UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Statements A, B, C and E are correct, while D and F are false. Nyaya does define perception as arising from sense-organ contact, and it distinguishes indeterminate nirvikalpa and determinate savikalpa perception. Some traditions also speak of yogaja pratyakṣa as an extraordinary type of perception. Illusory perceptions like shell-silver are taken as examples of error, not of valid pratyakṣa, and many schools explicitly accept perception as a pramāṇa, so F is clearly wrong. Thus A, B, C and E only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E, ignoring the reference to special forms of perception discussed in certain schools. Although A, B and C are true, they do not reflect the full range of pratyakṣa types mentioned in the item. Therefore A, B and C only cannot be the right answer.

Option B:
Option B is incorrect since it adds D, which wrongly treats illusion as valid perception. In Indian epistemology, such experiences are usually analysed as erroneous cognitions, not as paradigms of valid knowledge. Including D makes this combination inconsistent with the standard account.

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it omits A and includes D. Without A, the basic Nyaya definition of perceptual knowledge is missing, and accepting D confuses error with valid cognition. So B, C, D and E only cannot be chosen.

Option D:
Option D is correct as it groups A, B, C and E, capturing both the standard definition and the main subtypes of perception without conflating error with knowledge. It excludes D and F, both of which conflict with mainstream Indian logical theory. Hence this option matches the set of correct statements.

A, B, D and E are correct; C is false. Nyaya treats dreams as illusory/non-veridical rather than paradigms of valid perception. It defines perception via sense–object contact and distinguishes nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka stages, and UGC NET may test such details.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E (exam relevance), which is true.

Option B:
Option B is correct because it includes all true statements and excludes C (false about dreams).

Option C:
Option C is incomplete because it omits A (definition of perception), which is true.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it includes C (false).

Pramana is defined as the instrument or means that produces valid cognition. It connects the knower to the knowable object in a trustworthy way. Different systems list different numbers of pramanas, but all treat pramana as the technical term for a source of knowledge. Therefore the generic means of valid knowledge mentioned in the stem is called pramana.

Option A:
Option A is correct because pramana names the channel such as perception or inference through which knowledge arises. It focuses on the causal or justificatory route by which the cognition is obtained. Without pramana there would be no recognised basis for calling a cognition valid.

Option B:
Option B, prameya, is the object about which knowledge is obtained, like a pot or a cloth, not the means that produces the cognition. It is what is known, not the instrument of knowing. Hence it does not fit the description of a means.

Option C:
Option C, pramata, is the knowing subject who experiences the cognition. While essential to the knowledge situation, the subject is not termed the means of knowing. Thus pramata cannot fill the blank.

Option D:
Option D, pramiti, denotes the resultant valid cognition or knowledge produced by a pramana. It is the outcome in the epistemic process, not the instrument that yields it.

Statements A, B, C, D and E correctly summarise the main pramāṇas in Indian thought, while F is false. Perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony are widely accepted as distinct means of valid knowledge. Some schools, such as Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta, add arthāpatti (postulation) and anupalabdhi (non-cognition) as further pramāṇas. It is therefore wrong to claim that only perception is recognised everywhere; different schools endorse different sets. Thus A, B, C, D and E only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it stops at A, B and C and does not acknowledge śabda or the later additions of arthāpatti and anupalabdhi. While perception, inference and comparison are important, verbal testimony and additional pramāṇas play significant roles in many systems. Therefore A, B and C only cannot be accepted.

Option B:
Option B is also incomplete, since it includes D but omits E, thereby leaving out the fact that some traditions recognise further pramāṇas beyond the main four. Without E, the description of pramāṇa theory across schools remains partial. Hence A, B, C and D only is not the full set of correct statements.

Option C:
Option C is incorrect because it treats F as true by including it with A, B, C and D. F claims that all schools accept only pratyakṣa, which contradicts the wide use of inference, testimony and other pramāṇas in many systems. Including F makes the combination logically inconsistent with Indian epistemology.

Option D:
Option D is correct since it assembles A, B, C, D and E, capturing both the standard pramāṇas and the additional ones recognised by some schools, while excluding F’s overgeneralisation. This option therefore matches the set of correct statements presented in the item.

In Indian epistemology, pramāṇa denotes the reliable means through which valid cognition or true knowledge is obtained. Schools like Nyāya classify perception, inference, comparison and testimony as distinct pramāṇas. The focus is not on the object or the knower, but on the channels that justify a cognition as trustworthy. Thus, pramāṇa is central to debates about how we know what we claim to know.

Option A:
Option A confuses pramāṇa with prameya, which is the object that is known, not the means of knowing.

Option B:
Option B correctly identifies pramāṇa as the valid means of knowledge, emphasising the instrumentality and reliability that makes a cognition pramā.

Option C:
Option C aligns more with pramātṛ, the subject or knower, which is a different element of the knowledge situation.

Option D:
Option D wrongly restricts pramāṇa to inference alone; while anumāna is one pramāṇa, most classical systems acknowledge several distinct pramāṇas.