UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Statements A, B, D and F correctly describe central ideas about arguments, validity and exam-based reasoning, while C and E are false. Premises are indeed offered as reasons, and validity guarantees that true premises cannot lead to a false conclusion. Deductive reasoning does claim necessary support, and identifying premises and conclusion is a key skill in evaluating arguments. C is wrong because soundness requires both validity and true premises, not merely a true conclusion, and E reverses the definition of invalidity. Therefore A, B, D and F only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is correct because it includes all and only the true statements: A, B, D and F. It omits C, which misdefines soundness, and E, which mischaracterises invalid arguments. By grouping just these four, it faithfully reflects standard definitions used in logical reasoning. This makes Option A the accurate representation of the correct statements.

Option B:
Option B is incorrect because it includes E as if it were true. E claims that in an invalid argument it is impossible for premises to be true and conclusion false, which is actually the hallmark of validity, not invalidity. Adding this false statement to otherwise correct ones means the combination does not match the true set of statements.

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it accepts C along with A, B, D and F. C treats any argument with a true conclusion as sound, ignoring whether the premises are true or the reasoning is valid. Since soundness depends on both validity and true premises, including C makes this option logically unacceptable.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it omits A and includes both C and E, thereby excluding a basic description of premises while accepting two wrong definitions. Including C and E distorts the notions of soundness and invalidity, so this combination cannot represent the correct set of statements.

Asiddha hetu suffers from the foundational defect that it has not been successfully shown to exist in the paksha. Since the middle term is absent or doubtful at the very point where it is supposed to operate, no legitimate inference can proceed. Nyaya further distinguishes types of asiddha depending on whether the reason is impossible, located elsewhere or uncertain. The core idea remains that the reason is unproved.

Option A:
Option A is correct because asiddha literally means "unaccomplished" and signals that the first condition of trairupya, presence in the paksha, has not been met. Without this, the inferential chain cannot even begin.

Option B:
Option B, viruddha, describes a reason that proves the opposite of the intended sadhya rather than one whose presence is in doubt.

Option C:
Option C, savyabhicara, concerns irregular occurrence of the hetu across positive and negative instances, not its absence in the paksha.

Option D:
Option D, badhita, involves defeat of the supposed universal relation by stronger evidence, which presupposes that the hetu is at least present.

Statements A, B, C, D and E accurately describe standard types of hetvābhāsa in Indian logic, while F is false. Savyabhicāra points to irregular concomitance, viruddha reverses the intended conclusion, and asiddha is unestablished in the pakṣa. Bādhita is overridden by a stronger means of knowledge, and satpratipakṣa faces an equally strong counter-reason. A proper hetu must avoid, not exemplify, these defects, so F misstates the requirement. Therefore A, B, C, D and E only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E, leaving out the important case of satpratipakṣa where a counter-reason neutralises the original hetu. While A, B, C and D are true, they do not cover the full range of named fallacies in the list. Thus this option is not adequate.

Option B:
Option B is wrong because it includes F, which claims that a good reason should display one of these defects. In Indian logic, such defects mark the hetu as fallacious, not acceptable. Including F therefore contradicts the central idea of hetvābhāsa.

Option C:
Option C is correct since it assembles all five accurate descriptions of fallacious reasons and excludes the single statement that reverses the standard condition for a proper hetu. It offers a comprehensive view consistent with Nyaya accounts and exam expectations. Hence this is the right answer.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it omits A and instead includes F, thereby losing the description of savyabhicāra while endorsing the wrong requirement about valid hetu. This combination fails to reflect the recognised structure of Indian logical fallacies.

Vyapti expresses the universal, exceptionless relation between the reason (hetu) and the property to be proved (sadhya). It states that wherever the hetu is present, the sadhya is also present, and this relation underwrites the legitimacy of inference. Recognising vyapti is thus crucial for establishing that the observed sign reliably indicates the inferred property. Therefore the relation described is called vyapti.

Option A:
Option A, paksha, is the subject or locus in which the sadhya is to be established, such as the hill in the classic smoke–fire example. It is not the relation between hetu and sadhya themselves. Thus paksha does not match the description.

Option B:
Option B is correct because vyapti specifically denotes the invariable concomitance that connects reason and probandum. Without such a universal linkage, anumana would not yield reliable knowledge. This aligns exactly with the statement in the question.

Option C:
Option C, drstanta, is the example that illustrates the vyapti, such as a kitchen where smoke and fire are observed together. It helps make the underlying relation clear but is not itself the relation.

Option D:
Option D, nigamana, is the concluding statement in the five-membered form of inference and represents the final step of asserting the proved thesis. It does not name the universal connection that licenses the inference.

Statements A, B, C, E and F are correct, whereas D is false. Svarthānumāna is an internal inference process for oneself, while parārthānumāna is the externally presented inference to persuade others. The five-member Nyaya syllogism exemplifies parārthānumāna, and its clear stages help an audience track the reasoning, which is why UGC NET can test identification of these steps. D is wrong because svarthānumāna does not require verbal expression of all five members; the inferential process may remain implicit in the thinker’s mind. Thus A, B, C, E and F only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is correct because it includes all the true statements about the distinction between private and public inference while excluding D, which overstates the formality required in svarthānumāna. It reflects both the theoretical framework and its examination relevance. Therefore it is the best answer.

Option B:
Option B is incomplete as it omits F, ignoring the exam-oriented point that candidates may be asked to map sentences to steps of the Nyaya syllogism. Although A, B, C and E are true, leaving out F makes the combination less aligned with UGC NET practice. Hence it cannot be accepted.

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it omits A and includes only B, C, E and F. Without A, the nature of svarthānumāna as personal inference is not mentioned, which weakens the conceptual contrast. Thus B, C, E and F only does not represent all correct statements.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect since it accepts D, which incorrectly demands verbalisation of all five members in svarthānumāna, and omits B. This reverses the distinction between inner and outer inference and distorts the Nyaya account. Therefore A, C, D, E and F only cannot be chosen.

A, B and E are correct; C and D are false. Saptabhaṅgī extends syādvāda via seven qualified predications expressing many-sidedness, and it is Jain, not Nyaya. UGC NET may test the term and school association.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E (exam recognition and affiliation), which is true.

Option B:
Option B is correct because it includes all true statements (A, B, E) and excludes C and D (false).

Option C:
Option C is incorrect because C is false (it contradicts many-sidedness), and it omits A.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it includes C and D (both false).

Only D is wrong. Induction moves from instances to a generalisation and supports conclusions probabilistically. A single genuine counterexample shows a universal generalisation was overstated. Recognising induction helps judge strength. Since inductive arguments do not guarantee their conclusions, D is false.

Option A:
Option A is incorrect because A is true; it wrongly labels A as wrong along with D.

Option B:
Option B is correct because D is the only incorrect statement; induction never guarantees truth with certainty.

Option C:
Option C is incorrect because C is true; adding it to the wrong set is a misclassification.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because B and E are true; treating them as wrong is incorrect.

Kevalanvayi inference rests on vyapti that is affirmed solely through cases of joint presence; there is no instance where the hetu occurs apart from the sadhya. Thus only positive concomitance is used to secure the relation. A classic example is inferring “pot is nameable” from “pot is knowable” when all knowables are nameable. Hence the pattern described in the stem is kevalanvayi.

Option A:
Option A, kevalavyatireki, relies only on negative instances where both hetu and sadhya are absent together and has no positive sapaksha cases, the opposite emphasis from kevalanvayi.

Option B:
Option B, anvayavyatireki, uses both positive and negative instances together to establish vyapti and is broader than the purely positive case discussed here.

Option C:
Option C, samanyatodrsta, is a different classification based on general regularity, not on whether vyapti is known from positive or negative instances.

Option D:
Option D is correct because kevalanvayi literally means “only by affirmative concomitance,” which matches the condition of having no counter-instance of hetu without sadhya.

A categorical syllogism consists of exactly three categorical propositions: two premises and a conclusion. It involves three distinct terms arranged so that each term appears in two of the propositions. This structured pattern allows clear rules for assessing validity. Therefore the argument form described is called a categorical syllogism.

Option A:
Option A, enthymeme, is an argument in which one premise or the conclusion is left implicit and so does not fully display all its categorical components. While it may be based on syllogistic reasoning, it is not the complete formal pattern mentioned in the stem.

Option B:
Option B, disjunctive argument, uses a premise containing a disjunction, often combined with another premise to infer something about the disjuncts. It is not characterised by having all statements as categorical propositions. Thus disjunctive argument is not correct.

Option C:
Option C is correct because categorical syllogism precisely names the three-proposition deductive structure made up solely of categorical statements. It forms the backbone of traditional Aristotelian logic.

Option D:
Option D, analogical argument, reasons from similarities between cases and does not require two categorical premises and a categorical conclusion. Therefore analogical argument does not match the form specified.

Udaharana combines a general statement of vyapti with an illustrative case, making the universal relation between hetu and sadhya vivid. It typically reads like “wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in a kitchen.” This step helps the listener see that the relation claimed is grounded in familiar experience. Therefore the member described in the stem is called udaharana.

Option A:
Option A is correct because udaharana is explicitly defined as the third avayava that presents both the rule and an example, bridging abstract vyapti and concrete observation.

Option B:
Option B, paksha, is the subject of inference like the hill, and it appears in the thesis and other steps but is not itself the rule-with-example component.

Option C:
Option C, vyapti, is the underlying universal relation stated in more abstract terms; udaharana expresses this relation but also includes an illustrative instance.

Option D:
Option D, pramana, is a general term for means of knowledge and not the specific step in the Nyaya syllogism.

In traditional logic, a universal affirmative proposition has the form “All S are P”. It makes a positive claim about every member of the subject class. Such propositions are symbolised as A-type in the square of opposition. Therefore the proposition described in the stem is a universal affirmative.

Option A:
Option A, particular affirmative, asserts something about some members of a class, as in “Some S are P”. It does not cover all members and so cannot match the description in the question.

Option B:
Option B correctly names universal affirmative as the proposition that affirms a predicate of every member of the subject class. This aligns perfectly with the phrase “all members of a class”. Hence it is the correct answer.

Option C:
Option C, particular negative, denies a predicate about some members, as in “Some S are not P”. It changes both the quantity and quality from what the stem states. Thus particular negative is not appropriate.

Option D:
Option D, universal negative, denies something of all members, as in “No S are P”. While universal in scope, it is not affirmative in quality. Therefore universal negative does not fit the description.

A particular affirmative proposition is expressed in the form “Some S are P”. It makes an existential claim that there exists at least one member of the subject class that belongs to the predicate class. In traditional logic it is labelled I-type, reflecting its particular quantity and affirmative quality. Therefore the statement described in the stem is a particular affirmative proposition.

Option A:
Option A, universal affirmative, asserts that all members of the subject class are included in the predicate class. This is far stronger than the minimal claim that at least one such member exists, so it does not match the description.

Option B:
Option B, universal negative, denies that any S are P and thus contradicts the assertion that some S are P. It clearly cannot be the correct classification.

Option C:
Option C is correct because particular affirmative precisely relates to propositions that affirm the predicate of at least one subject. This form plays an important role in discussions of existential import and the square of opposition.

Option D:
Option D, particular negative, states that some S are not P, which is negative in quality and therefore different from the affirmative assertion in the stem.

Deductive reasoning is characterised by the claim that if the premises are true, the conclusion cannot be false. Its goal is truth preservation from premises to conclusion through a valid logical form. In such reasoning, counterexamples that make premises true and conclusion false are not allowed. Thus the type of reasoning described in the stem is deductive reasoning.

Option A:
Option A, inductive, deals with arguments where premises provide probable support for the conclusion rather than guaranteeing it. Inductive conclusions can still turn out false even if the premises are true. Therefore inductive reasoning does not match the strict necessity mentioned in the question.

Option B:
Option B is correct because deductive reasoning is defined by this requirement of necessary support: true premises should force the truth of the conclusion. Classic examples include syllogisms and formal proofs where validity ensures no loss of truth. This aligns directly with the wording of the stem.

Option C:
Option C, analogical, depends on similarities between cases to infer that what is true of one case is probably true of another. Its conclusions are at best probable and do not claim necessity. Hence analogical reasoning is not the correct answer.

Option D:
Option D, causal, focuses on cause–effect relations and may use either inductive or deductive patterns, but it is not defined solely by the necessary link between premises and conclusion. As a category it does not capture the essential feature of necessity highlighted in the stem.

The only wrong statement here is D; A, B, C and E correctly describe deductive reasoning and its exam patterns. Moving from particulars to generalisations is typically inductive, not deductive.

Option A:
Option A is incorrect because A is a correct definition of deductive validity.

Option B:
Option B is incorrect because C is true and should not be labelled wrong.

Option C:
Option C is correct because D alone is wrong.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it wrongly includes B and E (both true) among wrong statements.

A, B and D are correct. C is false because inductive arguments can be strong or weak depending on evidence. E is false because mathematics heavily relies on deduction. Thus A, B and D only is correct.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits D (science generalisation).

Option B:
Option B is incorrect because it includes C (false) and omits D (true).

Option C:
Option C is incorrect because it includes C (false) and omits A (true).

Option D:
Option D is correct because it includes all true statements (A, B, D) and excludes the false ones (C, E).