UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Statements A, B, C, D and F correctly explain how vyāpti is supported in Indian logic, while E is false. Nyaya stresses repeated observation without exception, looking at agreement in presence (anvaya) and agreement in absence (vyatireka). Tarka helps eliminate competing hypotheses, strengthening confidence in the concomitance. If a genuine counterexample appears, the vyāpti must be revised, so E is incorrect. UGC NET often uses the smoke–fire example to test recognition of these methods. Hence A, B, C, D and F only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits F, missing the explicit note that such methods appear in exam questions. Although A, B, C and D are conceptually sound, they do not link back to UGC NET practice. Therefore this option is not fully adequate.

Option B:
Option B is wrong since it omits A and includes only B, C, D and F, failing to mention the central requirement of repeated observation and absence of counterexamples. Without A, the empirical grounding of vyāpti is underplayed. This omission makes the option incomplete.

Option C:
Option C is incorrect as it includes E, which claims that vyāpti is irrevocable once established. The very idea of counterexamples shows that generalisations can and should be revised when new evidence arises. Including E therefore undermines the logic of empirical inference.

Option D:
Option D is correct because it unites the descriptive and methodological points about anvaya, vyatireka and tarka with the exam style of questioning, while rejecting the rigid, unscientific claim in E. It reflects both traditional theory and its modern pedagogical use.

Tarka is typically treated as a form of hypothetical or reductio style reasoning that helps test rival possibilities and expose contradictions. In vyāpti ascertainment, it is used to rule out alternative explanations and clear doubts, thereby strengthening our conviction in the invariable hetu–sādhya relation. It supports other pramāṇas rather than standing as one by itself.

Option A:
Option A wrongly elevates tarka to the status of an independent pramāṇa on a par with perception and inference; most schools explicitly deny it that status.

Option B:
Option B overstates its power by suggesting that tarka itself creates new objects of knowledge; rather, it refines and tests what other pramāṇas reveal.

Option C:
Option C correctly states that tarka helps remove doubts and inconsistencies while we are trying to establish vyāpti, making it an ancillary but important logical tool.

Option D:
Option D trivialises tarka as mere ornament, ignoring its recognised methodological role in Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā argumentation.