UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Statements A, B and C accurately distinguish inference for oneself from inference for others and describe the role of vyāpti illustration. E is also true, since UGC NET includes questions on these modes. D is false because Nyaya clearly accepts svārthānumāna as genuine internal inference. F is false because the canonical parārthānumāna has five members, not merely three. Therefore A, B, C and E only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete as it omits E, failing to mention that exams explicitly test this distinction. While A, B and C are true, they do not cover the full scope of the question.

Option B:
Option B is incorrect because it adds D, which misrepresents Nyaya’s position on svārthānumāna as if it were denied. This contradicts the standard account and makes the combination false.

Option C:
Option C is wrong since it includes F, which claims that parārthānumāna always has exactly three members, and it omits A, losing the definition of svārthānumāna. This mix of omission and error prevents the option from being correct.

Option D:
Option D is correct because it gathers all the true statements and excludes the two false claims about Nyaya’s denial of internal inference and the three-member limitation. It matches the syllabus level treatment of Indian inference.

Statements A, B, C, E and F are correct, whereas D is false. Svarthānumāna is an internal inference process for oneself, while parārthānumāna is the externally presented inference to persuade others. The five-member Nyaya syllogism exemplifies parārthānumāna, and its clear stages help an audience track the reasoning, which is why UGC NET can test identification of these steps. D is wrong because svarthānumāna does not require verbal expression of all five members; the inferential process may remain implicit in the thinker’s mind. Thus A, B, C, E and F only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is correct because it includes all the true statements about the distinction between private and public inference while excluding D, which overstates the formality required in svarthānumāna. It reflects both the theoretical framework and its examination relevance. Therefore it is the best answer.

Option B:
Option B is incomplete as it omits F, ignoring the exam-oriented point that candidates may be asked to map sentences to steps of the Nyaya syllogism. Although A, B, C and E are true, leaving out F makes the combination less aligned with UGC NET practice. Hence it cannot be accepted.

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it omits A and includes only B, C, E and F. Without A, the nature of svarthānumāna as personal inference is not mentioned, which weakens the conceptual contrast. Thus B, C, E and F only does not represent all correct statements.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect since it accepts D, which incorrectly demands verbalisation of all five members in svarthānumāna, and omits B. This reverses the distinction between inner and outer inference and distorts the Nyaya account. Therefore A, C, D, E and F only cannot be chosen.

Nyāya differentiates between svārthānumāna, inference for oneself, and parārthānumāna, inference stated for the benefit of others. Parārthānumāna is typically presented in the full five membered form, making each step explicit to the listener. Its purpose is communicative and instructional: to lead another person from accepted premises to a conclusion through transparent reasoning.

Option A:
Option A describes svārthānumāna, the inner inferential process that need not be linguistically articulated.

Option B:
Option B rightly identifies parārthānumāna as outwardly expressed inference aimed at persuading or teaching someone else.

Option C:
Option C confuses the issue with scriptural evidence; dependence on scripture concerns śabda rather than the distinction between self addressed and other addressed inference.

Option D:
Option D associates parārthānumāna with a special class of objects, whereas the term is defined by its audience and function, not by subject matter.

Nyāya differentiates inference by its audience. Svārthānumāna is the inner inferential process by which an individual arrives at a conclusion for themselves, without needing to articulate each step. Parārthānumāna is the outward, usually five-membered, presentation of an inference intended to lead another person to the same conclusion. The difference is communicative, not structural.

Option A:
Option A reverses the usual pattern; parārthānumāna is typically the fully verbalised form for others, whereas svārthānumāna can remain unexpressed.

Option B:
Option B correctly states that svārthānumāna is for oneself and parārthānumāna is for another, which is the standard Nyāya distinction.

Option C:
Option C incorrectly ties the distinction to different pramāṇas (perception vs testimony); both forms rely on the same inferential pramāṇa.

Option D:
Option D absurdly links the distinction to truth and falsity; both forms can be valid or invalid depending on the hetu and vyāpti.

Pararthanumana is inference presented for the benefit of another, typically in debate or teaching. It lays out each avayava, from pratijna to nigamana, so that the listener can clearly follow the reasoning. Nyaya stresses this form to ensure transparency and communicability of arguments. Therefore the inferential mode described in the stem is pararthanumana.

Option A:
Option A is correct because pararthanumana literally means "inference for another" and is defined by Nyaya as the public, discursive version of inference. It differs in purpose and presentation from merely private reasoning.

Option B:
Option B, svarthanumana, is inference for oneself where the mind need not spell out every limb, since the thinker already grasps the connections. It does not necessarily employ the full five-part format.

Option C:
Option C, anvaya, refers to agreement in presence used in establishing vyapti and is not itself a type of inference aimed at others.

Option D:
Option D, vyatireka, indicates agreement in absence and again describes a pattern used within inference rather than the communicative use addressed in the question.

In the Nyāya model, nigamana is the final step where the original thesis (pratijñā) is restated as now established by the reason, example and application. After showing that the hetu pervaded by the sādhya is present in the pakṣa, the arguer concludes “therefore the hill is fiery” or similar. Nigamana thus has a summarising and concluding role in the inferential sequence.

Option A:
Option A describes dṛṣṭānta (or udāharaṇa), where an example like “the kitchen, which has smoke and fire” is introduced.

Option B:
Option B refers to the hetu step, in which the reason such as “because it has smoke” is first stated.

Option C:
Option C correctly portrays nigamana as the terminal restatement of the thesis, now backed by the previously supplied reasoning.

Option D:
Option D instead captures the function of upanaya, which applies the general concomitance to the specific pakṣa.