UGCNET Questions

Vyāpti expresses the general, law like connection between hetu and sādhya across relevant cases, whereas pakṣadharmatā demands that the particular pakṣa actually possesses the hetu. Both are needed: without vyāpti, the hetu has no probative force; without pakṣadharmatā, the general relation cannot be applied to the case at hand.

Option A:
Option A swaps the ideas and confuses pakṣadharmatā with the sapakṣa condition; presence in pakṣa is pakṣadharmatā, not vyāpti.

Option B:
Option B correctly contrasts the global hetu–sādhya relation (vyāpti) with the local requirement that the hetu qualify the subject under discussion (pakṣadharmatā).

Option C:
Option C incorrectly claims that vyāpti is only about negatives and pakṣadharmatā only about positives; both concepts involve how the hetu and sādhya are related in various cases, not such a crude split.

Option D:
Option D mischaracterises the distinction by tying vyāpti to perception and pakṣadharmatā to testimony; both notions are structural features of inference, not names for different pramāṇas.

Nyāya presents a five membered structure of inference in which dṛṣṭānta (or udāharaṇa) is the stage where an example is given to show the universal concomitance between hetu (reason) and sādhya (probandum). For instance, citing “the kitchen where there is smoke and fire” illustrates the smoke–fire relation. This concrete case helps establish the vyāpti that underlies the reasoning.

Option A:
Option A, pratijñā, is the proposition or thesis to be proved, not the example.

Option B:
Option B, hetu, is the reason or sign used in inference, such as “there is smoke on the hill.”

Option C:
Option C correctly names dṛṣṭānta as the example that demonstrates the general connection between reason and what is to be proved.

Option D:
Option D, nigamana, is the final conclusion statement that restates the thesis in light of the reason, not the illustrative example.

An assumption is an unstated belief or idea that must be true for the argument’s reasoning to work, even though it is not explicitly mentioned. It forms part of the underlying support for the conclusion. When analysing arguments, identifying assumptions helps reveal what the author is relying on without saying. These hidden elements can be tested for reasonableness and necessity.

Option A:
Option A describes an explicit premise, which appears directly in the argument and is not hidden.

Option B:
Option B fits the notion of a conclusion or inference, something derived from the premises rather than presupposed by them.

Option C:
Option C captures the idea that assumptions operate in the background; they are required for the argument to be plausible but remain unstated.

Option D:
Option D refers to a statement that goes against the conclusion, which would weaken or refute the argument rather than support it implicitly.

Nyaya logic describes a five-membered inferential structure consisting of pratijñā (proposition), hetu (reason), udāharaṇa or dṛṣṭānta (example), upanaya (application) and nigamana (conclusion). Pramāṇa, meaning means of valid knowledge, is an important epistemological category in Indian philosophy but is not listed as one of these five components of a single inferential act. Therefore, it does not belong in the avayava sequence.

Option A:
Option A, pratijñā, is indeed the first member, stating the thesis that is to be proved.

Option B:
Option B, hetu, gives the reason or ground for the thesis and is a recognised member of the five-part structure.

Option C:
Option C, dṛṣṭānta, provides a familiar example to illustrate the universal concomitance and is also part of the classical scheme.

Option D:
Option D names a broader notion related to sources of knowledge, not a specific segment of the fivefold inferential form, so it is the one that does not fit.

Vyāpti is the technical term in Nyāya logic that refers to the universal, invariable relation between the reason (hetu) and the probandum (sādhya). It is the guarantee that wherever the hetu is present, the sādhya is also present, as in the relation between smoke and fire in proper cases. This invariable concomitance is what justifies moving from the presence of the sign to the conclusion about what it signifies. Without established vyāpti, inference would lack logical force.

Option A:
Option A refers to nigamana, the concluding statement of the five-membered inference, not the relation between reason and probandum.

Option B:
Option B points to the middle term, hetu, which is the sign in the minor term, but vyāpti concerns the relation involving this term, not the term itself.

Option C:
Option C correctly identifies vyāpti as the pervading relation, often described as “wherever smoke, there fire,” which underlies the possibility of anumāna.

Option D:
Option D is dṛṣṭānta or udāharaṇa, the example that illustrates the universal relation, distinct from the relation itself.