UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Nirvikalpa pratyaksha is described as an indeterminate awareness that grasps an object in a bare, non-relational way. At this stage, the mind has not yet organised the content into subject–predicate form or recognised it under a concept. Nyaya treats this as an initial phase preceding determinate judgment. Hence the perception referred to in the stem is nirvikalpa pratyaksha.

Option A:
Option A is correct because nirvikalpa literally means "without differentiation", highlighting the lack of explicit classification, naming or relational articulation in this cognition. It is important for explaining how determinate perception can have a non-conceptual base.

Option B:
Option B, savikalpa, is determinate perception that includes recognition of universals and relations, which contradicts the description of being without name or class. It belongs to a later stage of perceptual processing.

Option C:
Option C, laukika, denotes ordinary empirical perception and cuts across the distinction between determinate and indeterminate; laukika perception can itself be either nirvikalpa or savikalpa.

Option D:
Option D, alaukika, refers to extraordinary perception and again is a classification orthogonal to the determinate–indeterminate division, so it does not answer the specific description in the stem.

Nirvikalpa pratyaksha is defined as an indeterminate awareness in which an object is grasped without being classified or verbally identified. At this level, the mind has not yet organised the content into a subject–predicate structure. Nyaya considers this stage as epistemically prior to determinate judgment. The description in the stem exactly matches this notion of nirvikalpa perception.

Option A:
Option A is correct because nirvikalpa literally means "without distinctions", indicating the absence of explicit conceptual differentiations such as universals or relations. It helps Nyaya explain how determinate knowledge can have a non-conceptual basis.

Option B:
Option B, savikalpa, is determinate perception that already involves recognition of universals and relations, which conflicts with the idea of perception without name or class.

Option C:
Option C, laukika, refers to ordinary empirical perception and cuts across the determinate–indeterminate distinction; it includes both nirvikalpa and savikalpa phases and hence is too broad.

Option D:
Option D, alaukika, designates extraordinary perception and does not specifically single out the indeterminate stage within perceptual cognition.

Vyapti expresses the pervasion relation that underwrites inference: the hetu is found only where the sadhya is found. Knowing vyapti allows one to move securely from the presence of the hetu in the paksha to the presence of the sadhya there. It is established through observing positive and negative instances or through reliable testimony. Thus the universal connection described in the stem is called vyapti.

Option A:
Option A, paksha, is the individual subject where the inference is applied and cannot denote a general relation between two properties.

Option B:
Option B, hetu, is the specific reason or sign used in a given inference, such as smoke, not the general concomitance between smoke and fire.

Option C:
Option C, drstanta, is the example that illustrates vyapti in a familiar case like a kitchen. It helps show the relation but is not itself the relation.

Option D:
Option D is correct because vyapti is technically defined as the invariable concomitance of hetu with sadhya. Without vyapti, inference would lack its justificatory basis.

Samanyalaksana pratyaksha is defined as perception of universals through their instances, such that the common nature present in many particulars becomes directly evident. By seeing many individual cows, one comes to perceive the universal "cowness". Nyaya treats this as an extraordinary form of perception that explains our ability to form stable class-concepts. Hence the perception described in the stem is samanyalaksana.

Option A:
Option A is correct because samanyalaksana literally refers to the mark of generality and targets awareness of what is shared across individuals. It provides a realist account of how we access universals as genuine entities.

Option B:
Option B, jnanalaksana, involves perception mediated by a previous cognition and is typically used to explain cross-modal or residual awareness, not the direct grasp of universals via many cases.

Option C:
Option C, yogaja, is yogic perception grounded in meditative practice and is not restricted to universals; it concerns the extraordinary origin of cognition rather than its universal content.

Option D:
Option D, pratyaksha, is the generic term for perception and is too broad to pick out this specific mode of universal-focused awareness.

Pramiti is the knowledge-event or cognition that arises when a pramana successfully operates on a prameya for a pramata. It is characterised as true, non-contradicted and useful for practical purposes. Nyaya analyses errors by contrasting them with genuine pramiti. Thus the product of successful knowing mentioned in the stem is pramiti.

Option A:
Option A, prameya, is the external object that is known, not the cognitive state that knows it. It cannot therefore be the resultant cognition.

Option B:
Option B, pramana, is the route or instrument, such as perception or inference, which produces the cognition but is not identical with it.

Option C:
Option C, pramata, is the knowing subject who undergoes the cognitive state, not the state itself.

Option D:
Option D is correct because pramiti is precisely the awareness “this is such-and-such” that counts as valid knowledge. It completes the fourfold structure of knower, means, object and knowledge.