UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Statements A, B, C, D and F are correct, while E is false. Kevalānvayi relies on only positive instances, and kevalavyatireki is known mainly through negative instances where the absence of one correlates with the absence of the other. Anvayavyatireki involves both positive and negative agreement, and the classic smoke–fire example is typically classified this way. F is correct that recognising these forms helps exam candidates analyse anumāna. E is wrong because if hetu appears in vipakṣa, it fails the exclusiveness condition and cannot be a proper ground. Therefore A, B, C, D and F only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete since it stops at A, B and C and leaves out D and F, which add the standard example and its examination relevance. Although A, B and C are conceptually accurate, they do not provide the full picture. Hence A, B and C only cannot be accepted.

Option B:
Option B is incorrect because it omits B and includes only A, C, D and F. Without B, the specific character of kevalavyatireki inference is not properly captured, reducing clarity. Thus A, C, D and F only does not list all the true statements.

Option C:
Option C is wrong as it replaces A with B, C, D and F but omits A. While B, C, D and F are true, leaving out A removes the description of kevalānvayi, one of the three named types. This makes the combination incomplete.

Option D:
Option D is correct because it gathers A, B, C, D and F, covering all three inference types, a paradigm example and the exam context, while rejecting E, which violates the conditions for a proper hetu. It therefore matches the set of correct statements expected in UGC NET Indian logic.

Statements A, B, C and E accurately describe the threefold classification of inference in Indian logic and its exam relevance, while D is false. Pūrvavat moves from cause to effect, śeṣavat from effect to cause, and sāmānyato dṛṣṭa rests on general observation not limited to a single causal link. Far from being rejected, all three are taken as legitimate types of inference, and UGC NET frequently uses examples to test this distinction. Thus A, B, C, E only is the correct group of statements.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E, ignoring that exam questions may directly ask students to classify examples according to these types. A, B, C only therefore does not fully satisfy the question requirements.

Option B:
Option B is correct because it includes all of the true descriptive and exam-related statements while excluding D, which wrongly claims that one type is rejected. This combination matches standard Indian philosophy texts.

Option C:
Option C is wrong since it excludes A, losing the explanation of pūrvavat inference and thereby presenting only part of the scheme. B, C, E only does not cover the entire threefold division.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it leaves out B, failing to include śeṣavat, and so A, C, E only is incomplete.

Pūrvavat anumāna moves from a known cause to an effect that is yet to occur, often in temporal sequence. Observing dark monsoon clouds as a recognised cause, one infers the upcoming effect of rainfall. This aligns with the purvavat pattern where the cause is presently perceived, and the future effect is inferred based on established causal regularity.

Option A:
Option A fits the form of reasoning from present cause (clouds) to future effect (rain), which is exactly what pūrvavat anumāna describes.

Option B:
Option B, śeṣavat, reasons from an observed effect back to an unperceived cause, as in inferring fire from seen smoke.

Option C:
Option C, sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, involves inferences based on general association without clear one-sided cause–effect, such as inferring motion from changing location.

Option D:
Option D, kevalavyatireki, is a type of anumāna based only on negative concomitance, not the forward causal inference in the example.

Anvayavyatireki anumāna combines both positive and negative concomitance: we observe co-presence of smoke and fire in similar cases and co-absence of smoke where there is no fire. The smoke–fire relation is not restricted to only positive or only negative instances; we have both kitchens with smoke and fire and places like lakes where neither occurs. This pattern fits the definition of anvayavyatireki and is the classical example in Nyāya texts.

Option A:
Option A, kevalānvayi, involves only positive instances where the hetu occurs throughout a single homogeneous class, with no genuine negative instances.

Option B:
Option B, kevalavyatireki, works entirely through negative reasoning without positive cases, unlike the smoke–fire example.

Option C:
Option C aligns with the mixed pattern of co-presence and co-absence that Nyāya uses to illustrate robust vyāpti, making this the standard classification for the hill-fire inference.

Option D:
Option D refers to a fallacious hetu that is irregular, which does not apply to the textbook case of smoke as a reliable sign of fire.