UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Savyabhicara hetvabhasa arises when the supposed reason is seen both where the sadhya is present and where it is absent. This irregularity breaks the required vyapti, since the presence of the hetu no longer reliably signals the presence of the sadhya. As a result, the inference becomes defective. Thus the fallacy described in the stem is savyabhicara.

Option A:
Option A, viruddha, is a reason that proves the opposite of what is intended, not one that merely varies across cases.

Option B:
Option B, asiddha, concerns a reason that is not established in the paksha or may not exist there at all.

Option C:
Option C, badhita, is a reason whose alleged vyapti is contradicted by a stronger pramana, such as direct perception.

Option D:
Option D is correct because savyabhicara literally refers to a reason that “deviates” or “wanders” by occurring with and without the probandum, making it unfit as a trustworthy hetu.

Satpratipaksha arises when an argument's reason is neutralised by another reason of comparable strength that supports the opposite conclusion. In such a situation, neither side can claim decisive inferential support. Nyaya treats this as a defect in the original hetu because it fails to yield a clear, uncontested conclusion. Thus the fallacy in the stem is satpratipaksha hetvabhasa.

Option A:
Option A, asiddha, refers to an unestablished reason that may not exist in the paksha at all, rather than to a reason that is countered by another.

Option B:
Option B, badhita, involves being overridden by a stronger pramana, not merely an equally strong opposing reason.

Option C:
Option C, savyabhicara, points to irregularity of occurrence and does not require the presence of an explicit competing hetu.

Option D:
Option D is correct because satpratipaksha literally means “having a true counter-argument” and precisely captures a situation of equally balanced opposing reasons.

The ad hominem fallacy occurs when someone dismisses or discounts an argument by attacking the arguer rather than the premises or reasoning. Such attacks may focus on character, motives or background, but they are logically irrelevant to whether the conclusion follows from the reasons. This shifts attention away from the substance of the argument. Hence the kind of error described in the stem is the ad hominem fallacy.

Option A:
Option A, straw man, involves misrepresenting an opponent's position to make it easier to attack, rather than targeting the person. While also irrelevant, it is conceptually distinct from a direct personal attack.

Option B:
Option B is correct because ad hominem literally means “to the person” and captures reasoning that targets the individual rather than the issue. Recognising this fallacy helps students keep focus on arguments rather than personalities.

Option C:
Option C, ad verecundiam, is an appeal to inappropriate authority, where someone relies on the opinion of a non-expert to support a claim. It does not involve attacking a person's character.

Option D:
Option D, red herring, introduces an irrelevant issue to distract from the main point, but it need not involve personal criticism of the arguer.

Samkhya typically recognises only three pramanas: perception, inference and verbal testimony. This restricted list reflects the school's attempt to balance epistemic sufficiency with theoretical economy. They consider these three sources adequate for demonstrating the existence of purusha, prakriti and other key categories. Thus the correct number of pramanas for Samkhya is three.

Option A:
Option A, two, would be insufficient for Samkhya because it relies not only on perception but also on inference and scripture to justify metaphysical claims. Reducing the list to two would remove an important epistemic pillar.

Option B:
Option B, four, incorrectly attributes to Samkhya the Nyaya inclusion of comparison as a separate pramana. Samkhya does not isolate upamana as an independent means of knowledge.

Option C:
Option C is correct because classical presentations of Samkhya doctrine repeatedly affirm three pramanas: pratyaksha, anumana and sabda. This triad supports their dualistic ontology and theory of liberation.

Option D:
Option D, five, mistakenly imports pramanas such as arthapatti and anupalabdhi that belong to Mimamsa or Vedanta traditions, not to standard Samkhya.

The pattern "if p, then q; not p; therefore not q" is invalid because q may still be true even if p is false. This error is known as the fallacy of denying the antecedent. It mistakenly treats the conditional as though p were a necessary condition for q, which the original statement does not assert. Therefore the fallacy described is denying the antecedent.

Option A:
Option A, affirming, corresponds to affirming the consequent, a different fallacy with the form "if p, then q; q; therefore p". It does not match the structure that begins with "not p". Hence affirming is not correct here.

Option B:
Option B is correct because the erroneous step is to deny the antecedent p and then incorrectly deny the consequent q, assuming q depends exclusively on p. This misinterpretation of the conditional leads to an invalid inference.

Option C:
Option C, strengthening, is not a standard label for any recognised formal fallacy in this context and does not capture the problem of negating p. It therefore cannot be the answer.

Option D:
Option D, converting, might suggest swapping antecedent and consequent, but the structure in the stem is not about such reversal; it is about drawing an unwarranted negative conclusion from the denial of p. Thus converting is inappropriate.

All five statements A through E are correct descriptions of standard logical classifications and their exam use. Tautologies are true under all assignments, contradictions are always false, and contingencies vary with the assignment. A statement and its negation cannot both be tautologies because their truth-values must differ somewhere. Recognising tautological patterns is useful in UGC NET for spotting valid argument forms.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E, missing the applied exam-use point.

Option B:
Option B is correct since it includes every true statement (A–E).

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it omits C (definition of contingency).

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it omits A (definition of tautology).

Statements A, C, D and F present a balanced view of analogical reasoning and explanation in exam contexts. B is false because a single example cannot guarantee a universal generalisation; it can only suggest or illustrate. E is false since analogical arguments are typically inductive, providing support but not deductive certainty. The correct combination therefore includes A, C, D and F and excludes the two exaggerated claims.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits F, failing to mention that exams explicitly test the distinction between analogy and illustration. It also lacks an explicit reference to the exam context, making it less aligned with the question’s focus.

Option B:
Option B is incorrect as it leaves out C and includes F but misses one of the true statements about the dual role of analogies in clarification and argument. Without C, the description of analogical use remains incomplete.

Option C:
Option C is correct since it captures both the logical nature of analogy and the explanatory role, while emphasising that UGC NET questions may ask candidates to identify these patterns. It avoids the false claims that one example proves universals or that analogies are always deductive.

Option D:
Option D is wrong because it includes E, which mistakenly says all analogical arguments are deductive, and omits A, losing the core definition of analogical argument. This mix of omission and error makes the option unacceptable.

The straw man fallacy involves distorting or oversimplifying an opponent’s position. The critic then attacks this weaker version instead of the original claim. This tactic gives the illusion of refutation without genuinely engaging the argument. Therefore the fallacy described is called straw man.

Option A:
Option A, red herring, diverts attention to an unrelated issue, distracting from the main argument. It does not necessarily involve misrepresenting the opponent’s view. Hence red herring is not the correct label here.

Option B:
Option B, false cause, assumes a causal connection without adequate evidence. It concerns causal reasoning rather than misrepresentation of positions. Thus false cause does not match the pattern in the stem.

Option C:
Option C accurately names the straw man fallacy as the practice of constructing an easier target by altering the original claim. This weaker version is then attacked as though it were the real argument. Therefore straw man is the best answer.

Option D:
Option D, ad populum, appeals to popular opinion as evidence for a claim’s truth. It relies on numbers rather than accurate representation of views. Consequently ad populum is not appropriate here.

Logical appraisal focuses on the relation between premises and conclusion in an argument. It asks whether the premises provide genuine support and whether the inference is valid or strong. This kind of appraisal is central to critical thinking in logic. Therefore the process described in the stem is called logical appraisal.

Option A:
Option A correctly labels the evaluation of inferential support as logical appraisal. It concerns the strength of reasoning rather than effects on an audience. Hence this option matches the intention of the question.

Option B:
Option B, psychological persuasion, emphasises how arguments influence beliefs or emotions. It deals with impact on people and may ignore logical quality. Thus psychological persuasion is not the same as examining logical support.

Option C:
Option C, rhetorical analysis, studies style, language and persuasive techniques from a communication viewpoint. While related, it does not primarily test whether premises logically support a conclusion. Therefore rhetorical analysis is not the best term here.

Option D:
Option D, stylistic critique, comments on writing style or presentation features. It focuses on clarity or elegance rather than logical structure. Consequently stylistic critique does not capture the logical focus of the stem.

Statements A, B, C, D and F correctly describe these special kinds of hetu, whereas E is false. A sādhāraṇa hetu spreads across both similar and dissimilar cases, an asādhāraṇa hetu is confined to the pakṣa alone and an anupasaṃhāri hetu is so universal that it cannot mark a relevant difference. All of them are defective for Nyaya because they undermine strict vyāpti, and UGC NET may test recognition of these defects. E is wrong since sādhāraṇa hetu is not praised but criticised as logically weak.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits D and F, leaving out both the statement that these hetus are defective and the exam context in which they appear. While A, B and C are true, they do not convey why these types matter or how they are tested. Therefore A, B and C only is not fully adequate.

Option B:
Option B is also incomplete, including D but still omitting F and thus failing to mention UGC NET’s interest in these classifications. Without F, the answer lacks an explicit exam link. Hence A, B, C and D only cannot be considered the best answer.

Option C:
Option C is incorrect as it leaves out A and includes only B, C, D and F. Without A, the description of sādhāraṇa hetu is missing, yet it is crucial for the question. This omission means B, C, D and F only does not represent the full set of correct statements.

Option D:
Option D is correct since it gathers all the true statements while excluding E, which misrepresents sādhāraṇa hetu as desirable. It presents both the structural defects and their relevance for exam questions. Thus A, B, C, D and F only is the appropriate combination.

Upamana is recognised in Nyaya as a distinct pramana in which knowledge arises by comparing an unfamiliar object with a known one based on a description of similarity. For example, learning what a gavaya is by comparing it to a cow one already knows involves upamana. This process relies on grasping relevant likenesses rather than direct perception or inference from a sign. Hence the comparison-based source of knowledge described in the stem is called upamana.

Option A:
Option A is correct because upamana literally points to “knowing through similarity,” and Nyaya explicitly lists it as separate from perception, inference and verbal testimony. It captures a common way in which people identify new things by reference to familiar ones.

Option B:
Option B, anumana, is inference based on a sign and its invariable concomitance with the probandum, such as inferring fire from smoke. It does not operate primarily through comparison of similarities.

Option C:
Option C, pratyaksha, is direct perception arising from contact between sense organs and objects, not mediated by comparison with previously known cases.

Option D:
Option D, sabda, is verbal testimony, particularly the words of reliable persons or scriptures, where knowledge comes from trusted reports rather than from recognising similarity.

Badhita hetu is one whose alleged universal relation with the sadhya is overruled by more powerful means of knowledge. For instance, an argument claiming that fire is cold based on some spurious reason is refuted by direct perception of fire's heat. When stronger pramanas deny the connection asserted by the hetu, the reason is considered defeated. Therefore the fallacy in the stem is badhita hetvabhasa.

Option A:
Option A, asiddha, concerns reasons not established in the paksha and does not necessarily involve conflict with superior evidence about the vyapti. The defect is at the level of presence, not of being contradicted.

Option B:
Option B is correct because badhita literally means "defeated" and captures the idea that although a relation is claimed, it cannot stand in the face of more authoritative cognition. Nyaya places high priority on coherence among pramanas.

Option C:
Option C, viruddha, describes reasons that entail the opposite conclusion, which is a different kind of logical failure from being overridden by stronger knowledge.

Option D:
Option D, savyabhicara, is about irregular association rather than explicit refutation by perception or scripture.

A, B and E are correct; C and D are wrong. Sharing one property does not justify assuming all properties, and not every comparison is a strong analogy. UGC NET expects evaluation of analogies based on relevant similarities.

Option A:
Option A is incorrect because D is also wrong; selecting only C is incomplete.

Option B:
Option B is incorrect because C is also wrong; selecting only D is incomplete.

Option C:
Option C is incorrect because E is true; including it among wrong statements is incorrect.

Option D:
Option D is correct because it identifies both false statements (C and D).

A, B and C state the classic trairūpya conditions, and E is true about exam usage. D is false because allowing hetu in vipakṣa breaks the required negative concomitance. Hence A, B, C and E only are correct.

Option A:
Option A is correct because it includes all three marks plus exam relevance and excludes D (false).

Option B:
Option B is incomplete because it omits E (exam application).

Option C:
Option C is incorrect because it omits A (presence in pakṣa is essential).

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it includes D (false).

The only wrong statement is D; all of A, B, C and E are correct. Lack of detectable correlation in a given dataset does not logically rule out every possible causal link, because data may be limited or noisy. Statements A and B emphasise that even strong correlations need not reveal direct causation, and C notes the role of experimental control and background theory. E rightly warns that misreading correlation-based questions can produce incorrect causal conclusions.

Option A:
Option A is incorrect because it treats both D and E as wrong, but E is actually correct in warning about exam mistakes. While D is indeed false, E accurately describes a real exam risk. Hence D and E only does not give the right set of wrong statements.

Option B:
Option B is wrong since it includes A among the wrong statements, even though A is a textbook caution about correlation not proving causation. By misclassifying A, this option overstates the strength of correlational evidence.

Option C:
Option C is correct because it singles out D, the claim that uncorrelated variables must be causally unrelated, as the sole incorrect statement. This respects the subtlety that causation may be hidden or non-linear and not captured by a simple correlation.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect as it adds C to the set of wrong statements, even though C correctly highlights the need for controlled studies or strong background knowledge to support causal claims. Therefore C and D only cannot be accepted.