UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Classical Nyāya recognises exactly four independent pramāṇas: perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna) and verbal testimony (śabda). Each is treated as a distinct and irreducible means of valid knowledge. Other candidate pramāṇas are either reduced to these or rejected as independent. Therefore the list that contains precisely these four is the correct one for classical Nyāya.

Option A:
Option A lists the standard Nyāya four: perception, inference, comparison and testimony. It neither omits any accepted pramāṇa nor adds any that Nyāya does not treat as independent. This makes it fully consistent with Nyāya epistemological texts.

Option B:
Option B replaces comparison with memory, but memory is generally considered mere reproduction of past knowledge and not an independent pramāṇa. Hence the set does not match Nyāya’s list.

Option C:
Option C omits inference and adds presumption, which classical Nyāya does not accept as a separate pramāṇa, so the classification becomes misleading.

Option D:
Option D adds non perception as if Nyāya had a separate pramāṇa for absence; that status is debated in later schools and is not part of the classical fourfold scheme.

Dignāga and Dharmakīrti defend a two pramāṇa theory in which perception and inference exhaust the basic ways of knowing. Other proposed pramāṇas, such as testimony, are analysed as reducible to these two. Testimony, for example, is explained through inference from the speaker’s reliability combined with prior perceptions. This twofold scheme contrasts with the richer lists of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā.

Option A:
Option A overlooks the role of inference, which Buddhists clearly acknowledge as a separate pramāṇa alongside perception.

Option B:
Option B correctly states that Buddhist logicians typically count exactly two fundamental pramāṇas: perception and inference.

Option C:
Option C reproduces the Nyāya four pramāṇa list, not the Buddhist view.

Option D:
Option D corresponds to the six pramāṇa scheme of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and many Advaitins rather than to Buddhist epistemology.