Kevalānvayi anumāna is based entirely on positive instances, with no genuine negative cases available for observing absence. The classic example is the knowable–nameable relation, because all knowable objects are said to be nameable. There is no case of a knowable that is not nameable. This yields a purely affirmative pattern where inference relies on universal affirmation alone.
Option A:
Option A is usually treated as anvayavyatireki since we can cite both positive and negative smoke–fire instances. It is not purely positive.
Option B:
Option B correctly gives the knowable–nameable example in which only positive instances are available and the vyāpti is affirmed everywhere, fitting kevalānvayi.
Option C:
Option C commits a fallacy by inferring “pot” from “breakable,” because many non pots are also breakable; it is not an illustration of kevalānvayi.
Option D:
Option D reverses the common smoke–fire direction and still depends on positive and negative cases, so it does not serve as the stock kevalānvayi example.
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