UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Sabda is recognised as a pramana in which valid knowledge is produced by meaningful sentences uttered by a reliable speaker or contained in authoritative texts. It covers a wide range of everyday and scriptural information that individuals cannot verify directly. The reliability of sabda depends on the competence and honesty of the source. Therefore the testimony-based knowledge referred to in the stem is called sabda.

Option A:
Option A is correct because sabda directly names verbal testimony as a distinct means of knowledge in Nyaya. It captures cases where we justifiably believe something on the basis of another's trustworthy report.

Option B:
Option B, upamana, uses comparison to identify new objects and does not primarily involve belief in another's authority beyond the initial description.

Option C:
Option C, arthapatti, is postulation where a new fact is inferred to explain an otherwise inexplicable situation, which is different from simply accepting a statement on trust.

Option D:
Option D, anupalabdhi, is non-perception or absence, accepted as a pramana in some schools like Bhatta Mimamsa, not in classical Nyaya. It involves cognising the non-existence of an object rather than learning from verbal testimony.

Classical Nyāya recognises exactly four independent pramāṇas: perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna) and verbal testimony (śabda). Each is treated as a distinct and irreducible means of valid knowledge. Other candidate pramāṇas are either reduced to these or rejected as independent. Therefore the list that contains precisely these four is the correct one for classical Nyāya.

Option A:
Option A lists the standard Nyāya four: perception, inference, comparison and testimony. It neither omits any accepted pramāṇa nor adds any that Nyāya does not treat as independent. This makes it fully consistent with Nyāya epistemological texts.

Option B:
Option B replaces comparison with memory, but memory is generally considered mere reproduction of past knowledge and not an independent pramāṇa. Hence the set does not match Nyāya’s list.

Option C:
Option C omits inference and adds presumption, which classical Nyāya does not accept as a separate pramāṇa, so the classification becomes misleading.

Option D:
Option D adds non perception as if Nyāya had a separate pramāṇa for absence; that status is debated in later schools and is not part of the classical fourfold scheme.

According to classical Nyaya, there are exactly four independent sources of valid knowledge: pratyaksha, anumana, upamana and sabda. Each pramana has its own distinctive causal structure and domain of application. Accepting four pramanas allows Nyaya to explain a wide range of cognitions, from direct sense experience to knowledge of remote facts conveyed by trustworthy speakers. Therefore the correct number of pramanas in Nyaya is four.

Option A:
Option A, three, would leave out one of the standard Nyaya pramanas and thus under-represent the richness of their epistemic classification. Some other schools like Samkhya accept three pramanas, but Nyaya explicitly adds comparison as a fourth. Hence three is not accurate for Nyaya.

Option B:
Option B is correct because Nyaya counts perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony as mutually irreducible sources of knowledge. This fourfold scheme becomes a benchmark against which other Indian schools define their own pramana lists.

Option C:
Option C, five, would match neither the classical Nyaya nor the usual Navya-Nyaya enumeration, which still keeps the same four. Although some other systems add further pramanas, Nyaya remains committed to four.

Option D:
Option D, six, corresponds to pramana lists in traditions such as Bhatta Mimamsa or Advaita Vedanta, which include arthapatti and anupalabdhi; it does not describe Nyaya doctrine.

A, B and C correctly describe variations in pramāṇa lists across schools, and E reflects a common exam question pattern. D is false because Cārvāka is generally sceptical and does not accept Nyaya’s full set, rejecting scriptural authority. Thus A, B, C and E only are correct.

Option A:
Option A is correct because it includes all true statements and excludes D (false about Cārvāka).

Option B:
Option B is incomplete because it omits E (exam pattern).

Option C:
Option C is incorrect because it includes D (false) and omits A (Nyaya four).

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it omits B (arthāpatti) and includes D (false).

Classical Nyāya recognises exactly four independent pramāṇas: perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna) and verbal testimony (śabda). Every other alleged means is either reduced to one of these or rejected as independent.

Option A:
Option A lists perception, inference, comparison and testimony, which is the standard fourfold Nyāya scheme.

Option B:
Option B replaces comparison with memory, but Nyāya treats memory as reproduction of past knowledge, not a fresh pramāṇa.

Option C:
Option C omits inference and adds presumption, which classical Nyāya does not accept as a separate pramāṇa.

Option D:
Option D substitutes non perception for testimony; recognition of non perception as an independent pramāṇa belongs to other schools, not to classical Nyāya.