Anupalabdhi as Independent Pramana – UGC NET Question

The Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā, associated with Kumārila, famously posits anupalabdhi as a distinct pramāṇa for apprehending absence, such as knowing that a pot is not on the floor. They argue that absence cannot be adequately captured by ordinary perception or inference and therefore requires its own means of valid cognition.

Option A:
Option A, Cārvāka, is highly sceptical about pramāṇas beyond perception and inference and does not develop a systematic doctrine of anupalabdhi as an independent pramāṇa.

Option B:
Option B, classical Nyāya, typically reduces knowledge of absence to special forms of perception or to inference and does not, in its earlier form, list anupalabdhi as a separate pramāṇa.

Option C:
Option C correctly points to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā tradition as the one that elevates anupalabdhi to independent pramāṇa status for absence cognition.

Option D:
Option D, early Buddhism, recognises various modes of knowledge but does not standardly articulate anupalabdhi as a separate pramāṇa in the way Mīmāṃsā does.