UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Anumana is the term for inference as a means of valid knowledge in Indian philosophical traditions. It involves moving from the perception of a sign or hetu to knowledge of what that sign indicates, the sadhya. Classical examples include inferring fire from the perception of smoke on a hill. Thus the reasoning-based knowledge described in the stem is called anumana.

Option A:
Option A is correct because anumana is explicitly defined as knowledge arising from inferential reasoning, distinct from direct perception or testimony. It plays a central role in Nyaya and other schools as a pramana. The stem’s emphasis on moving from a sign to what it indicates matches this definition.

Option B:
Option B, pratyaksha, denotes direct perception through sense contact with objects. It does not involve mediated reasoning from signs. Therefore pratyaksha is not the right answer.

Option C:
Option C, upamana, refers to knowledge by comparison or analogy, such as understanding an unfamiliar object by relating it to a known one. Although it involves similarity, it is not the inferential sign-based process indicated in the question.

Option D:
Option D, sabda, corresponds to verbal testimony, particularly from reliable sources or scripture. It delivers knowledge through authoritative statements rather than through reasoning from observed signs. Hence sabda is not suitable here.

Paksha refers to the subject about which something is to be inferred, such as the hill in "The hill is fiery because it has smoke". It is the locus where the reason is observed and where the property to be proved is asserted. Identifying the paksha makes clear the scope of the inferential claim. Hence the subject described in the stem is called paksha.

Option A:
Option A, sapaksha, is the collection of similar instances where both hetu and sadhya are present, used to support vyapti. These are positive examples, not the particular subject under direct consideration. Therefore sapaksha is not correct.

Option B:
Option B, vipaksha, denotes dissimilar instances where the sadhya is absent and typically the hetu should also be absent. They test the universality of the vyapti but are not the main locus of inference. Thus vipaksha does not fit the stem.

Option C:
Option C is correct because paksha explicitly names the individual case about which the inference is being made. It is central to understanding who or what the conclusion is intended to apply to.

Option D:
Option D, hetu, is the reason or middle term cited to justify the sadhya, such as "having smoke". It is a property of the paksha rather than the paksha itself, so it cannot be the answer here.

Sabda is the pramana that delivers knowledge through credible verbal statements, such as those found in authentic scriptures or uttered by trustworthy experts. In traditions like Nyaya and Mimamsa, such testimony is considered an independent and irreducible means of valid cognition when certain conditions of reliability are met. Sabda thus covers truths that may not be accessible through direct perception or inference alone. Therefore the testimony-based knowledge described in the stem is called sabda.

Option A:
Option A is correct because sabda emphasises the role of authoritative speech as a channel of knowledge, recognising that much of what we know depends on others' reports. Classical discussions carefully analyse what makes a speaker or text trustworthy.

Option B:
Option B, upamana, as noted, is comparison-based knowledge arising from perceived similarity between a described object and a known one. It does not require dependence on an authoritative speaker beyond the initial description.

Option C:
Option C, arthapatti, is postulation or presumption, a pramana recognised in some schools like Mimamsa, where a new fact is postulated to reconcile apparently conflicting data; it is different from mere testimony.

Option D:
Option D, anumana, refers to inferential knowledge derived from a sign and its vyapti with the probandum, not from accepting a statement on another's authority.