:
Option C is wrong as it includes F, which treats any potentially helpful idea as an assumption, even if the argument does not depend on it. It also omits A, leaving out the necessity aspect that defines assumptions.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it includes F and omits C, thereby losing the description of inference questions and endorsing an overly broad notion of assumption. This mismatch prevents it from being correct.

Statements A, B, C, E and F are correct, while D is false. Upamāna is indeed characterised as comparison, with the gavaya example being widely cited in textbooks. Nyaya treats it as an independent pramāṇa, although some other schools attempt to reduce it to combinations of perception and verbal testimony. UGC NET questions sometimes embed such scenarios and ask which source of knowledge is being used. D is wrong because it overstates the agreement among schools and ignores Nyaya’s insistence on a distinct process.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete since it omits E and F, which acknowledge both the reductionist view of some schools and the examination pattern. While A, B and C describe Nyaya’s standpoint and example, they do not cover inter-school debate or test relevance. Hence A, B and C only is not a complete answer.

Option B:
Option B is also incomplete because it still leaves out F and includes only A, B, C and E. Without F, the answer does not mention how upamāna-based questions appear in UGC NET. Therefore A, B, C and E only cannot be regarded as fully adequate.

Option C:
Option C is correct because it collects all the true statements, presenting Nyaya’s independent-pramāṇa view, other schools’ criticisms and the exam angle, while excluding D, which falsely merges upamāna completely with inference. It thus reflects the nuanced treatment of upamāna in Indian epistemology. Consequently, A, B, C, E and F only is the right combination.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect as it leaves out A and includes only B, C, E and F. Without A, the general translation and role of comparison are not clearly set out, and the omission makes the description less complete. Therefore B, C, E and F only cannot be the correct choice.

Statements A, B, D and E correctly represent the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, while C is false. The view holds that conditioned entities last only for a kṣaṇa and that supposed enduring substances are conceptual impositions, which undermines substantialist metaphysics and notions of a permanent self. This perspective shapes Buddhist explanations of causation and personal identity, and UGC NET questions often connect it to logical problems about change. Nyaya criticises, rather than fully accepts, this momentariness, making C incorrect.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete as it omits E, failing to mention explicitly how this doctrine can appear in exam questions. A, B, D only therefore does not fully meet the stem’s requirements.

Option B:
Option B is correct because it brings together the main doctrinal points and the exam relevance, while excluding C, which misstates Nyaya’s stance. This combination aligns closely with standard summaries of kṣaṇikatvāda.

Option C:
Option C is wrong since it omits A and therefore fails to state clearly the core thesis that all conditioned things are momentary. B, D, E only thus gives a partial and less precise account.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect as it includes C along with other true statements, wrongly suggesting inter-school agreement where there is actually debate. A, C, D, E only therefore mixes false information with correct material.

Statements A, B, C and D correctly distinguish truth from validity and define soundness. E is false because a true conclusion can result from invalid reasoning. Therefore A, B, C and D are the correct statements.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits D, the definition of soundness (validity + true premises).

Option B:
Option B is incorrect because it includes E, which is false, and it also omits D, which is true.

Option C:
Option C is incorrect because it omits A, which is true (validity does not require true premises).

Option D:
Option D is correct as it gathers all four true statements (A, B, C, D) and omits E.

The fallacy of division arises when an arguer illegitimately infers that because a group or whole has a certain property, each individual member or component must also have that property. This overlooks the possibility that properties of the whole need not be shared by its parts. Logical evaluation requires examining whether the transfer of attributes is warranted in each case. Therefore the mistaken inference described in the stem is called the fallacy of division.

Option A:
Option A, composition, is the reverse error of assuming that what is true of parts must be true of the whole. While related, it moves in the opposite direction and so does not match the stem.

Option B:
Option B is correct because division specifically covers the inference from whole to part that fails to distinguish collective and distributive properties. For example, from “the team is famous” it does not follow that every player is famous.

Option C:
Option C, false cause, involves incorrectly identifying a causal relationship between events, which is unrelated to the whole–part misreasoning noted here.

Option D:
Option D, equivocation, rests on the ambiguous use of a term in different senses within an argument, not on illegitimate distribution of a property from whole to parts.

Asiddha hetu fails because the alleged reason does not exist or is not known to exist in the paksha. Since the foundational fact is missing, no valid inference can proceed from it. Nyaya lists several subtypes depending on why the hetu is unestablished. Thus the defective reason described in the stem is asiddha.

Option A:
Option A, viruddha, focuses on reasons that prove the opposite conclusion, not on absence of the reason in the subject.

Option B:
Option B is correct because asiddha literally means “unaccomplished” or “unproved” and captures the idea that the reason has not been successfully shown in the very locus where it is needed.

Option C:
Option C, badhita, involves reasons whose supposed vyapti is contradicted by stronger evidence, even if they are present in the paksha.

Option D:
Option D, nirvikalpa, describes a kind of indeterminate perception and is not a classification of hetu at all.

Statements A, B, C and E correctly describe śabda as Nyaya’s pramāṇa of testimony and its dependence on a trustworthy speaker, with scripture as a special case. D is false because Nyaya allows reliable secular testimony too. Hence A, B, C and E only is correct.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E (exam classification point).

Option B:
Option B is incorrect because it includes D (false restriction to Veda only).

Option C:
Option C is incorrect because it omits A (āpta-vākya definition), so it is incomplete.

Option D:
Option D is correct because it includes all true statements and excludes D.

Statements A, B, D and E correctly characterise asiddha hetu as a middle term that is not properly established, either because it does not qualify the pakṣa or is itself impossible, and note its place in UGC NET questions. C is false because a hetu present in the pakṣa but absent in all sapakṣa cases is rather an example of asādhāraṇa or improperly restricted reason, not simply asiddha. Thus the true statements are A, B, D and E only.

Option A:
Option A is correct since it includes all the accurate descriptions and the exam-related remark, while excluding C which mislabels a different defect as asiddha. It reflects the standard Nyaya classification of hetvābhāsa.

Option B:
Option B is incomplete because it omits E, failing to mention that UGC NET often provides examples of such fallacious reasons in the options. Without E, the exam application of the concept is missing.

Option C:
Option C is incorrect as it drops A, losing the basic idea that asiddha hetu is unestablished in the pakṣa, and it also keeps an incomplete/incorrect mix. So it does not include all true statements.

Option D:
Option D is wrong because it keeps C (false) and omits B (true), so it cannot be the correct combination.

Statements A, B and C define the three Nyaya types of inference by reference to positive and negative correlations, and D notes that in all cases the notion of vyāpti underlies inference. F is correct because UGC NET may present examples and ask which type they exemplify. E is false since Nyaya explicitly uses anvaya and vyatireka to help support vyāpti. Therefore A, B, C, D and F only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete as it omits F, failing to mention the examination angle of identifying such inference types.

Option B:
Option B is incorrect because it omits C (anvayavyatireki), so it does not include all true statements.

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it includes E, which denies the role of anvaya/vyatireka in supporting vyāpti.

Option D:
Option D is correct because it includes all true statements and excludes the false one (E).

Statements A, B, C and D all describe logically possible combinations of truth and validity, whereas E is false. Validity concerns whether a true-premise situation can ever lead to a false conclusion; it does not rule out cases where premises are false. Invalid arguments with true premises may happen to have true conclusions, showing that invalidity does not force falsity of the conclusion. Hence the only wrong claim is that every invalid argument with true premises must have a false conclusion, making E the unique incorrect statement.

Option A:
Option A is wrong because it marks D as the sole incorrect statement even though D correctly notes that invalid arguments can still reach true conclusions by coincidence. Treating D as wrong confuses the distinction between logical guarantee and accidental truth.

Option B:
Option B is correct since it singles out E, which overstates the consequences of invalidity, as the only false statement among generally accepted logical possibilities. This fits the standard truth–validity matrix taught for exam preparation.

Option C:
Option C fails because it groups D with E as wrong, but D is a well-known counterexample pattern to the idea that invalidity always yields false conclusions. Saying D and E only misrepresents one true logical observation.

Option D:
Option D is also incorrect, as it labels C as wrong along with D and E, even though C simply describes a possible situation where a valid form is used with false premises and a false conclusion. As long as there is no row with true premises and a false conclusion, such a case is compatible with validity.

Statements A, B, C and E are correct, while D is false. The law of excluded middle asserts that for any proposition p, either p or ¬p holds in classical two-valued logic, with no third option. Some non-classical systems, such as intuitionistic logic, restrict or reject this law in certain contexts, which supports C. In classical logic, “p ∨ ¬p” is a tautology, not a contradiction, so D mislabels it. UGC NET logic questions frequently refer to excluded middle and non-contradiction, as E indicates. Therefore A, B, C, E only is the correct set.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete since it omits E, not mentioning the exam’s interest in these fundamental laws. A, B, C only therefore does not fully satisfy the stem.

Option B:
Option B is wrong because it leaves out C, failing to acknowledge that some non-classical logics challenge the universal scope of excluded middle. A, B, E only thus presents too narrow a view.

Option C:
Option C is incorrect as it omits A and thereby fails to state the law itself, giving only its context and exam relevance. B, C, E only therefore does not directly identify excluded middle.

Option D:
Option D is correct because it collects the accurate statements about the law, its classical role, its non-classical challenges and its exam importance while excluding D, which wrongly calls “p ∨ ¬p” a contradiction. This selection matches standard introductions to logic and UGC NET-level treatments.

Savikalpa pratyaksha is determinate perception in which the object is apprehended together with qualifying properties, universals and relations. It allows us to make informative judgments, such as identifying something as a blue pot. Nyaya regards this stage as central for everyday knowledge and linguistic communication. Hence the perception described in the stem is savikalpa pratyaksha.

Option A:
Option A, nirvikalpa, lacks explicit conceptual articulation and therefore cannot directly support judgments that classify an object under a specific name or universal. It contradicts the determinate character mentioned.

Option B:
Option B is correct because savikalpa literally means "with differentiations" and captures the structured awareness that includes both subject and predicates. It is the fully articulated cognitive state presupposed in most ordinary assertions.

Option C:
Option C, yogaja, is a kind of extraordinary perception arising from yogic discipline and is defined by its origin rather than by the presence of universals and relations in the presented content.

Option D:
Option D, samanyalaksana, is a special extraordinary perception of universals through instances and does not denote the general form of determinate sense perception in daily life.

A necessary condition is one without which a particular event cannot occur. Its absence guarantees that the event will not happen. However, its presence alone may not be enough to bring about the event because other conditions might also be required. Thus the description in the stem matches the concept of a necessary condition.

Option A:
Option A, sufficient, names a condition that by itself guarantees the occurrence of the event. A sufficient condition need not be required in every case. Therefore it does not fit the idea of something that must be present but may not be enough.

Option B:
Option B correctly identifies necessary as the label for conditions that are required but not independently adequate. If the necessary condition is missing, the event cannot occur. Hence this option is the best match for the stem.

Option C:
Option C, trivial, suggests an unimportant or insignificant factor and has no precise technical meaning in logical conditional analysis. A trivial condition might be present or absent without affecting the event. Thus trivial is not appropriate here.

Option D:
Option D, accidental, refers to something happening by chance and does not capture a stable logical dependency. An accidental factor is not necessarily required whenever the event occurs. Therefore accidental condition is not what the stem describes.