UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Dravya is the basic category of substance that underlies and supports qualities and actions. Classical lists include nine or more dravyas such as earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, self and mind. These entities provide the ontological foundation for other categories. Therefore the substrates mentioned in the stem are called dravya.

Option A:
Option A, samanya, denotes universals common to many substances and qualities but is not itself a substance.

Option B:
Option B, guna, consists of attributes like colour or smell that inhere in dravyas and cannot exist independently.

Option C:
Option C, karma, refers to motion or activity that also exists only in substances.

Option D:
Option D is correct because dravya literally means “that which flows” and is used to designate the enduring bearers of properties and actions within this metaphysical scheme.

All five statements are correct: A and B define indicative vs modal, C and D give appropriate examples of possibility and necessity, and E notes their relevance to evaluating the strength of claims in reasoning.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E (the exam-application point).

Option B:
Option B is incomplete because it omits D (a standard example of necessity).

Option C:
Option C is correct because it includes all true statements (A–E).

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it omits A (the definition of indicative statements).

A tautology is a statement that is true under every assignment of truth values to its components. Its truth is guaranteed by its logical form alone. Such statements are logically necessary and cannot be false. Therefore the description in the stem matches the concept of a tautology.

Option A:
Option A, contradiction, is always false under every possible valuation. It represents the opposite logical extreme from a tautology. Hence contradiction does not fit the stem.

Option B:
Option B, contingency, is a statement that is true under some valuations and false under others. Its truth is not fixed across all possibilities. Therefore contingency is not the correct answer here.

Option C:
Option C correctly names tautology as the always true compound statement described. Tautologies play an important role in logical equivalence and proof. Thus tautology is the appropriate choice.

Option D:
Option D, paradox, refers informally to a statement that seems self-contradictory or absurd yet often reveals a truth. It is not defined as a statement true in all valuations. Consequently paradox is not suitable here.

Statements A, B, D and E are correct. C is false since neither tradition restricts valid knowledge to perception alone. F is false because UGC NET Paper 1 does not require specialist-level mastery of all intra-school debates. Therefore A, B, D and E only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E (exam focus on comparisons).

Option B:
Option B is incorrect because it omits A (Nyaya’s four-pramāṇa list), which is central to comparison.

Option C:
Option C is incorrect because it includes C, which is false.

Option D:
Option D is correct because it includes all true statements and excludes the false ones (C, F).

Pancavayava literally means "having five members" and designates the canonical Nyaya format of inference that explicitly lists pratijna, hetu, udaharana, upanaya and nigamana. This elaborated structure ensures that no crucial step remains implicit, especially in debates and didactic contexts. It serves as an ideal model for presenting arguments clearly. Hence the five-part scheme described in the stem is called pancavayava.

Option A:
Option A, trairupya, names the three characteristics of a valid hetu and thus concerns conditions on reasons, not the overall format of inference. It deals with content adequacy, not with the number of avayavas.

Option B:
Option B, hetvabhasa, refers to fallacious reasons that fail to establish the conclusion; it is a category of defects rather than a name for the whole inferential framework.

Option C:
Option C, anumana, is the generic term for inference as a pramana and can occur in different presentational forms; it does not specifically identify the five-limbed style.

Option D:
Option D is correct because Nyaya texts explicitly use pancavayava to label the standard five-step argumentation pattern they advocate.

Statements A, B, C, E and F correctly summarise the traditional conditions for a proper hetu, while D is false. The hetu must qualify the pakṣa, coincide with the sādhya in positive instances and be absent when the sādhya is absent, thereby supporting a reliable vyāpti. If any of these conditions fail, the middle term can become fallacious, which is what hetvābhāsa denotes. D is wrong because a sādhāraṇa hetu that spreads across vipakṣa as well is defective, not strong. UGC NET may test recognition of which condition is violated in sample inferences.

Option A:
Option A is correct since it includes the three core lakṣaṇas of a valid hetu, the connection to hetvābhāsa and the exam-oriented point about identifying violations. It excludes D, which elevates a defective sādhāraṇa hetu to a strong one, contradicting standard accounts. Thus this option accurately represents the set of correct statements.

Option B:
Option B is incomplete because it omits E and F, leaving out both the link to fallacious reasoning and the exam application. While A, B and C are true, they do not show what happens when the conditions fail or how they are tested. Therefore A, B and C only is not fully adequate.

Option C:
Option C is also incomplete as it leaves out F, the statement about UGC NET questions explicitly using these conditions. Without F, the answer does not reflect the way the topic appears in the syllabus. Hence A, B, C and E only cannot be the best choice.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it omits A and includes only B, C, E and F. Without A, the requirement that the hetu be present in the pakṣa itself is missing, which is fundamental. This omission means the option does not incorporate all the correct statements in the list.

Sesavat anumana proceeds from the experience of a current effect to the conclusion that an appropriate cause has already occurred. Seeing a river in spate, one infers that heavy rain has fallen upstream. The temporal order here goes from later effect back to earlier cause. This is precisely the pattern Nyaya calls sesavat inference.

Option A:
Option A is correct because sesavat suggests "like the remainder", implying that what is now present points back to something previously existing that explains it. It captures the explanatory move from observed consequence to unobserved origin.

Option B:
Option B, purvavat, is the opposite pattern, where one infers a future effect from a present cause, and so does not match the example in the stem.

Option C:
Option C, samanyatodrsta, rests on general uniformities of co-existence that may not involve a clear causal sequence, which is different from the strongly causal flavour of the swollen river case.

Option D:
Option D, kevalanvayi, describes a pattern of vyapti based solely on positive instances and is not a temporal classification of inference.

Avyapti occurs when a definition does not extend to all objects that properly fall under the concept being defined. In such cases, some genuine instances are wrongly excluded, revealing that the defining characteristics are insufficient. This defect undermines the adequacy of the lakshana because it fails to capture the full extension of the term. Thus the under-definition mentioned in the stem is called avyapti.

Option A:
Option A, asambhava, refers to a definition that is impossible or self-contradictory, not merely too narrow. It signals a more radical failure than missing some instances.

Option B:
Option B, trairupya, names the marks of a valid hetu and belongs to the theory of inference, not to the analysis of definitions.

Option C:
Option C, ativyapti, is the opposite defect in which the definition is too broad, including things that should not be counted as instances.

Option D:
Option D is correct because avyapti literally means "non-pervasion" and pinpoints the failure of the definitional predicate to pervade the entire class that it is meant to characterise.

Statements A, B, C and E correctly state how necessary and sufficient conditions function, while D is false. A necessary condition must be present for the effect, and a sufficient condition guarantees the effect when it occurs. In some cases, a condition can be both necessary and sufficient, as with logical equivalences. If X is genuinely necessary for Y, Y cannot occur without X, so D contradicts the definition. UGC NET cause–effect and assumption questions often hinge on these distinctions, validating E.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it leaves out C and E, omitting both the possibility of conditions being both ways and the explicit exam relevance. A, B only therefore does not provide the full information intended.

Option B:
Option B improves on A but still omits E, failing to note that these notions are directly examined in UGC NET reasoning. A, B, C only thus remains incomplete with respect to the stem.

Option C:
Option C is wrong as it drops A and incorrectly suggests that specifying B, C, E alone is enough while excluding the basic role of necessary conditions. B, C, E only gives an unbalanced picture of the concepts.

Option D:
Option D is correct since it includes all true statements and excludes D, which misdescribes the relation of necessity. This aligns with standard logic and analytical reasoning used in exam questions.

Ativyapti arises when the defining characteristics are so general that they include items that do not genuinely belong to the definiendum. This means the definition covers more cases than it should, making it incapable of distinguishing the target class from neighbouring ones. Such over-extension is a serious flaw in logical analysis of concepts. Hence the defect described in the stem is called ativyapti.

Option A:
Option A is correct because ativyapti literally means "excessive pervasion", indicating that the predicate extends beyond its proper domain. It captures the problem of a lax or overly inclusive definition.

Option B:
Option B, avyapti, is under-definition, where some legitimate instances are omitted, which is the opposite error from that mentioned in the question.

Option C:
Option C, asambhava, denotes an impossible or contradictory definition, not one that is merely too wide.

Option D:
Option D, hetvabhasa, designates a fallacious reason in inference rather than a defect in defining terms.

The ad hominem fallacy occurs when someone attacks an opponent’s character, motives or other personal traits rather than engaging with the argument. Such attacks are irrelevant to the truth of the claim being discussed. This shifts focus away from reasons and evidence. Therefore the fallacy described in the stem is ad hominem.

Option A:
Option A, straw man, misrepresents an opponent’s position and then attacks the distorted version. It is a fallacy of mischaracterisation, not of personal attack. Hence straw man is not the correct answer here.

Option B:
Option B, slippery slope, suggests without adequate support that a relatively small step will inevitably lead to a chain of disastrous events. It concerns causal exaggeration, not attacks on persons. Thus slippery slope does not fit the description.

Option C:
Option C, false cause, wrongly assumes a causal connection between events without proper justification. It deals with causation rather than the personal qualities of a speaker. Therefore false cause is not the fallacy indicated in the question.

Option D:
Option D correctly names ad hominem as the practice of criticising the person instead of the argument. Logical assessment requires focusing on reasons and evidence, not on irrelevant personal attacks. Hence ad hominem is the best choice.

Disjunction is the logical operation that forms a compound statement using "or". In its inclusive sense used in standard logic, a disjunction is true when at least one of the disjuncts is true and false only when both are false. This behaviour corresponds exactly to the description in the stem. Hence the connective is called disjunction.

Option A:
Option A, conjunction, links statements with "and" and is true only when both conjuncts are true. Its falsity conditions are therefore quite different and do not match the pattern described. Thus conjunction is not the correct answer.

Option B:
Option B is correct because disjunction accurately characterises the truth conditions stated: it fails only when neither component is true. This makes disjunction the appropriate technical term for the "or" connective in propositional logic.

Option C:
Option C, biconditional, expresses "p if and only if q" and is true when both components share the same truth value. This is more restrictive than the simple "or" relation and does not correspond to the stem.

Option D:
Option D, negation, alters the truth value of a single statement and does not combine two statements with "or". Consequently negation cannot be the intended connective.

Sabda is recognised as a pramana in which valid knowledge is produced by meaningful sentences uttered by a reliable speaker or contained in authoritative texts. It covers a wide range of everyday and scriptural information that individuals cannot verify directly. The reliability of sabda depends on the competence and honesty of the source. Therefore the testimony-based knowledge referred to in the stem is called sabda.

Option A:
Option A is correct because sabda directly names verbal testimony as a distinct means of knowledge in Nyaya. It captures cases where we justifiably believe something on the basis of another's trustworthy report.

Option B:
Option B, upamana, uses comparison to identify new objects and does not primarily involve belief in another's authority beyond the initial description.

Option C:
Option C, arthapatti, is postulation where a new fact is inferred to explain an otherwise inexplicable situation, which is different from simply accepting a statement on trust.

Option D:
Option D, anupalabdhi, is non-perception or absence, accepted as a pramana in some schools like Bhatta Mimamsa, not in classical Nyaya. It involves cognising the non-existence of an object rather than learning from verbal testimony.

Statements A, B, C, D and F are correct, while E is false. Kevalānvayi relies on only positive instances, and kevalavyatireki is known mainly through negative instances where the absence of one correlates with the absence of the other. Anvayavyatireki involves both positive and negative agreement, and the classic smoke–fire example is typically classified this way. F is correct that recognising these forms helps exam candidates analyse anumāna. E is wrong because if hetu appears in vipakṣa, it fails the exclusiveness condition and cannot be a proper ground. Therefore A, B, C, D and F only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete since it stops at A, B and C and leaves out D and F, which add the standard example and its examination relevance. Although A, B and C are conceptually accurate, they do not provide the full picture. Hence A, B and C only cannot be accepted.

Option B:
Option B is incorrect because it omits B and includes only A, C, D and F. Without B, the specific character of kevalavyatireki inference is not properly captured, reducing clarity. Thus A, C, D and F only does not list all the true statements.

Option C:
Option C is wrong as it replaces A with B, C, D and F but omits A. While B, C, D and F are true, leaving out A removes the description of kevalānvayi, one of the three named types. This makes the combination incomplete.

Option D:
Option D is correct because it gathers A, B, C, D and F, covering all three inference types, a paradigm example and the exam context, while rejecting E, which violates the conditions for a proper hetu. It therefore matches the set of correct statements expected in UGC NET Indian logic.

Equivocation is a fallacy that exploits the ambiguity of a word or phrase by using it with one meaning in a premise and a different meaning elsewhere in the argument. Because the shift is often subtle, the conclusion can appear to follow logically when in fact it rests on a semantic trick. This undermines the reliability of the reasoning because the premises do not truly support the conclusion under a single consistent sense of the term. Therefore the error described in the stem is the fallacy of equivocation.

Option A:
Option A, ambiguity, describes a general feature of language where expressions can have multiple meanings, but not every use of ambiguous terms involves fallacious reasoning. Equivocation is a specific way of exploiting ambiguity within an argument.

Option B:
Option B is correct because equivocation names the particular mistake of sliding between meanings mid-argument without alerting the reader. Critical thinking requires checking that key terms are used consistently throughout an argument to avoid this trap.

Option C:
Option C, false analogy, involves drawing a conclusion from a weak or inappropriate comparison between cases, which is a different type of logical error unrelated to word meanings shifting.

Option D:
Option D, begging the question, occurs when an argument's premises assume the truth of the conclusion in some form; it is a structural circularity, not a semantic shift.