UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

In Indian epistemology, particularly in the Nyaya school, pramanas are recognised as valid means or instruments of knowledge. Perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony form the canonical four pramanas in early Nyaya. Each provides a distinct route by which cognition can be justified. Therefore the group of knowledge sources mentioned in the stem is correctly called pramanas.

Option A:
Option A, vyaptis, refers to relations of invariable concomitance between hetu and sadhya and is not itself a means of knowledge. Vyapti is used within inference but does not name the broader category of knowledge sources. Hence vyaptis is not appropriate.

Option B:
Option B, hetus, are reasons or middle terms used in inference to support a conclusion. They function within one pramana, anumana, rather than naming all means of knowledge. Thus hetus cannot be the correct answer.

Option C:
Option C, pakshas, are the subjects or loci in which a property is to be established in inference. Again, paksha is a component of inferential structure, not a general type of knowledge source. Therefore pakshas is not suitable here.

Option D:
Option D is correct because pramanas encompass all the recognised independent means through which valid cognition can arise in Nyaya. The examples listed in the question are standard members of this group.

In classical Indian logic, pratyaksha is the pramana that denotes direct perception. It is knowledge gained through immediate contact of the senses with their objects, free from error and distortion. This form of cognition is considered foundational for empirical awareness. Hence the type of knowledge described in the stem is called pratyaksha.

Option A:
Option A, anumana, refers to inference, where knowledge arises from reasoning based on signs or evidence. It is mediated, not direct, and therefore differs from sense perception. So anumana is not the right answer.

Option B:
Option B correctly identifies pratyaksha as sense perception or direct awareness of objects. It contrasts with inferential and testimonial sources of knowledge. Therefore pratyaksha is the most accurate term here.

Option C:
Option C, upamana, denotes knowledge by comparison or analogy, such as learning about an unknown object by comparing it with a known one. This is again different from immediate sensory contact. Thus upamana does not fit the description.

Option D:
Option D, sabda, is verbal testimony, especially authoritative or scriptural knowledge. It relies on trustworthy speakers rather than direct sensory experience. Therefore sabda cannot be the correct answer to this question.

Pratyaksha is the Nyaya term for perceptual knowledge obtained through immediate contact of the senses with their appropriate objects. It is regarded as a primary and direct means of knowledge, prior to inference and other mediate processes. Nyaya further analyses pratyaksha into ordinary and extraordinary forms depending on the manner of contact. Hence the kind of direct knowledge described in the stem is called pratyaksha.

Option A:
Option A, anumana, refers to inference as a means of knowledge where one moves from a perceived sign to an unperceived object through recognised concomitance. It is mediate, not direct, and so does not match the description of immediate sensory contact.

Option B:
Option B is correct because pratyaksha literally means perception and is defined in Nyaya as knowledge produced by the operation of sense organs on objects, free from defects and doubt. This aligns closely with the wording of the question.

Option C:
Option C, upamana, is knowledge gained by comparison or analogy, such as recognising an unknown animal by comparing it with a description of a known one. It is neither direct sensory contact nor simple inference.

Option D:
Option D, sabda, is verbal testimony, particularly from reliable or authoritative sources. It delivers knowledge through language rather than through direct perceptual contact with objects.

Pratyaksha is the Nyaya term for perceptual knowledge arising from appropriate contact of the senses with external objects. It is considered immediate and non-inferential, forming a basic foundation for other cognitions. Nyaya distinguishes ordinary and extraordinary kinds of such perception. Thus the direct sense-based knowledge described in the stem is called pratyaksha.

Option A:
Option A, anumana, is inference that moves from a perceived sign to an unperceived probandum through recognised concomitance. It is mediate and conceptual rather than immediate sensory contact. Hence it does not suit the description.

Option B:
Option B is correct because pratyaksha literally means perception and is defined in Nyaya as knowledge produced by sense-object contact free from defects and doubt. The stem clearly points to this direct sensory origin.

Option C:
Option C, upamana, is comparison-based knowledge where an unknown object is understood by likening it to a known one. It does not require direct contact with the object itself.

Option D:
Option D, sabda, refers to verbal testimony as a pramana, where knowledge comes from trustworthy words or scriptures rather than from the senses acting on objects.