UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Kevalanvayi inference relies on a vyapti that is confirmed entirely through cases where both hetu and sadhya are present together, with no example of hetu existing without sadhya. The universality of the relation appears from the absence of counter-instances. This pattern is especially clear in cases where the hetu is coextensive with the broader class of the sadhya. Thus the inference in the stem is kevalanvayi.

Option A:
Option A, kevalavyatireki, is based solely on negative instances where both hetu and sadhya are absent together, and has no positive sapaksha examples, making it the opposite configuration.

Option B:
Option B, anvayavyatireki, uses both positive and negative instances and therefore does not restrict itself to only positive evidence.

Option C:
Option C is correct because kevalanvayi literally means "only by affirmative concomitance" and corresponds exactly to the case where there is no locus of hetu without sadhya. It highlights a particularly strong pattern of pervasion.

Option D:
Option D, samanyatodrsta, is a temporal and relational classification dealing with general uniformities rather than the specific structure of evidence for vyapti.

A, C, D and E are correct; B is false. Appeals to authority can be reasonable if the authority is relevant and expert; they become fallacious when irrelevant (e.g., celebrities on technical issues). UGC NET tests spotting relevance and expertise.

Option A:
Option A is correct because it includes the true, nuanced statements and excludes B (the incorrect blanket claim).

Option B:
Option B is incomplete because it omits C (checking expertise), which is true and central.

Option C:
Option C is incomplete because it omits A (proper authority can be reasonable), which is true.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it includes B (false).

Yogaja pratyaksha is a special kind of perception said to arise from yogic concentration and discipline, allowing direct awareness of subtle realities that ordinary senses cannot reach. It is considered alaukika because it does not depend on usual sense-object contact. Traditional texts describe yogaja perception as immediate and self-evident to the yogi. Therefore the supernormal awareness mentioned in the stem is called yogaja pratyaksha.

Option A:
Option A, laukika, refers to everyday empirical perception through external senses and cannot account for the extraordinary, meditative origin of yogic awareness.

Option B:
Option B, samanyalaksana, is focused on perceiving universals through their instances, not on supernormal access to hidden or distant objects.

Option C:
Option C is correct because yogaja directly points to yogic origin, distinguishing these cognitions from both ordinary perception and reasoning. It preserves the claimed immediacy of such insights while acknowledging their exceptional status.

Option D:
Option D, anumana, is mediate inferential knowledge and lacks the immediacy and non-discursive character attributed to yogic perception.

Contraposition is an operation that takes a conditional or certain categorical propositions and transforms them by swapping subject and predicate while also negating each. For example, “If p, then q” becomes “If not q, then not p”, and these are logically equivalent. This method is often used in proofs because the contrapositive of a true conditional must also be true. Thus the inference described in the stem is contraposition.

Option A:
Option A, conversion, simply interchanges subject and predicate without negating them, as when “No S are P” is converted to “No P are S”. It does not include the additional step of negation that characterises contraposition.

Option B:
Option B, obversion, changes the quality of a proposition and replaces the predicate with its complement but does not interchange subject and predicate. It is a different immediate inference.

Option C:
Option C is correct because contraposition uniquely combines reversal of order with negation of both terms, yielding a statement equivalent to the original under classical logic for suitable forms. This fits the description given in the question.

Option D:
Option D, equipollence, is sometimes used to describe equivalence obtained by combining operations like obversion and conversion, but it is not the standard name for the specific transformation outlined in the stem.

Pratijna is the opening claim or thesis in the Nyaya five-membered argument that sets out what the speaker intends to establish. It identifies both the subject (paksha) and the property to be proved (sadhya), as in “The hill is fiery.” This statement guides the subsequent presentation of reasons, examples and applications. Consequently, the initial thesis described in the stem is called pratijna.

Option A:
Option A is correct because pratijna functions as the focal point around which the rest of the inferential steps are organised. Without clearly stating the pratijna, the audience would not know what conclusion the argument aims to justify.

Option B:
Option B, hetu, is the reason offered to support the thesis, such as “because there is smoke.” It is a distinct member of the inference and cannot itself be the thesis.

Option C:
Option C, paksha, is the subject or locus in which the property is to be established, like “the hill,” and forms part of the pratijna but does not name the full thesis statement.

Option D:
Option D, vyapti, is the universal relation of concomitance between hetu and sadhya, which underpins the reliability of the inference. It is a principle appealed to by the argument, not the thesis being asserted.

Upadhi is introduced to explain why an apparently universal relation between hetu and sadhya fails in some cases by revealing an unnoticed limiting condition. For example, the connection between smoke and fire holds only when certain conditions about fuel and ignition are met. Recognising the upadhi refines the vyapti so that it becomes genuinely exceptionless. Thus the restricting factor described in the stem is called upadhi.

Option A:
Option A is correct because upadhi literally means "subsidiary condition" and functions as a qualifier that saves genuine universals from overgeneralisation. It shows that the true vyapti is conditional upon the presence of this factor.

Option B:
Option B, udaharana, is the statement of rule with example and does not itself serve as a hidden constraint on the relation.

Option C:
Option C, paksha dharma, refers simply to a property present in the paksha and is not the special condition that limits the domain of a universal connection.

Option D:
Option D, samsaya, denotes doubt as a mental state and plays a role in prompting inquiry, not in technically restricting the scope of vyapti.

Statements A, B, C and E are correct, while D and F are false. Causal reasoning does seek contributing factors, post hoc identifies a common fallacy based on mere sequence, and controlled comparison helps isolate causal variables. Exam questions often ask which explanation best accounts for observed facts, which is captured in E. D is wrong because temporal order alone does not prove causation, and F is wrong because correlation does not automatically establish a causal link. Thus A, B, C and E only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E, overlooking the way UGC NET uses cause and effect items to test evaluative skills. Although A, B and C are conceptually sound, they do not reflect this exam context. Hence A, B and C only cannot be chosen.

Option B:
Option B is incorrect because it drops A, failing to state what causal reasoning tries to do in general. Having only B, C and E leaves out the overall idea of causation itself. This omission makes the option conceptually weaker than the full set of correct statements.

Option C:
Option C is correct since it unites the description of causal inquiry, a classic fallacy, a methodological tool and the exam style of questioning. By excluding D and F, it also protects against common confusions between sequence, correlation and causation. Therefore this option fits both theory and practice.

Option D:
Option D is wrong because it includes D, which absurdly claims that temporal succession always suffices for causation, and omits C’s point about controlled comparison. Accepting D leads to many false causal attributions. So A, B, D and E only is not a valid answer.

Laukika pratyaksha encompasses all ordinary perceptions generated by the standard interaction of the five senses with their corresponding objects. It includes both indeterminate and determinate stages so long as the source is usual sense contact. Nyaya contrasts this with extraordinary forms of perception that go beyond standard sensory operations. Therefore the empirical perception in the stem is called laukika pratyaksha.

Option A:
Option A, alaukika, denotes extraordinary perception that occurs in atypical ways, such as perception of universals or yogic insight, and does not describe ordinary sensory experience.

Option B:
Option B, nirvikalpa, refers to indeterminacy of content and can apply to both ordinary and extraordinary perceptions, so it is not tied to the empirical nature of the source in the way the stem suggests.

Option C:
Option C is correct because laukika literally means "worldly" and captures the normal, commonsense realm of perception that most knowledge about the external world relies upon.

Option D:
Option D, yogaja, is a specific kind of alaukika perception arising from yogic discipline, not the general class of everyday sense-based awareness.

The fallacy of composition occurs when one concludes that because each part of a whole has some property, the whole itself must also have that property. This ignores how components may interact or combine in ways that change the overall characteristics. Logical scrutiny requires considering whether the property is preserved when parts are assembled. Thus the mistaken inference described in the stem is the fallacy of composition.

Option A:
Option A, division, is the complementary error of inferring that each part has a property simply because the whole does. It runs from whole to part rather than from part to whole and so does not fit the stem.

Option B:
Option B is correct because composition captures exactly the part-to-whole misreasoning. For example, from “each player on this team is excellent” it does not automatically follow that “the team is excellent”, since teamwork and strategy also matter.

Option C:
Option C, hasty generalisation, involves drawing a broad conclusion about a population from an insufficient or unrepresentative sample, which is a different type of inferential mistake.

Option D:
Option D, post hoc, concerns erroneous causal inference based on temporal succession, not on part–whole relationships.

Laukika pratyaksha comprises all ordinary perceptions that arise through normal functioning of the senses with their appropriate objects, such as seeing a pot or hearing a sound. It forms the foundation of common-sense knowledge about the world. Nyaya contrasts this category with extraordinary perceptions that involve unusual connections or capacities. Therefore the perception described in the stem is laukika pratyaksha.

Option A:
Option A, alaukika, refers to non-ordinary or extraordinary perception, including yogaja and other special forms, and thus does not match the everyday sensory experiences highlighted.

Option B:
Option B, nirvikalpa, indicates indeterminacy of content and can occur both in ordinary and extraordinary perception, so it is not specifically about usual worldly contact.

Option C:
Option C is correct because laukika literally means "worldly" and is explicitly used to mark the class of perceptions tied to ordinary empirical interaction with objects.

Option D:
Option D, yogaja, is a subset of alaukika perception arising from yogic practice and is far removed from the routine sensory events mentioned in the question.

Statements A, B, C, E and F correctly describe key aspects of deductive and inductive reasoning, while D is false. Deductive reasoning aims at necessity, and when a deductive argument is sound, true premises guarantee a true conclusion. Inductive reasoning supports probabilistic conclusions such as sample-based generalisations, and UGC NET passages may mix both patterns in a single item set. D is wrong because many inductive arguments are acceptable and widely used in science and everyday life.

Option A:
Option A is correct because it includes all the true statements A, B, C, E and F and excludes D, which wrongly dismisses all inductive arguments as invalid. This option captures the contrast between necessity and probability, highlights the role of generalisation and reflects exam usage. It therefore matches the actual theory of reasoning tested in Paper 1.

Option B:
Option B is incorrect because it omits E and F, leaving out the important points about generalisations from samples and the appearance of both patterns in UGC NET questions. Although A, B and C are true, they do not provide a complete picture of how inductive reasoning is used and assessed. Hence this combination under-represents the correct information.

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it still omits F and thus fails to note the mixed presence of deductive and inductive reasoning in exam passages. Without F, the practical exam context is lost, even though A, B, C and E are all true. As such, this option does not fully answer the question about which statements are correct.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it ignores A, which defines deductive necessity, and includes only B, C, E and F. While all four included statements are true, leaving out A means that the central definition of deductive reasoning is missing. Therefore this combination does not contain all the correct statements from the list.

Vyapti expresses the universal and invariable relation between the hetu and the sadhya. It states that wherever the middle term is present, the major term is also present. This unbroken concomitance underlies the validity of inference in Indian logic. Therefore the relation described in the stem is called vyapti.

Option A:
Option A, paksha, is the subject or locus in which the middle term is asserted. It refers to the site of inference, not to the invariable relation itself. Hence paksha is not the correct term here.

Option B:
Option B, hetu, is the middle term or reason cited to prove the sadhya. While hetu participates in vyapti, it is not the name of the relation of concomitance. Thus hetu does not answer the question precisely.

Option C:
Option C correctly names vyapti as the universal concomitance between hetu and sadhya. It is expressed in examples like “wherever there is smoke, there is fire”. Therefore vyapti is the best fit for the stem.

Option D:
Option D, nigamana, signifies the concluding statement of the five-membered inference. It summarises what has been established but does not denote the underlying relation. Consequently nigamana is not the answer sought.

Statements A, B, C and D correctly describe the four standard categorical forms, while E is false. A-propositions are indeed “All S are P”, E-propositions “No S are P”, I-propositions “Some S are P” and O-propositions “Some S are not P”. I-propositions are particular, not universal, so they do not express universal affirmation. Therefore the set of all and only true statements is A, B, C, D only.

Option A:
Option A is correct because it includes exactly those four statements that match the standard AEIO scheme and excludes E, which wrongly labels an I-proposition as universal. This option fully represents textbook terminology used in UGC NET preparation.

Option B:
Option B is incorrect since it omits D, leaving out the correct form of the O-proposition, and so A, B, C only does not list all true statements. It is therefore incomplete with respect to the question stem.

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it drops C, the correct form of the I-proposition, and thus A, B, D only fails to include all valid categorical types. It also still excludes nothing false beyond E, so it does not capture the full set of accurate statements.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect as it includes E along with B, C and D, thereby treating the false statement about I-propositions as if it were true. B, C, D, E only therefore mixes correct and incorrect information and cannot be accepted.

Statements A, B, C and E correctly characterise equivocation and its exam relevance, while D is false. When a key term changes meaning mid-argument, the reasoning may look sound but is actually invalid. Careful attention to how words are used can reveal this shift, and many UGC NET passages exploit such ambiguity. An argument that equivocates is not automatically valid; indeed, the fallacy consists in the hidden invalidity it creates. Thus A, B, C, E only is the correct set.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E, failing to mention the specific way this fallacy appears in exam questions. A, B, C only therefore does not fully address the stem.

Option B:
Option B is wrong as it leaves out C, losing the important advice that clarifying meanings is a key detection method. A, B, E only underplays how to diagnose the error.

Option C:
Option C is correct since it keeps the definition, effect, diagnostic method and exam context while excluding D, which implies that equivocal arguments are nonetheless valid. This option matches standard critical reasoning treatments.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it includes D, mistakenly suggesting that equivocation is compatible with deductive validity. B, C, D, E only therefore blends true observations with a serious error.

Statements A, B, C, E and F correctly sketch key differences between Buddhist logic and Nyaya, while D is false. Buddhist theorists typically reduce śabda to forms of inference rather than treating it as wholly independent. Apoha explains generality via exclusion of others, and the doctrine of momentariness shapes their understanding of causal series and inference. UGC NET may test these contrasts at a conceptual level. Thus A, B, C, E and F only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits F, failing to mention the exam relevance of these doctrinal differences. While A, B, C and E are true, they do not acknowledge how the topic appears in UGC NET. Therefore this option is not fully suitable.

Option B:
Option B is correct since it includes the main historical and theoretical points along with their significance for the syllabus, while excluding D, which misrepresents the status of śabda. It matches the depth usually expected from candidates.

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it includes D, which incorrectly grants verbal testimony independent pramāṇa status in mainstream Buddhist logic. This conflicts with their reductionist approach. Including D makes the combination inconsistent.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect as it omits B and includes only A, C, E and F, thereby leaving out the central apoha theory of meaning. Without B, a major hallmark of Buddhist logic is missing. Hence this option cannot be accepted.