UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

A, B, D and E are correct; C is false. The gavaya case involves prior verbal description and memory plus later perception and comparison, so it is not “without memory”. Some schools subsume upamāna under other pramāṇas; UGC NET may ask to identify it via examples.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E (exam identification), which is true.

Option B:
Option B is correct because it includes all true statements and excludes C (false).

Option C:
Option C is incomplete because it omits A (Nyaya recognises upamāna distinctly), which is true.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it includes C (false).

Statements A, B, C, E and F are correct, while D is false. Upamāna is indeed characterised as comparison, with the gavaya example being widely cited in textbooks. Nyaya treats it as an independent pramāṇa, although some other schools attempt to reduce it to combinations of perception and verbal testimony. UGC NET questions sometimes embed such scenarios and ask which source of knowledge is being used. D is wrong because it overstates the agreement among schools and ignores Nyaya’s insistence on a distinct process.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete since it omits E and F, which acknowledge both the reductionist view of some schools and the examination pattern. While A, B and C describe Nyaya’s standpoint and example, they do not cover inter-school debate or test relevance. Hence A, B and C only is not a complete answer.

Option B:
Option B is also incomplete because it still leaves out F and includes only A, B, C and E. Without F, the answer does not mention how upamāna-based questions appear in UGC NET. Therefore A, B, C and E only cannot be regarded as fully adequate.

Option C:
Option C is correct because it collects all the true statements, presenting Nyaya’s independent-pramāṇa view, other schools’ criticisms and the exam angle, while excluding D, which falsely merges upamāna completely with inference. It thus reflects the nuanced treatment of upamāna in Indian epistemology. Consequently, A, B, C, E and F only is the right combination.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect as it leaves out A and includes only B, C, E and F. Without A, the general translation and role of comparison are not clearly set out, and the omission makes the description less complete. Therefore B, C, E and F only cannot be the correct choice.

Upamana is the pramana through which one comes to know an unfamiliar object by identifying it with something previously described as similar to a known object. After hearing that a gavaya resembles a wild cow, one later recognises a gavaya in the forest by comparing it with cows already seen. This recognition depends on grasping relevant similarity rather than direct testimony alone or standard inference. Therefore the process in the stem exemplifies upamana.

Option A:
Option A, pratyaksha, provides direct awareness of objects but does not by itself explain the informative step of recognising the new object as the one previously described. Perception supplies the raw appearance, while comparison via memory yields the upamana-based knowledge. Hence pratyaksha is only part of the story.

Option B:
Option B, sabda, certainly initiates the process by giving the description of similarity, yet the decisive cognition that “this is that described object” occurs only when one compares the perceived animal with the earlier verbal description. Thus sabda alone is not the pramana that completes the recognition.

Option C:
Option C, anupalabdhi, is the non-perception pramana used to know absences, such as knowing that there is no pot on the floor, which is conceptually different from identifying a new positive object by likeness. It cannot account for the comparative recognition in this case.

Option D:
Option D is correct because upamana isolates comparison-based recognition as a distinct epistemic route. It highlights a common pattern of learning new kinds by analogy with familiar cases.

Statements A, B, D and F are correct, whereas C and E are false. Nyaya recognises four independent pramāṇas and treats comparison as a distinct source of knowledge based on similarity linking a word to its object. Mīmāṃsā and some Vedānta schools add arthāpatti and anupalabdhi, so D is correct. Cārvāka famously restricts itself mainly to perception and is sceptical about other pramāṇas, so E is wrong, and Nyaya extends verbal testimony beyond scripture to reliable persons generally, making C false. UGC NET questions often ask candidates to identify which items belong to Nyaya’s list.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits F, failing to mention the exam-style use of pramāṇa lists. While A, B and D correctly state Nyaya and Mīmāṃsā positions, they do not capture how this knowledge is tested. Therefore A, B and D only is not a fully satisfactory answer.

Option B:
Option B is correct as it includes A, B, D and F, the statements that align with standard presentations of Nyaya and related schools and that reflect the structure of UGC NET questions. It excludes C and E, both of which misrepresent the scope of verbal testimony and the Cārvāka position. Thus this option accurately lists the correct statements.

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it omits A, leaving out the basic statement of Nyaya’s four pramāṇas, and includes only B, D and F. Without A, the picture of Nyaya epistemology is incomplete. Hence B, D and F only cannot be the right combination.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect since it includes C, which wrongly restricts Nyaya śabda to scripture alone, and omits F’s contribution in other contexts. The presence of C introduces a clear error, making A, B, C, D and F only an unacceptable choice.