Dignāga and Dharmakīrti defend a two pramāṇa theory in which perception and inference exhaust the basic ways of knowing. Other proposed pramāṇas, such as testimony, are analysed as reducible to these two. Testimony, for example, is explained through inference from the speaker’s reliability combined with prior perceptions. This twofold scheme contrasts with the richer lists of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā.
Option A:
Option A overlooks the role of inference, which Buddhists clearly acknowledge as a separate pramāṇa alongside perception.
Option B:
Option B correctly states that Buddhist logicians typically count exactly two fundamental pramāṇas: perception and inference.
Option C:
Option C reproduces the Nyāya four pramāṇa list, not the Buddhist view.
Option D:
Option D corresponds to the six pramāṇa scheme of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and many Advaitins rather than to Buddhist epistemology.
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