Many Buddhist epistemologists, notably Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, simplify pramāṇa theory to two basic sources: perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). They argue that other alleged means, such as testimony or comparison, can be reduced to combinations or applications of these two. This two pramāṇa view contrasts with the fourfold Nyāya and the more expansive lists of some Mīmāṃsā schools.
Option A:
Option A aligns with Buddhist texts that elevate perception and inference as the only ultimate pramāṇas, treating other modes as derivative or reducible.
Option B:
Option B wrongly promotes testimony to independent status in this context; Buddhists typically interpret scripture through inference and do not add it as a separate source.
Option C:
Option C adds comparison as an independent pramāṇa, which is not accepted in standard Buddhist epistemology.
Option D:
Option D chooses testimony and presumption, neither of which form the canonical Buddhist pair of pramāṇas.
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