Indian Logic Short Notes (One Liners)

Paper 1 – Short Notes (One Liners)

Logical Reasoning Short Notes (One Liners)

Short Notes

1. Pramāṇa (Means of Knowledge):

Pramāṇa means a valid way to gain true knowledge (pramā).
Indian logic accepts different pramāṇas; Nyāya highlights four main ones.
It is different from opinion, because pramāṇa gives tested and reliable knowledge.
Example: Seeing smoke; Hearing expert words; Inferring fire.

2. Pramā (Valid Knowledge):

Pramā is correct knowledge that matches reality and can be trusted.
It comes through proper pramāṇas like perception, inference, comparison, testimony.
It differs from doubt and illusion, which do not give certainty.
Example: Knowing “This is fire”; Knowing “Water is wet”; Knowing “2+2=4”.

3. Apramā (Invalid Knowledge):

Apramā is wrong or unreliable knowledge that does not match reality.
It includes doubt, mistake, and illusion due to weak sources or wrong reasoning.
It differs from pramā because it cannot be used as proof in argument.
Example: Thinking rope is snake; Wrong rumour as truth; Guessing without evidence.

4. Pratyakṣa (Perception):

Pratyakṣa is knowledge gained directly through senses like eyes and ears.
It is the most basic pramāṇa, but it can fail due to distance or illusion.
It differs from inference because it does not need “because” reasoning.
Example: Seeing a book; Hearing a bell; Feeling heat from fire.

5. Laukika Pratyakṣa (Ordinary Perception):

Laukika perception is normal sense-based knowledge in daily life.
It uses external senses and gives knowledge of common objects and events.
It differs from alaukika perception which is special and not purely sense-based.
Example: Seeing a tree; Tasting sugar; Hearing a song.

6. Alaukika Pratyakṣa (Extraordinary Perception):

Alaukika perception is special perception beyond simple sense contact.
It includes knowing universals, relation by past memory, or yogic perception.
It differs from laukika because it is not only direct sensory contact.
Example: Knowing “cowness” in cows; Recognizing a friend from voice; Yogic insight.

7. Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa (Indeterminate Perception):

Nirvikalpaka is the first raw stage of perception without naming or judging.
You notice something exists, but you do not classify it as “this is a pot”.
It differs from savikalpaka which adds name, class, and features.
Example: Seeing “something” in dark; Noticing a shape; Sensing a presence.

8. Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa (Determinate Perception):

Savikalpaka is the clear stage where you identify and label the object.
It includes name, class, quality, and relation like “This is a red pot”.
It differs from nirvikalpaka because it has full recognition and meaning.
Example: “This is a chair”; “That is a tall man”; “This is a sweet mango”.

9. Anumāna (Inference):

Anumāna is knowledge gained by reasoning from a sign (hetu) to a conclusion (sādhya).
It uses universal relation (vyāpti) like smoke is always with fire.
It differs from perception because it depends on logic, not direct seeing.
Example: Smoke → Fire; Dark clouds → Rain; Footprints → Someone walked.

10. Vyāpti (Invariable Concomitance):

Vyāpti means a fixed universal relation between middle term and major term.
It is the base of inference, like wherever smoke is, fire is present.
It differs from chance relation because it must hold in all relevant cases.
Example: Smoke with Fire; Being human with Mortality; Fire with Heat.

11. Pakṣa (Minor Term/Subject):

Pakṣa is the subject where you want to prove something in inference.
It is the “this” case, like “the hill”, where you see the sign.
It differs from sapakṣa/vipakṣa which are supporting or opposing examples.
Example: Hill in “Hill has fire”; Room in “Room has smoke”; Pot in “Pot is breakable”.

12. Hetu (Middle Term/Reason):

Hetu is the reason or sign used to prove the conclusion in inference.
It must be present in pakṣa and related to sādhya by vyāpti.
It differs from random reason because it must be logically connected.
Example: Smoke as hetu; Wet ground as hetu; Loud sound as hetu.

13. Sādhya (Major Term/Probandum):

Sādhya is what you want to prove about the pakṣa using inference.
It is the target conclusion like “fire” on the hill.
It differs from hetu because hetu is the evidence, sādhya is the result.
Example: Fire on hill; Rain coming; Presence of electricity.

14. Sapakṣa (Positive Instances):

Sapakṣa are examples where both hetu and sādhya are present together.
They support vyāpti by showing the relation in known cases.
It differs from vipakṣa where sādhya is absent.
Example: Kitchen smoke with fire; Furnace smoke with fire; Candle flame with heat.

15. Vipakṣa (Negative Instances):

Vipakṣa are examples where sādhya is absent and hetu should also be absent.
They help confirm vyāpti by showing no counterexample cases.
It differs from sapakṣa because it checks absence cases.
Example: Lake has no fire and no smoke; Sky has no fire and no smoke; Wet clay without smoke.

16. Parārthānumāna (Inference for Others):

It is inference done to convince others using clear steps and words.
Nyāya uses a five-member syllogism to present it properly.
It differs from svārthānumāna which is inference for self inside mind.
Example: Explaining hill fire to friend; Teacher proving logic in class; Debate reasoning.

17. Svārthānumāna (Inference for Self):

It is inference done in one’s own mind to gain knowledge personally.
It may not need full formal steps because it is internal understanding.
It differs from parārtha because no audience is being convinced.
Example: You infer rain from clouds; You infer fever from body heat; You infer power cut from fan stop.

18. Nyāya Five-Member Syllogism (Pañcāvayava):

Nyāya syllogism has 5 parts: Pratijñā, Hetu, Udāharaṇa, Upanaya, Nigamana.
It explains inference clearly with example and application steps.
It differs from Aristotle’s 3-step syllogism used in Western logic.
Example: “Hill has fire”; “Because smoke”; “Where smoke, fire (kitchen)”; “Hill has smoke”; “Therefore hill has fire”.

19. Pratijñā (Proposition):

Pratijñā is the initial statement of what you want to prove.
It declares the sādhya about the pakṣa in a clear sentence.
It differs from nigamana which repeats it as final proven conclusion.
Example: Hill has fire; Room has smoke; This pot is breakable.

20. Udāharaṇa (Example):

Udāharaṇa gives a known example that shows the vyāpti relation.
It usually uses a common case like kitchen smoke with fire.
It differs from upanaya which connects the example back to pakṣa.
Example: Kitchen has smoke with fire; Furnace shows smoke with fire; Lamp shows heat with fire.

21. Upanaya (Application):

Upanaya applies the general rule from udāharaṇa to the present pakṣa case.
It connects “this hill has smoke like the kitchen” type reasoning.
It differs from udāharaṇa because it is about the current case, not general example.
Example: This hill has smoke; This room has smell; This cloth is wet.

22. Nigamana (Conclusion):

Nigamana is the final step stating the conclusion based on earlier steps.
It confirms the sādhya in pakṣa after applying vyāpti and hetu.
It differs from pratijñā because now it is established, not just stated.
Example: Therefore hill has fire; Therefore rain will come; Therefore there is electricity.

23. Upamāna (Comparison/Analogy):

Upamāna is knowledge gained by comparing something unknown with something known.
It helps identify objects by similarity, like learning what “gavaya” is by analogy.
It differs from inference because it depends on resemblance, not vyāpti.
Example: Gavaya like cow; New fruit like mango; New device like a phone.

24. Śabda (Testimony):

Śabda is knowledge gained from reliable words of a trustworthy person or scripture.
It works when the speaker is competent and honest, and message is clear.
It differs from blind belief because it requires trustworthy source.
Example: Doctor advice; Teacher explanation; Official rule notification.

25. Āptavākya (Statement of a Reliable Person):

Āpta is a truthful and knowledgeable person, and āptavākya is their testimony.
Such testimony is accepted as pramāṇa when no strong doubt exists.
It differs from gossip because gossip lacks reliability and verification.
Example: Expert teacher’s statement; Scientist’s explanation; Doctor prescription guidance.

26. Nyāya Four Pramāṇas:

Nyāya accepts four main pramāṇas: perception, inference, comparison, testimony.
These cover direct experience, reasoning, similarity-based knowledge, and trusted words.
It differs from other schools like Mīmāṃsā which accept more pramāṇas.
Example: Pratyakṣa; Anumāna; Upamāna; Śabda.

27. Hetvābhāsa (Fallacy of Reason):

Hetvābhāsa is a faulty reason that only appears to be a valid hetu.
It breaks inference because it fails conditions like presence in pakṣa or vyāpti.
It differs from true hetu which must be reliable and universally connected.
Example: Proving fire from “red color”; Proving rain from “cold wind always”; Proving honesty from “nice dress”.

28. Savyabhicāra (Irregular Middle):

It is a hetvābhāsa where the reason is not consistently linked with the conclusion.
The hetu occurs in some cases without the sādhya, so vyāpti fails.
It differs from valid hetu because valid hetu never breaks the universal rule.
Example: “Smoky because fog”; “Fire because heat” (heat can exist without fire); “Living because moving” (machines move).

29. Viruddha (Contradictory Reason):

Viruddha hetu proves the opposite of what you want to prove.
The reason supports a conclusion that contradicts your target sādhya.
It differs from weak reason; here it directly goes against the conclusion.
Example: “Sound is eternal because it is produced” (produced suggests non-eternal); “Fire is cold because it burns”; “Water is dry because it wets”.

30. Satpratipakṣa (Counterbalanced Reason):

Satpratipakṣa means there is an equally strong opposite reason available.
Because both sides have strong reasons, the inference becomes undecided.
It differs from contradiction because here reasoning is balanced, not impossible.
Example: “This is good because popular” vs “Not good because misleading”; “Soul exists because memory” vs “Soul not needed because brain”; “God exists because order” vs “No proof because suffering”.

31. Asiddha (Unproved Middle):

Asiddha is a fallacy where the hetu is not established in the pakṣa.
If the reason itself is doubtful or absent in the subject, inference fails.
It differs from irregular middle because here hetu is not even proven present.
Example: “Hill has fire because water” (water not on hill); “Man is wise because horns”; “Room has smoke because cloud inside”.

32. Bādhita (Contradicted Middle):

Bādhita is a reason contradicted by stronger evidence like perception.
If direct perception shows the opposite, inference using that reason fails.
It differs from asiddha because hetu may exist, but it is defeated by stronger proof.
Example: “Fire is cold because touch” (perception shows heat); “Sun is small because looks small”; “Water is dry because looks clear”.

33. Pramāṇa vs Prameya:

Pramāṇa is the means of knowledge, while prameya is the object known.
One is the method, the other is the target or content of knowledge.
Many confuse them; pramāṇa gives knowledge, prameya receives the knowledge.
Example: Eye as pramāṇa; Pot as prameya; Inference as pramāṇa.

34. Prameya (Object of Knowledge):

Prameya means the thing or fact that is known through pramāṇas.
Nyāya lists many prameyas like soul, body, senses, mind, and more.
It differs from pramiti, which is the act/result of knowing, not the object.
Example: Pot as object known; Fire as object known; Truth about “rain” as object known.

35. Pramiti (Cognition/Knowledge Result):

Pramiti is the knowledge produced in the mind after using a pramāṇa.
It is the result of knowing, like “I know this is a pot”.
It differs from prameya because prameya is outside object, pramiti is mental result.
Example: Knowing “This is smoke”; Knowing “This is fire”; Knowing “This is my book”.

36. Doubt (Saṃśaya):

Doubt is an uncertain state where you cannot decide between two options.
It happens due to similar features or lack of clear evidence.
It differs from error because doubt is “not sure”, error is “sure but wrong”.
Example: Rope or snake; Friend or stranger from far; Which option is correct.

37. Error/Illusion (Viparyaya):

Viparyaya is wrong knowledge where you are confident but the reality is different.
It happens due to faulty perception, memory mixing, or wrong conditions.
It differs from doubt because doubt is uncertain, illusion feels certain.
Example: Rope seen as snake; Mirage seen as water; Shell seen as silver.

38. Memory (Smṛti):

Smṛti is remembering past knowledge without new direct contact now.
It is not treated as a primary pramāṇa in Nyāya because it depends on earlier knowledge.
It differs from perception, which is fresh knowledge from present sense contact.
Example: Remembering a formula; Remembering a friend’s face; Remembering yesterday’s class.

39. Valid Reason Conditions (Hetu Lakṣaṇa):

A valid hetu must satisfy key conditions like presence in pakṣa and connection by vyāpti.
It should be in sapakṣa and absent in vipakṣa for strong inference.
It differs from weak reason which fails one or more of these conditions.
Example: Smoke present on hill; Smoke present in kitchen with fire; Smoke absent in lake without fire.

40. Vyāpti-Graha (Knowing Vyāpti):

Vyāpti-graha is the method of knowing the universal relation needed for inference.
It is gained by observation of cases and absence cases, and no counterexample.
It differs from guesswork; it needs repeated checking and reliability.
Example: Many times smoke with fire; Never smoke without fire in known cases; Using kitchen and lake examples.

41. Anvaya–Vyatireka Method:

Anvaya means presence-with-presence, and vyatireka means absence-with-absence.
Together they help establish vyāpti by checking both positive and negative cases.
It differs from single observation because it requires both sides checking.
Example: Smoke with fire (anvaya); No fire means no smoke (vyatireka); Heat with fire; No fire means no heat.

42. Kevalānvayi Hetu:

Kevalānvayi is a reason found only in positive cases, with no negative example available.
Vyāpti is known only through agreement in presence, not through absence cases.
It differs from kevalavyatireki which is known mainly through absence.
Example: “Knowable, therefore nameable” type cases; “Made therefore impermanent” (treated as always with impermanence); “Desirable therefore good” type patterns.

43. Kevalavyatireki Hetu:

Kevalavyatireki is a reason established mainly through negative cases.
Here you rely on absence examples where sādhya is absent and hetu is absent.
It differs from kevalānvayi because it uses strong “absence” checking.
Example: “Not perceivable, therefore not material” type; “No smoke where no fire”; “No shadow where no light-blocking object”.

44. Anvaya-Vyatireki Hetu:

This is the common type where both positive and negative cases are available.
Vyāpti is established through both presence and absence checking.
It is usually easiest to understand and appears in many standard examples.
Example: Smoke and fire (kitchen/lake); Wet and water presence; Footprints and person presence.

45. Pakṣatā (Fitness of Subject):

Pakṣatā means the subject is fit for inference because the conclusion is doubtful there.
If you already perceive fire on hill, inference is not needed; if you doubt, inference starts.
It differs from certainty; inference works when there is a need to prove.
Example: Hill where fire is not directly seen; Room where smell suggests something; Sky where you doubt cloud movement.

46. Liṅga (Sign):

Liṅga is the sign or mark that indicates the presence of something else.
In inference, liṅga is similar to hetu as the reason to prove sādhya.
It differs from symbol; liṅga is a real sign observed in the subject.
Example: Smoke as sign of fire; Footprints as sign of person; Dark clouds as sign of rain.

47. Pakṣadharmatā:

Pakṣadharmatā means the hetu is present in the pakṣa (subject).
Without this, inference fails because the reason is not found in the case.
It differs from vyāpti; vyāpti is universal link, pakṣadharmatā is local presence.
Example: Smoke seen on hill; Smell in room; Wetness on floor.

48. Sādhya-Sambandha (Relation to Conclusion):

The hetu must be related to the sādhya through a reliable universal relation.
This relation ensures the reason truly supports the conclusion.
It differs from mere association, because association may be accidental.
Example: Smoke linked with fire; Disease symptom linked with illness; Dark clouds linked with rain.

49. Parāmarśa (Consideration):

Parāmarśa is the mental step: “This hill has smoke which is always with fire”.
It connects pakṣadharmatā and vyāpti, and then inference arises.
It differs from mere seeing smoke; it is “seeing + remembering universal relation”.
Example: Seeing smoke and recalling smoke-fire link; Seeing wet ground and recalling rain-wet link; Seeing footprints and recalling person-footprint link.

50. Anumiti (Inferential Knowledge):

Anumiti is the final knowledge produced by inference after parāmarśa.
It is the result cognition like “There is fire on the hill”.
It differs from anumāna, which is the process/means; anumiti is the result.
Example: Knowing “Hill has fire”; Knowing “It will rain”; Knowing “Someone walked here”.

51. Arthāpatti (Postulation):

Arthāpatti means finding a new hidden fact to explain an observed fact without contradiction.
It is used when perception and inference cannot explain the situation clearly.
Many confuse it with inference, but here the new fact is assumed to save consistency.
Example: Devadatta is fat but does not eat in daytime → He eats at night; A person is alive but not seen at home → He is outside; Salary is low but lifestyle is high → Extra income exists.

52. Anupalabdhi (Non-Perception):

Anupalabdhi means knowing “absence” because the thing is not perceived where it should be seen.
It is used to know “there is no pot on the floor” when the floor is clearly visible.
Many confuse it with perception, but it is knowledge of absence, not presence.
Example: No chalk on board; No keys on table; No student in the class.

53. Tarka (Hypothetical Reasoning):

Tarka means testing an idea by assuming it and seeing if it creates contradiction.
It helps remove wrong doubt and supports inference, but it is not a full pramāṇa by itself.
Many treat it as proof, but it is mainly a checking tool for better clarity.
Example: Assume “Fire is cold” → Contradiction; Assume “All effects are eternal” → Contradiction; Assume “No cause is needed” → Contradiction.

54. Upādhi (Condition/Limit):

Upādhi is a hidden condition that makes a supposed universal relation fail.
It explains why a hetu sometimes appears with sādhya but not always in every case.
Many mistakes happen when upādhi is ignored and vyāpti is assumed too quickly.
Example: Smoke with Fire “when fuel burns”; Heat with Fire “in burning objects”; Wetness with Water “in normal conditions”.

55. Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa:

It is extraordinary perception where you grasp a general class (universal) through a particular object.
By seeing one cow, you also understand “cowness” as a common feature in all cows.
Many confuse it with inference, but it is treated as a special kind of perception.
Example: Seeing “cowness” in a cow; Seeing “potness” in a pot; Seeing “treeness” in a tree.

56. Jñāna-lakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa:

It is extraordinary perception where memory-linked knowledge makes you “perceive” related things.
Seeing sandalwood can bring the smell in mind as if it is present now.
Many confuse it with pure memory, but it starts from present perception and then links.
Example: Seeing Ice and feeling “coldness” strongly; Seeing Mango and sensing “taste” in mind; Seeing Friend and recalling voice instantly.

57. Yogaja Pratyakṣa (Yogic Perception):

Yogaja pratyakṣa is special direct knowledge gained through deep yoga practice.
It is said to go beyond normal senses and gives very clear awareness.
Many confuse it with imagination, but in texts it is treated as a valid extraordinary perception.
Example: Deep meditation insight; Clear inner awareness of mind states; Intense concentration-based knowledge.

58. Pūrvat Anumāna (Cause → Effect):

Pūrvat inference predicts an effect from a known cause.
It uses a known relation like “dark clouds usually lead to rain.”
Many confuse it with perception, but rain is not seen yet; it is predicted by reasoning.
Example: Dark clouds → Rain; Fever symptoms → Illness; Lightning → Thunder soon.

59. Śeṣavat Anumāna (Effect → Cause):

Śeṣavat inference finds a cause from an observed effect.
It uses reasoning like “wet ground suggests it rained.”
Many confuse it with guess, but it depends on known regular relation between cause and effect.
Example: Wet road → Rain happened; Smoke smell → Fire happened; Footprints → Someone walked.

60. Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa Anumāna:

This inference is based on general observation, not strict cause-effect relation.
It uses common relation like “movement suggests some force or effort.”
Many confuse it with pūrvat/śeṣavat, but here it is not direct cause-effect prediction.
Example: Seeing a watch → There is a maker; Seeing order → There is planning; Seeing change → There is some cause.

61. Sādhāraṇa Hetu (Common Reason):

A common reason is found in cases with sādhya and also in cases without sādhya.
Because it appears on both sides, it cannot strongly prove the conclusion.
Many use such reasons in exams and get wrong because the link is not fixed.
Example: “Knowable” for “Nameable”; “Visible” for “Good”; “Pleasant” for “True”.

62. Asādhāraṇa Hetu (Uncommon Reason):

An uncommon reason appears only in the subject (pakṣa) and not in similar examples.
Because it cannot be tested in sapakṣa/vipakṣa properly, it becomes unreliable.
Many think “unique reason” is strong, but in logic it can be weak for proof.
Example: “This hill has special smoke only here”; “Only this person has this sign”; “Only this object shows this mark”.

63. Anupasaṃhāri Hetu (All-Pervading Reason):

Anupasaṃhāri hetu is said to be present everywhere, so negative examples do not exist.
Vyāpti is handled only through positive agreement, not through absence testing.
Many find it confusing because vipakṣa cannot be clearly shown in such cases.
Example: “Knowable” used in broad claims; “Nameable” in general claims; “Object of knowledge” type relations.

64. Nirṇaya (Ascertainment):

Nirṇaya means final clear decision after removing doubt using proper reasoning and evidence.
It comes after checking pramāṇas and seeing which view fits without contradiction.
Many confuse it with opinion, but nirṇaya is stable and reason-supported knowledge.
Example: Deciding answer after checking options; Final judgement after proof; Confirming truth after evidence.

65. Vāda (Discussion):

Vāda is a fair debate where both sides aim to find truth using correct reasoning.
It uses valid pramāṇas and avoids tricks, anger, and personal attacks.
Many confuse debate types; vāda is the ideal and most respectful form.
Example: Teacher-student reasoning talk; Academic seminar debate; Court-style logical discussion.

66. Jalpa (Wrangling):

Jalpa is debate aimed at winning, not at truth.
It allows unfair moves like tricky words and weak reasons to defeat the opponent.
Many confuse it with vāda, but jalpa focuses on victory rather than correctness.
Example: Debate with only “win” goal; Using blame to silence; Using weak logic to look strong.

67. Vitaṇḍā (Cavil/Destructive Debate):

Vitaṇḍā means only criticizing the opponent without giving your own clear thesis.
The person tries to show the other side is wrong but does not prove their own view.
Many confuse it with jalpa; vitaṇḍā is more “attack only” without positive claim.
Example: Only finding faults in others; Saying “you are wrong” without alternative; Pure objection style debate.

68. Nigrahasthāna (Points of Defeat):

Nigrahasthāna are mistakes in debate that make a person lose the argument.
These include self-contradiction, changing the stand, or using meaningless statements.
Many forget these in PYQs; they are key terms in Nyāya debate theory.
Example: Contradicting your own claim; Avoiding the main point; Using unclear answers.

69. Siddhānta (Established Doctrine):

Siddhānta is an accepted conclusion in a system after proper reasoning.
It acts as a stable base for further arguments and learning in that tradition.
Many confuse it with personal belief; siddhānta is accepted by the school logically.
Example: “Four pramāṇas” in Nyāya; “Karma theory” in many schools; “Mokṣa as goal” in many traditions.

70. Dr̥ṣṭānta (Illustrative Example):

Dr̥ṣṭānta is a clear example used to show the universal relation in inference.
It supports the reasoning by giving a known case like kitchen smoke with fire.
Many confuse it with upanaya; dr̥ṣṭānta is general example, not application to pakṣa.
Example: Kitchen smoke with fire; Furnace smoke with fire; Lamp heat with fire.

71. Padārtha (Categories):

Padārtha means the main “things to be known” or categories used to explain reality in Indian systems.
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika uses categories like substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and inherence.
It helps reasoning because you classify what you discuss, so arguments become clear and exact.
Example: Substance like Pot; Quality like Color; Action like Movement.

72. Dravya (Substance):

Dravya is the base “thing” that supports qualities and actions.
In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, substances include earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, self, mind.
It differs from quality because substance can hold qualities, but quality cannot stand alone.
Example: Pot as substance; Water as substance; Mind as substance.

73. Guṇa (Quality):

Guṇa is a quality that depends on a substance and cannot exist alone.
Examples include color, taste, smell, number, size, and also cognition and pleasure in self.
It differs from action because quality is stable attribute, action is movement or change.
Example: Red color; Sweet taste; Knowledge in a person.

74. Karma (Action):

Karma is action or motion present in a substance, like moving or falling.
It causes change and is one of the categories used to explain events.
It differs from quality because action is dynamic, while quality is an attribute.
Example: Walking; Falling; Rotating.

75. Sāmānya (Generality/Universal):

Sāmānya is the common feature shared by many individuals of the same class.
It helps in classification, like “cowness” in all cows.
It differs from viśeṣa because sāmānya is shared, viśeṣa makes unique identity.
Example: Cowness; Treeness; Humanity.

76. Viśeṣa (Particularity):

Viśeṣa is the unique feature that makes one ultimate entity different from another.
It is used mainly to distinguish atoms and individual selves in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.
It differs from sāmānya because it is not shared by a group, it is purely unique.
Example: Uniqueness of atom A; Uniqueness of atom B; Unique self identity.

77. Samavāya (Inherence):

Samavāya is an inseparable relation between two things that cannot be separated.
Example: cloth and threads; whole and parts; universal and individual.
It differs from ordinary contact, because contact can break, inherence cannot.
Example: Threads in cloth; Color in flower; Cowness in a cow.

78. Abhāva (Absence):

Abhāva means absence or non-existence, like “no pot on floor.”
Some systems treat it as a separate category and discuss types of absence.
It differs from non-perception; abhāva is the absence itself, anupalabdhi is knowing it.
Example: Absence of chalk; Absence of sound; Absence of light.

79. Saṃyoga (Conjunction/Contact):

Saṃyoga is contact between two substances, like book on table.
It can be made and broken, so it is temporary.
It differs from samavāya because samavāya is permanent inseparable relation.
Example: Cup on plate; Person holding pen; Ring on finger.

80. Vibhāga (Disjunction/Separation):

Vibhāga means separation of two things that were earlier in contact.
It explains breaking contact like removing book from table.
It differs from conjunction, because it is the opposite process in relations.
Example: Removing cup from plate; Dropping a pen; Taking ring off finger.

81. Kāraṇa (Cause):

Kāraṇa is the cause that produces an effect (kārya).
Indian logic studies different kinds of causes like material, instrumental, and non-material causes.
It differs from condition; cause directly produces effect, condition only supports it.
Example: Clay causes pot; Seed causes plant; Fuel causes fire.

82. Kārya (Effect):

Kārya is the result produced from a cause.
It depends on cause and conditions, and it may change or perish with time.
It differs from cause; effect is produced, cause produces.
Example: Pot from clay; Plant from seed; Smoke from fire.

83. Samavāyi Kāraṇa (Inherent Material Cause):

It is the material cause that remains inseparably in the effect.
Example: threads are in the cloth, so threads are samavāyi cause of cloth.
It differs from nimitta cause, which is outside like a weaver’s action.
Example: Threads for cloth; Clay for pot; Atoms for a substance.

84. Nimitta Kāraṇa (Efficient Cause):

Nimitta cause is the efficient or instrumental cause that helps produce the effect.
Example: potter makes pot using clay, so potter is nimitta cause.
It differs from material cause, because nimitta is not part of the final product.
Example: Potter for pot; Weaver for cloth; Carpenter for chair.

85. Asamavāyi Kāraṇa (Non-inherent Cause):

It is a cause that is not part of the effect, but contributes through material cause.
Example: color in threads helps color in cloth, so thread-color is asamavāyi cause.
It differs from samavāyi because it is not directly inhering in the effect as substance.
Example: Thread color for cloth color; Clay’s qualities for pot qualities; Atom qualities for object qualities.

86. Satkāryavāda vs Asatkāryavāda (Effect Theory):

Satkāryavāda says effect exists in cause in unmanifest form; Sāṃkhya supports it.
Asatkāryavāda says effect is new and does not pre-exist; Nyāya supports this view.
Many confuse; this is about whether effect is already “there” in cause or not.
Example: Milk → Curd (Satkārya view); Clay → Pot (Asatkārya view); Seed → Plant (debated case).

87. Parināmavāda (Real Transformation):

Parināmavāda says cause really transforms into effect, like milk becoming curd.
The cause changes form, but matter continues in a new state.
It differs from vivartavāda where change is only appearance, not real change.
Example: Milk to curd; Seed to plant; Dough to bread.

88. Vivartavāda (Apparent Change):

Vivartavāda says the effect is only an appearance, and the cause remains unchanged.
Example: rope seen as snake; Brahman appears as world in Advaita view.
It differs from parināmavāda which accepts real transformation.
Example: Rope-snake illusion; Mirage water; One reality appearing as many.

89. Ātman (Self):

Ātman is the self, considered a knower and experiencer of knowledge, pleasure, pain.
Nyāya treats it as a real substance that is different from body and senses.
It differs from mind; mind is an instrument, self is the owner of experience.
Example: Feeling happy; Knowing a fact; Experiencing pain.

90. Manas (Mind):

Manas is an internal organ that connects the self to senses for cognition.
Nyāya says mind is atomic (very subtle) and allows attention to one object at a time.
It differs from self; self is stable experiencer, mind is the connecting instrument.
Example: Focusing on one sound; Shifting attention to sight; Thinking about a memory.

91. Prāgabhāva (Prior Absence):

Prāgabhāva means an object was absent before it was produced.
It ends when the object is created, so it has a clear “ending point”.
It helps explain “before creation” absence in cause–effect thinking.
Example: Absence of Pot before making; Absence of Cloth before weaving; Absence of Plant before germination.

92. Dhvaṃsābhāva (Posterior Absence):

Dhvaṃsābhāva means an object is absent after it is destroyed.
It begins when the object is destroyed, and continues after that.
It helps explain “after destruction” absence in daily examples.
Example: Absence of Pot after breaking; Absence of Lamp after extinguishing; Absence of Book after burning.

93. Atyantābhāva (Absolute Absence):

Atyantābhāva means total non-existence of something at all times and places.
It is not tied to creation or destruction; it is “never exists” type absence.
It is used for impossible relations or impossible objects.
Example: Absence of Horns in a Rabbit; Absence of Square Circle; Absence of Fire inside Water (as a nature).

94. Anyonyābhāva (Mutual Absence):

Anyonyābhāva means mutual difference: A is not B, and B is not A.
It explains identity differences like “pot is not cloth” by nature.
It is not about time; it is about “this is different from that”.
Example: Pot is not Cloth; Cow is not Horse; Pen is not Pencil.

95. Lakṣaṇa (Definition):

Lakṣaṇa is a proper definition that shows the exact nature of a thing.
A good definition should be clear, not too broad, and not too narrow.
In exams, wrong definitions are tested using common definition-fault terms.
Example: Defining Triangle; Defining Teacher; Defining Valid Knowledge.

96. Ativyāpti (Too Broad Definition):

Ativyāpti means the definition includes extra things that should not be included.
It becomes “over-covering” and fails to separate the target from non-target.
Many PYQs ask you to spot why a definition is too broad.
Example: “Bird = Animal that flies” includes Bat; “Student = Person in a building” includes Visitors; “Triangle = Shape with sides” includes Square.

97. Avyāpti (Too Narrow Definition):

Avyāpti means the definition misses some true cases of the target.
It becomes “under-covering” and does not include all members correctly.
Many confuse it with ativyāpti; here the problem is missing real cases.
Example: “Bird = Sparrow” misses Crow; “Even number = Multiple of 4” misses 2,6; “Teacher = Person in school” misses Online tutor.

98. Asambhava (Impossible Definition):

Asambhava means the definition is impossible or cannot fit any real case.
It describes the target using a condition that can never happen.
It is common in PYQs as “definition has no possible example”.
Example: “Man = One with horns”; “Fire = Cold object”; “Square = Circle-shaped”.

99. Trairūpya (Three Marks of Valid Hetu):

Trairūpya means the valid reason must satisfy three basic conditions.
The hetu must be in the subject, found in similar cases, and absent in dissimilar cases.
It helps quickly test whether a reason can work in inference.
Example: Smoke on Hill; Smoke in Kitchen with Fire; No Smoke in Lake without Fire.

100. Indriya–Artha Sannikarsa (Sense–Object Contact):

Sense–object contact is required for ordinary perception in Nyāya.
Without contact, perception does not arise, even if the object exists.
Contact can be direct or through special relations like inherence.
Example: Eye with Color; Ear with Sound; Nose with Smell.

101. Sāmānya (Universal) as Pratyakṣa Target:

Nyāya says you can know universals like “cowness” through perception.
It is not just a word; it is treated as a real common nature.
This point is often tested as “universal known by what pramāṇa?”
Example: Cowness in Cow; Potness in Pot; Treeness in Tree.

102. Laukika Śabda (Human Testimony):

Laukika śabda is knowledge from trustworthy human statements.
It works when the speaker knows the fact and speaks honestly and clearly.
It differs from guessing, because the source must be reliable.
Example: Doctor’s Prescription; Teacher’s Instruction; Official Notice.

103. Vaidika Śabda (Scriptural Testimony):

Vaidika śabda is knowledge from Vedas, treated as authoritative in many schools.
It is used mainly for things beyond ordinary senses, like dharma or mokṣa topics.
Many PYQs ask “vaidika vs laukika” in śabda-pramāṇa.
Example: Dharma Rules from Text; Ritual Instructions; Mokṣa Teaching.

104. Chala (Quibble):

Chala means twisting someone’s words by taking a different meaning to win a debate.
It focuses on language tricks instead of the real idea being discussed.
It is treated as an unfair move in debate theory.
Example: Misreading a word’s meaning; Taking a joke as claim; Using grammar to escape answer.

105. Jāti (Futile Rejoinder):

Jāti is a weak, endless type of objection that does not truly refute the point.
It repeats patterns of doubt without giving solid counter-proof.
It is listed in Nyāya debate as an improper method.
Example: “Your reason is like mine, so wrong”; “This also can be doubted”; “It might be different, so reject”.

106. Nigrahasthāna (Defeat by Fault):

Nigrahasthāna is defeat due to clear faults like contradiction or changing stand.
It is not about “who shouts louder”; it is about rule-based debate mistakes.
PYQs often ask examples like self-contradiction or irrelevant reply.
Example: Self-contradiction; Changing topic; Refusing to answer.

107. Navya-Nyāya (New Nyāya):

Navya-Nyāya is a later development that uses very precise technical language.
It aimed to remove confusion by using strict analysis of meaning and relations.
It differs from older style because it becomes more formal and exact.
Example: Technical term analysis; Precise relation words; Detailed logic structure.

108. Nyāya vs Vaiśeṣika (Quick Idea):

Nyāya focuses more on logic, debate, and pramāṇas for knowledge.
Vaiśeṣika focuses more on categories (padārthas) and theory of reality.
Many texts later combine them as Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika tradition.
Example: Pramāṇa focus; Padārtha focus; Combined school view.

109. Pramāṇya (Validity of Knowledge):

Pramāṇya means “knowledge is valid”, and systems debate how validity is known.
Some say validity is known by itself, others say it needs later checking.
This is a common confusion question in Indian epistemology.
Example: Trusting clear perception; Verifying by re-check; Correcting after mistake.

110. Aprāmāṇya (Invalidity of Knowledge):

Aprāmāṇya means “knowledge is invalid” due to error, doubt, or wrong source.
It is known when you find mismatch with reality or stronger counter-evidence.
It differs from simple ignorance, because here there is a wrong cognition present.
Example: Rope seen as Snake; Mirage seen as Water; Wrong rumor accepted as fact.

110 Most Asked in PYQs One Liners

Pramāṇa means a valid source/means of knowledge.
Pramā is correct knowledge that matches reality.
Apramā is invalid knowledge like doubt or illusion.
Pratyakṣa is knowledge through direct perception.
Anumāna is knowledge through inference from a sign.
Upamāna is knowledge through comparison/similarity.
Śabda is knowledge from reliable testimony.
Nyāya accepts four pramāṇas: perception, inference, comparison, testimony.
Vyāpti is the universal relation needed for inference.
Hetu is the reason/sign used in inference.
Pakṣa is the subject where you prove the conclusion.
Sādhya is what you want to prove in the subject.
Sapakṣa are positive instances where hetu and sādhya occur together.
Vipakṣa are negative instances where sādhya is absent.
Pañcāvayava is Nyāya’s five-member syllogism.
Pratijñā states the claim to be proved.
Udāharaṇa gives an example showing the universal rule.
Upanaya applies the rule to the present case.
Nigamana states the final conclusion.
Hetvābhāsa is a fallacy of the middle term (wrong reason).
Savyabhicāra is an irregular middle where vyāpti fails.
Viruddha is a reason that proves the opposite.
Asiddha is an unproved middle not established in the subject.
Bādhita is a reason defeated by stronger evidence.
Satpratipakṣa is a reason blocked by an equally strong counter-reason.
Nirvikalpaka is indeterminate perception without naming.
Savikalpaka is determinate perception with naming and features.
Āpta is a trustworthy, competent speaker.
Āptavākya is testimony of a reliable person.
Saṃśaya means doubt between alternatives.
Viparyaya means illusion or wrong cognition.
Smṛti is memory, not fresh knowledge by senses now.
Prameya is the object of knowledge.
Pramiti is the knowledge result in the mind.
Parāmarśa is linking sign-in-subject with universal relation.
Anumiti is the final inferential knowledge.
Pakṣadharmatā means hetu is present in the subject.
Anvaya checks presence-with-presence in vyāpti testing.
Vyatireka checks absence-with-absence in vyāpti testing.
Anvaya–Vyatireka is the method to establish universal relation.
Kevalānvayi uses only positive agreement cases.
Kevalavyatireki uses mainly negative absence cases.
Anvaya-Vyatireki uses both positive and negative cases.
Pakṣatā means the subject is fit for inference due to doubt.
Liṅga is the observed sign indicating the conclusion.
Scope confusion often occurs in negating “all” and “some”.
Not(All) means “Some not”, not “None”.
Not(Some) means “None”, i.e., “All not”.
Testimony works only when the speaker is trustworthy and message is clear.
Inference needs both sign in subject and universal relation remembered.
Arthāpatti explains an observed fact by assuming a needed hidden fact without contradiction.
Anupalabdhi is knowing absence when an object is not perceived where it should be seen.
Tarka checks an idea by assuming it and spotting contradiction.
Upādhi is a hidden condition that breaks a wrongly assumed universal relation.
Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa perceives the universal through a particular object.
Jñāna-lakṣaṇa connects present perception with memory-linked awareness.
Yogaja Pratyakṣa is extraordinary perception gained through yogic practice.
Pūrvat Anumāna infers effect from cause.
Śeṣavat Anumāna infers cause from effect.
Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa Anumāna uses general relation, not strict cause-effect.
Sādhāraṇa Hetu appears in both similar and dissimilar cases, so it is weak.
Asādhāraṇa Hetu is limited to pakṣa and becomes hard to test.
Anupasaṃhāri Hetu has no clear vipakṣa, so absence testing is not possible.
Nirṇaya is final certainty after removing doubt through reasoning.
Vāda is truth-seeking debate using correct reasoning.
Jalpa is win-seeking debate that can use unfair moves.
Vitaṇḍā attacks opponent’s view without presenting one’s own thesis.
Nigrahasthāna are debate-faults that cause defeat.
Siddhānta is an established conclusion accepted in a system.
Dr̥ṣṭānta is the example used to show vyāpti in inference.
Padārtha means categories used to explain and classify reality.
Dravya is substance that supports qualities and actions.
Guṇa is a quality that depends on a substance.
Karma is action/motion present in a substance.
Sāmānya is a universal common feature shared by many.
Viśeṣa is unique particularity that distinguishes ultimate entities.
Samavāya is inseparable inherence relation.
Abhāva means absence or non-existence as a category.
Saṃyoga is conjunction/contact between substances.
Vibhāga is separation after contact.
Kāraṇa is cause that produces an effect.
Kārya is the effect produced from a cause.
Samavāyi Kāraṇa is the inherent material cause present in the effect.
Nimitta Kāraṇa is the efficient cause like agent/tool.
Asamavāyi Kāraṇa is non-inherent cause like qualities of material cause.
Asatkāryavāda says effect is newly produced and not pre-existing in cause.
Satkāryavāda says effect pre-exists in cause in unmanifest form.
Parināmavāda says cause really transforms into effect.
Vivartavāda says effect is only apparent change, not real change.
Manas links self with senses and allows one cognition at a time.
Prāgabhāva is absence before an object is produced.
Dhvaṃsābhāva is absence after an object is destroyed.
Atyantābhāva is absolute absence for all times and places.
Anyonyābhāva means mutual difference: A is not B.
Lakṣaṇa is a correct definition that fits only the target class.
Ativyāpti is a definition that is too broad and includes extra cases.
Avyāpti is a definition that is too narrow and misses true cases.
Asambhava is an impossible definition that fits no real case.
Trairūpya tests a valid hetu using three basic conditions.
Sannikarsa (contact) is needed for ordinary perception in Nyāya.
Sāmānya (universal) can be known through perception in Nyāya view.
Laukika Śabda is testimony from a trustworthy human source.
Vaidika Śabda is scriptural testimony used for beyond-sense topics.
Chala is quibbling by twisting the meaning of words in debate.
Jāti is a futile objection that does not truly refute the point.
Nigrahasthāna is defeat due to debate faults like contradiction.
Navya-Nyāya uses highly precise technical language for analysis.
Nyāya stresses pramāṇas and logic; Vaiśeṣika stresses categories of reality.
Pramāṇya means the validity of knowledge.
Aprāmāṇya means invalidity of knowledge due to error or defeat by evidence.

90 Confusing Pairs / Differences

Pramāṇa vs Prameya — Pramāṇa is the means of knowing; prameya is the object known.
Pramā vs Apramā — Pramā is valid knowledge; apramā is invalid knowledge.
Pratyakṣa vs Anumāna — Pratyakṣa is direct sense knowledge; anumāna is reasoning-based knowledge.
Upamāna vs Anumāna — Upamāna uses similarity; anumāna uses universal relation (vyāpti).
Śabda vs Gossip — Śabda is reliable testimony; gossip is unreliable talk.
Nirvikalpaka vs Savikalpaka — Nirvikalpaka is raw perception; savikalpaka is identified perception.
Laukika vs Alaukika — Laukika is ordinary perception; alaukika is extraordinary perception.
Hetu vs Sādhya — Hetu is the reason; sādhya is what is proved.
Pakṣa vs Sapakṣa — Pakṣa is the subject case; sapakṣa is supporting example cases.
Sapakṣa vs Vipakṣa — Sapakṣa has sādhya present; vipakṣa has sādhya absent.
Pratijñā vs Nigamana — Pratijñā states the claim first; nigamana gives the proved conclusion last.
Udāharaṇa vs Upanaya — Udāharaṇa gives example rule; upanaya applies it to the case.
Parārthānumāna vs Svārthānumāna — Parārtha is for others; svārtha is for self.
Vyāpti vs Pakṣadharmatā — Vyāpti is universal link; pakṣadharmatā is sign present in subject.
Hetu Lakṣaṇa vs Hetvābhāsa — Hetu lakṣaṇa are valid conditions; hetvābhāsa is faulty reason.
Savyabhicāra vs Asiddha — Savyabhicāra is irregular link; asiddha is reason not proved in subject.
Viruddha vs Bādhita — Viruddha supports opposite conclusion; bādhita is defeated by stronger evidence.
Satpratipakṣa vs Contradiction — Satpratipakṣa has equal counter-reason; contradiction is impossible together.
Saṃśaya vs Viparyaya — Saṃśaya is doubt; viparyaya is confident wrong knowledge.
Anumāna vs Anumiti — Anumāna is the process/means; anumiti is the inferential result.
Parāmarśa vs Anumiti — Parāmarśa is the linking step; anumiti is the final conclusion knowledge.
Anvaya vs Vyatireka — Anvaya checks presence together; vyatireka checks absence together.
Anvaya–Vyatireka vs Single Observation — Anvaya–vyatireka tests both sides; single observation is weak.
Kevalānvayi vs Kevalavyatireki — Kevalānvayi uses only positives; kevalavyatireki uses mainly negatives.
Memory (Smṛti) vs Perception (Pratyakṣa) — Smṛti is past recall; pratyakṣa is present sense knowledge.
Āpta vs Non-expert — Āpta is competent and truthful; non-expert may mislead unknowingly.
Pramiti vs Prameya — Pramiti is cognition result; prameya is the object of cognition.
Universal Statement vs Particular Statement — Universal says all; particular says at least one.
Not(All) vs None — Not(all) means some not; none means no one at all.
Not(Some) vs Some Not — Not(some) means none; some not means at least one exception.
Arthāpatti vs Anumāna — Arthāpatti assumes a needed hidden fact to fit data; anumāna concludes using vyāpti.
Anupalabdhi vs Pratyakṣa — Anupalabdhi knows absence; pratyakṣa knows presence by senses.
Tarka vs Pramāṇa — Tarka is a checking tool; pramāṇa is a direct means of valid knowledge.
Upādhi vs Vyāpti — Upādhi limits the relation; vyāpti is the universal relation itself.
Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa vs Laukika Pratyakṣa — Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa is extraordinary; laukika is ordinary sense perception.
Jñāna-lakṣaṇa vs Smṛti — Jñāna-lakṣaṇa starts from perception and links memory; smṛti is pure recall.
Yogaja Pratyakṣa vs Imagination — Yogaja is treated as valid extraordinary knowing; imagination has no proof link.
Pūrvat vs Śeṣavat — Pūrvat infers effect from cause; śeṣavat infers cause from effect.
Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa vs Cause-Effect Inference — Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa uses general relation; cause-effect uses direct causal link.
Sādhāraṇa Hetu vs Valid Hetu — Sādhāraṇa appears with and without sādhya; valid hetu has fixed link by vyāpti.
Asādhāraṇa Hetu vs Pakṣadharmatā — Asādhāraṇa is hard to test in examples; pakṣadharmatā is simply hetu present in pakṣa.
Anupasaṃhāri Hetu vs Anvaya-Vyatireki Hetu — Anupasaṃhāri lacks clear vipakṣa; anvaya-vyatireki uses both sides testing.
Nirṇaya vs Saṃśaya — Nirṇaya is final certainty; saṃśaya is doubt.
Vāda vs Jalpa — Vāda seeks truth; jalpa seeks victory.
Jalpa vs Vitaṇḍā — Jalpa argues for its own thesis; vitaṇḍā only criticizes without own thesis.
Nigrahasthāna vs Hetvābhāsa — Nigrahasthāna are debate-defeats; hetvābhāsa are reasoning fallacies in inference.
Siddhānta vs Opinion — Siddhānta is system-accepted conclusion; opinion is personal belief.
Dr̥ṣṭānta vs Upanaya — Dr̥ṣṭānta is general example; upanaya applies it to the case.
Anupalabdhi vs Vipakṣa — Anupalabdhi is a pramāṇa for absence; vipakṣa is an absence-case used to test vyāpti.
Arthāpatti vs Upamāna — Arthāpatti postulates a needed fact; upamāna identifies by similarity.
Samavāya vs Saṃyoga — Samavāya is inseparable; saṃyoga is temporary contact.
Saṃyoga vs Vibhāga — Saṃyoga is joining/contact; vibhāga is separation.
Dravya vs Guṇa — Dravya is substance; guṇa is quality dependent on substance.
Guṇa vs Karma — Guṇa is attribute; karma is motion/action.
Sāmānya vs Viśeṣa — Sāmānya is shared universal; viśeṣa is unique particularity.
Abhāva vs Anupalabdhi — Abhāva is absence; anupalabdhi is knowing absence by non-perception.
Kāraṇa vs Kārya — Kāraṇa produces; kārya is produced.
Samavāyi Kāraṇa vs Nimitta Kāraṇa — Samavāyi is material part of effect; nimitta is external agent/tool.
Nimitta Kāraṇa vs Asamavāyi Kāraṇa — Nimitta is maker/tool; asamavāyi is non-inherent supporting cause like material qualities.
Samavāyi Kāraṇa vs Asamavāyi Kāraṇa — Samavāyi is substance in effect; asamavāyi is qualities that help through material cause.
Satkāryavāda vs Asatkāryavāda — Satkārya says effect pre-exists; asatkārya says effect is newly produced.
Parināmavāda vs Vivartavāda — Parināma is real change; vivarta is apparent change.
Ātman vs Manas — Ātman is experiencer; manas is internal instrument connecting senses.
Padārtha vs Prameya — Padārtha is category framework; prameya is specific object of knowledge.
Sāmānya vs Class Name — Sāmānya is real universal (as per school); class name is just a word label.
Contact vs Inherence — Contact can break; inherence cannot be separated.
Efficient Cause vs Material Cause — Efficient cause makes; material cause becomes the product.
Cause Theory vs Illusion Theory — Cause theory explains production; illusion theory explains appearance.
Quality vs Property of Universal — Quality belongs to substance; universal is common nature shared by many individuals.
Absence vs Negation — Absence is state of non-existence; negation is the logical operation “not”.
Prāgabhāva vs Dhvaṃsābhāva — Prāgabhāva is before creation; dhvaṃsābhāva is after destruction.
Atyantābhāva vs Anyonyābhāva — Atyantābhāva is “never exists”; anyonyābhāva is “A is not B” difference.
Abhāva vs Anupalabdhi — Abhāva is absence itself; anupalabdhi is the means to know absence.
Lakṣaṇa vs Example — Lakṣaṇa defines the class; example shows one instance of the class.
Ativyāpti vs Avyāpti — Ativyāpti includes too much; avyāpti includes too little.
Avyāpti vs Asambhava — Avyāpti misses some true cases; asambhava fits no case at all.
Trairūpya vs Vyāpti — Trairūpya checks hetu conditions; vyāpti is the universal relation behind inference.
Sannikarsa vs Anumāna — Sannikarsa gives perception; anumāna gives inference by reasoning.
Laukika Śabda vs Vaidika Śabda — Laukika is human testimony; vaidika is scriptural testimony.
Chala vs Jāti — Chala twists words; jāti gives weak repetitive objections.
Jāti vs Nigrahasthāna — Jāti is a faulty rebuttal type; nigrahasthāna is defeat due to debate faults.
Nyāya vs Vaiśeṣika — Nyāya focuses on knowledge methods; vaiśeṣika focuses on reality categories.
Sāmānya vs Viśeṣa — Sāmānya is common universal; viśeṣa is unique particularity.
Saṃyoga vs Samavāya — Saṃyoga is separable contact; samavāya is inseparable inherence.
Dravya vs Guṇa — Dravya is substance; guṇa is quality depending on substance.
Guṇa vs Karma — Guṇa is attribute; karma is motion/action.
Pramāṇya vs Aprāmāṇya — Pramāṇya is validity; aprāmāṇya is invalidity of cognition.
Pramā vs Pramiti — Pramā is valid knowledge; pramiti is the cognition result produced in mind.
Smṛti vs Pratyakṣa — Smṛti is memory recall; pratyakṣa is present sense-based knowledge.
Tarka vs Proof — Tarka checks by contradiction possibility; proof establishes the conclusion by valid steps.

Indian Logic Short Notes (One Liners)

Table of Contents

Short Notes

110 Most Asked in PYQs One Liners

90 Confusing Pairs / Differences

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