DignÄga and DharmakÄ«rti defend a two pramÄį¹a theory in which perception and inference exhaust the basic ways of knowing. Other proposed pramÄį¹as, such as testimony, are analysed as reducible to these two. Testimony, for example, is explained through inference from the speakerās reliability combined with prior perceptions. This twofold scheme contrasts with the richer lists of NyÄya and MÄ«mÄį¹sÄ.
Option A:
Option A overlooks the role of inference, which Buddhists clearly acknowledge as a separate pramÄį¹a alongside perception.
Option B:
Option B correctly states that Buddhist logicians typically count exactly two fundamental pramÄį¹as: perception and inference.
Option C:
Option C reproduces the NyÄya four pramÄį¹a list, not the Buddhist view.
Option D:
Option D corresponds to the six pramÄį¹a scheme of BhÄį¹į¹a MÄ«mÄį¹sÄ and many Advaitins rather than to Buddhist epistemology.
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