UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Statements A, B and C accurately distinguish inference for oneself from inference for others and describe the role of vyāpti illustration. E is also true, since UGC NET includes questions on these modes. D is false because Nyaya clearly accepts svārthānumāna as genuine internal inference. F is false because the canonical parārthānumāna has five members, not merely three. Therefore A, B, C and E only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete as it omits E, failing to mention that exams explicitly test this distinction. While A, B and C are true, they do not cover the full scope of the question.

Option B:
Option B is incorrect because it adds D, which misrepresents Nyaya’s position on svārthānumāna as if it were denied. This contradicts the standard account and makes the combination false.

Option C:
Option C is wrong since it includes F, which claims that parārthānumāna always has exactly three members, and it omits A, losing the definition of svārthānumāna. This mix of omission and error prevents the option from being correct.

Option D:
Option D is correct because it gathers all the true statements and excludes the two false claims about Nyaya’s denial of internal inference and the three-member limitation. It matches the syllabus level treatment of Indian inference.

In Nyāya’s parārthānumāna, udāharaṇa (or dṛṣṭānta) is the step where a general example is cited, such as “like a kitchen where there is smoke and fire.” Its role is to illustrate the universal relation (vyāpti) between hetu and sādhya in a familiar case so that the listener accepts that connection.

Option A:
Option A refers to pratijñā, the thesis, which simply states what is to be proved.

Option B:
Option B refers to the hetu step, where the reason (e.g., “because it has smoke”) is first introduced.

Option C:
Option C correctly identifies udāharaṇa as the example statement that makes the vyāpti vivid by mentioning a well-known case.

Option D:
Option D describes nigamana, the concluding restatement of the thesis after the reason, example and application have been given.

In the Nyāya model, nigamana is the final step where the original thesis (pratijñā) is restated as now established by the reason, example and application. After showing that the hetu pervaded by the sādhya is present in the pakṣa, the arguer concludes “therefore the hill is fiery” or similar. Nigamana thus has a summarising and concluding role in the inferential sequence.

Option A:
Option A describes dṛṣṭānta (or udāharaṇa), where an example like “the kitchen, which has smoke and fire” is introduced.

Option B:
Option B refers to the hetu step, in which the reason such as “because it has smoke” is first stated.

Option C:
Option C correctly portrays nigamana as the terminal restatement of the thesis, now backed by the previously supplied reasoning.

Option D:
Option D instead captures the function of upanaya, which applies the general concomitance to the specific pakṣa.