UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Anumana is the term for inference as a means of valid knowledge in Indian philosophical traditions. It involves moving from the perception of a sign or hetu to knowledge of what that sign indicates, the sadhya. Classical examples include inferring fire from the perception of smoke on a hill. Thus the reasoning-based knowledge described in the stem is called anumana.

Option A:
Option A is correct because anumana is explicitly defined as knowledge arising from inferential reasoning, distinct from direct perception or testimony. It plays a central role in Nyaya and other schools as a pramana. The stem’s emphasis on moving from a sign to what it indicates matches this definition.

Option B:
Option B, pratyaksha, denotes direct perception through sense contact with objects. It does not involve mediated reasoning from signs. Therefore pratyaksha is not the right answer.

Option C:
Option C, upamana, refers to knowledge by comparison or analogy, such as understanding an unfamiliar object by relating it to a known one. Although it involves similarity, it is not the inferential sign-based process indicated in the question.

Option D:
Option D, sabda, corresponds to verbal testimony, particularly from reliable sources or scripture. It delivers knowledge through authoritative statements rather than through reasoning from observed signs. Hence sabda is not suitable here.

Hetu is the term used for the inferential mark or reason that is known to be invariably associated with the probandum. Its presence in the paksha licenses the move to the conclusion, as when smoke functions as hetu for fire on the hill. A proper hetu must satisfy conditions ensuring its reliability. Thus the reason described in the stem is called hetu.

Option A:
Option A, vyapti, is the underlying universal concomitance between hetu and sadhya, not the particular instance observed in the paksha. It is a general relation rather than the concrete reason present in the subject.

Option B:
Option B is correct because hetu is explicitly defined as that which, being pervaded by the sadhya, serves as the logical ground for inference. Without hetu there would be no inferential step from paksha to sadhya.

Option C:
Option C, drstanta, is the illustrative example used to show the vyapti, like a kitchen where smoke and fire co-occur. It supports the argument but is distinct from the reason stated in the paksha.

Option D:
Option D, prameya, is the object of knowledge in general, not specifically the middle term of an inference.

Anumana is defined as knowledge that follows from the recognition of a sign and its universal concomitance with what is to be proved. When we see smoke and recall that wherever there is smoke there is fire, we infer the presence of fire by anumana. It is therefore a mediate form of cognition depending on prior knowledge of vyapti. The description in the stem fits this inferential process exactly.

Option A:
Option A, upamana, yields knowledge by comparison and similarity, not by a sign–probandum relation grounded in vyapti. It relies on resemblance rather than on an established universal connection.

Option B:
Option B, sabda, is verbal testimony, a distinct pramana in which words of a reliable authority produce knowledge. It does not operate through a linga–sadhya relation.

Option C:
Option C is correct because anumana is the standard Indian term for inference based on a reason or sign. It captures the idea of drawing a conclusion about an unperceived entity from perceived evidence.

Option D:
Option D, arthapatti, or postulation, is a pramana recognised especially in Mimamsa where a new fact is posited to reconcile apparently conflicting data. It is not the same as ordinary sign-based inference.