UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā expands the list of pramāṇas beyond Nyāya’s four by adding arthāpatti (postulation) and anupalabdhi (non perception as a means to know absence). These two are treated as independent because they are thought to provide knowledge not reducible to perception, inference, comparison or testimony.

Option A:
Option A includes upamāna and śabda, which Nyāya already recognises; they are not additional in Mīmāṃsā relative to Nyāya.

Option B:
Option B correctly identifies arthāpatti and anupalabdhi as the characteristic additions that lead to a six pramāṇa scheme in Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā.

Option C:
Option C mentions memory and imagination, which are psychological functions rather than distinct pramāṇas in standard classifications.

Option D:
Option D highlights yogic and dream perceptions, which may be treated as special modes of perception but are not the canonical “extra” pramāṇas in Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā.

Arthāpatti is invoked when accepted facts seem mutually inconsistent unless a new connecting fact is assumed. For example, if a person is known to be alive and also known never to eat during the day, one postulates that they must eat at night. This postulated eating is neither directly perceived nor inferred in the usual way, yet it is taken as a necessary explanation. Schools that accept arthāpatti treat such postulation as an independent pramāṇa.

Option A:
Option A would collapse arthāpatti into perception, but perception requires direct sense contact and does not involve positing unseen facts to preserve coherence.

Option B:
Option B describes upamāna, where knowledge arises from similarity, not from reconciling conflicting data by assumption.

Option C:
Option C correctly states that arthāpatti works by positing an unobserved fact which, if accepted, makes the known facts consistent.

Option D:
Option D again reduces the process to memory, which merely reproduces earlier cognitions and cannot by itself resolve new apparent contradictions.

The Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā, associated with Kumārila, famously posits anupalabdhi as a distinct pramāṇa for apprehending absence, such as knowing that a pot is not on the floor. They argue that absence cannot be adequately captured by ordinary perception or inference and therefore requires its own means of valid cognition.

Option A:
Option A, Cārvāka, is highly sceptical about pramāṇas beyond perception and inference and does not develop a systematic doctrine of anupalabdhi as an independent pramāṇa.

Option B:
Option B, classical Nyāya, typically reduces knowledge of absence to special forms of perception or to inference and does not, in its earlier form, list anupalabdhi as a separate pramāṇa.

Option C:
Option C correctly points to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā tradition as the one that elevates anupalabdhi to independent pramāṇa status for absence cognition.

Option D:
Option D, early Buddhism, recognises various modes of knowledge but does not standardly articulate anupalabdhi as a separate pramāṇa in the way Mīmāṃsā does.

Arthapatti, or postulation, is invoked when existing data seem inconsistent unless some additional fact is assumed, and that assumption then explains the situation. A standard illustration is inferring that a person who never eats during the day but remains stout must be eating at night. The new fact is not directly perceived or strictly inferred by vyapti but is posited to make sense of the evidence. Thus the pramana named in the stem is arthapatti.

Option A:
Option A, anupalabdhi, concerns knowledge of absence produced by non-perception and does not centrally involve hypothesising unseen facts to resolve contradictions in data. Its focus is on recognising that something is not present.

Option B:
Option B is correct because arthapatti is designed to handle cases where straightforward perception and inference fail to explain phenomena without contradiction. It captures a pattern of reasoning where explanatory adequacy justifies positing an otherwise hidden fact.

Option C:
Option C, upamana, explains knowledge through comparison and similarity but not through reconciling apparently conflicting information.

Option D:
Option D, samskara, relates to mental impressions or residues and is not counted as a pramana for generating new empirical knowledge in the way described.

Statements A, B and C correctly describe arthāpatti and anupalabdhi and their acceptance in Mīmāṃsā and some Vedānta schools. E is true because UGC NET sometimes tests which schools add these pramāṇas beyond the basic Nyaya four. D is false since Nyaya does not universally accept them as independent pramāṇas, and F is false because they are not unanimously rejected; rather, they are disputed. Thus the correct combination is A, B, C and E only.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete as it omits E (exam relevance).

Option B:
Option B is correct because it includes all true statements and excludes the false ones (D, F).

Option C:
Option C is incorrect because it includes F and omits A.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it includes F and omits B.

Arthāpatti is invoked when two accepted facts seem inconsistent unless a new, unobserved fact is assumed. For example, if a person is known to be alive and yet never seen eating in the day, one postulates that they eat at night. This postulated connecting fact is not straightforwardly perceived or inferred in the usual way but is taken as a distinct mode of valid cognition. Thus, arthāpatti is treated as an independent pramāṇa by schools that accept it.

Option A:
Option A would make arthāpatti indistinguishable from perception, which contradicts the emphasis on postulating something not directly seen.

Option B:
Option B resembles upamāna, where similarity between things gives new knowledge, but arthāpatti resolves clashes between known facts rather than relying on likeness.

Option C:
Option C correctly characterises arthāpatti as a special kind of reasoning where an unobserved fact is posited to maintain coherence among accepted data.

Option D:
Option D associates the pramāṇa with purely negative instances, which is more relevant to certain inferences or to absence cognition than to arthāpatti specifically.