UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Upamana is the pramana by which one comes to know something by recognising its similarity to a described, already known object. For example, after hearing that a gavaya is like a wild cow, one later identifies the gavaya by comparing it with cows one has seen. This process centrally involves grasping resemblance rather than direct perception or inference from a sign. Hence the comparative knowledge mentioned in the stem is called upamana.

Option A:
Option A, sabda, is testimony received from a reliable speaker or scripture. Although a description initiates the process of upamana, the decisive cognition of the new object occurs through comparison, not mere acceptance of words.

Option B:
Option B, smriti, is memory, which recalls past experiences but does not by itself introduce a new, previously unknown object through comparison. It is therefore not the pramana described.

Option C:
Option C, pratyaksha, is direct perception produced by sense-object contact. In the example of recognising a gavaya, the senses do perceive the animal, but the crucial knowledge that “this is that described animal” arises through comparison, which is upamana.

Option D:
Option D is correct because upamana highlights similarity as the operative factor in this new cognition. Indian logicians treat it as a distinct and important source of knowledge about unfamiliar entities.

Statements A, B, C and E correctly summarise the Nyaya conception of anumāna, while D is false. Inference crucially depends on recognising a universal concomitance (vyāpti) between hetu and sādhya and then applying it to a pakṣa, as in the smoke–fire example. Nyaya treats inference as a separate pramāṇa alongside perception and others, and exam questions frequently test this structure. The suggestion that inference never presupposes any universal relation contradicts the very idea of vyāpti, so D must be rejected.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it stops at A and B, omitting both the classical example of smoke and fire and the explicit exam relevance expressed in C and E. A, B only therefore fails to include all the correct statements the stem is pointing toward.

Option B:
Option B improves on A by adding the example in C but still neglects E, which mentions that UGC NET questions highlight these components. A, B, C only thus remains an incomplete representation of the correct information.

Option C:
Option C is incorrect since it leaves out A, the definition that inference arises from applying vyāpti, which is central to the concept. Even though B, C and E are true, missing A means this option cannot be the right answer.

Option D:
Option D is correct because it gathers all the true statements that capture both the conceptual and exam-related aspects of anumāna while excluding D, which denies the role of universal relation. It therefore matches the accepted understanding of Indian inference.

Pratyaksha is defined in Nyaya as knowledge generated by the direct contact of sense organs with their appropriate objects. Such cognition is immediate and does not depend on prior inference or testimony for its occurrence. It provides a basic and widely accepted source of information about the world. Thus, the sense-based knowledge mentioned in the stem is correctly termed pratyaksha.

Option A:
Option A, anumana, refers to inferential knowledge that arises from a sign and its invariable concomitance with the probandum and is therefore mediate rather than immediate. It presupposes pratyaksha or other pramanas for the establishment of vyapti. Hence anumana does not satisfy the condition of direct sense contact described in the stem.

Option B:
Option B is correct because pratyaksha literally means perception and is specifically tied to the operation of the senses in Nyaya. It captures the immediacy and non-inferential character of the cognition described. By isolating pratyaksha as a distinct pramana, Nyaya can examine conditions under which perceptual knowledge is valid or defective.

Option C:
Option C, upamana, is comparison-based knowledge where an unfamiliar object is understood through similarity with a known one and does not rely solely on fresh sense contact with that object. The key element there is recognition of likeness rather than mere sensory presence.

Option D:
Option D, sabda, denotes verbal testimony as a pramana, where one acquires knowledge by trusting the statements of reliable speakers or scriptures. It is mediated by language and authority, not by the bare functioning of the senses.

Pratyaksha is the Nyaya term for perceptual knowledge arising from appropriate contact of the senses with external objects. It is considered immediate and non-inferential, forming a basic foundation for other cognitions. Nyaya distinguishes ordinary and extraordinary kinds of such perception. Thus the direct sense-based knowledge described in the stem is called pratyaksha.

Option A:
Option A, anumana, is inference that moves from a perceived sign to an unperceived probandum through recognised concomitance. It is mediate and conceptual rather than immediate sensory contact. Hence it does not suit the description.

Option B:
Option B is correct because pratyaksha literally means perception and is defined in Nyaya as knowledge produced by sense-object contact free from defects and doubt. The stem clearly points to this direct sensory origin.

Option C:
Option C, upamana, is comparison-based knowledge where an unknown object is understood by likening it to a known one. It does not require direct contact with the object itself.

Option D:
Option D, sabda, refers to verbal testimony as a pramana, where knowledge comes from trustworthy words or scriptures rather than from the senses acting on objects.

Statements A, B, C, E and F are correct, whereas D is false. Nyaya recognises four main pramāṇas, and Advaita Vedānta typically extends the list to six, adding arthāpatti and anupalabdhi. Cārvāka is famous for its near-exclusive reliance on perception, and Mīmāṃsā highlights arthāpatti as a distinct means of knowledge. F is right that different schools endorse different sets of pramāṇas, but D is wrong because Buddhist schools do not simply duplicate Nyaya’s list. Therefore A, B, C, E and F only is the correct combination.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits F, failing to emphasise the cross-school variation in pramāṇa theory, which is central for comparative questions. While A, B, C and E are true, leaving out F makes the portrayal less accurate. Thus A, B, C and E only cannot be accepted.

Option B:
Option B is incorrect because it includes D (which is false) and omits E and F (which are true). Therefore it does not match the full set of correct statements A, B, C, E and F.

Option C:
Option C is correct because it explicitly groups A, B, C, E and F, capturing both specific school positions and the general fact of variation. It excludes D, which oversimplifies Buddhist pramāṇa theory. This reflects the nuanced picture expected in UGC NET questions on Indian epistemology.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect as it includes D while omitting A, thereby accepting a false uniformity of Buddhist and Nyaya pramāṇas and ignoring Nyaya’s own list. The combination therefore contradicts well-known doctrinal differences. Hence B, C, D, E and F only cannot be chosen.

Upamana is the pramana through which one comes to know an unfamiliar object by identifying it with something previously described as similar to a known object. After hearing that a gavaya resembles a wild cow, one later recognises a gavaya in the forest by comparing it with cows already seen. This recognition depends on grasping relevant similarity rather than direct testimony alone or standard inference. Therefore the process in the stem exemplifies upamana.

Option A:
Option A, pratyaksha, provides direct awareness of objects but does not by itself explain the informative step of recognising the new object as the one previously described. Perception supplies the raw appearance, while comparison via memory yields the upamana-based knowledge. Hence pratyaksha is only part of the story.

Option B:
Option B, sabda, certainly initiates the process by giving the description of similarity, yet the decisive cognition that “this is that described object” occurs only when one compares the perceived animal with the earlier verbal description. Thus sabda alone is not the pramana that completes the recognition.

Option C:
Option C, anupalabdhi, is the non-perception pramana used to know absences, such as knowing that there is no pot on the floor, which is conceptually different from identifying a new positive object by likeness. It cannot account for the comparative recognition in this case.

Option D:
Option D is correct because upamana isolates comparison-based recognition as a distinct epistemic route. It highlights a common pattern of learning new kinds by analogy with familiar cases.

Statements A, B, D and F are correct, whereas C and E are false. Nyaya recognises four independent pramāṇas and treats comparison as a distinct source of knowledge based on similarity linking a word to its object. Mīmāṃsā and some Vedānta schools add arthāpatti and anupalabdhi, so D is correct. Cārvāka famously restricts itself mainly to perception and is sceptical about other pramāṇas, so E is wrong, and Nyaya extends verbal testimony beyond scripture to reliable persons generally, making C false. UGC NET questions often ask candidates to identify which items belong to Nyaya’s list.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits F, failing to mention the exam-style use of pramāṇa lists. While A, B and D correctly state Nyaya and Mīmāṃsā positions, they do not capture how this knowledge is tested. Therefore A, B and D only is not a fully satisfactory answer.

Option B:
Option B is correct as it includes A, B, D and F, the statements that align with standard presentations of Nyaya and related schools and that reflect the structure of UGC NET questions. It excludes C and E, both of which misrepresent the scope of verbal testimony and the Cārvāka position. Thus this option accurately lists the correct statements.

Option C:
Option C is wrong because it omits A, leaving out the basic statement of Nyaya’s four pramāṇas, and includes only B, D and F. Without A, the picture of Nyaya epistemology is incomplete. Hence B, D and F only cannot be the right combination.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect since it includes C, which wrongly restricts Nyaya śabda to scripture alone, and omits F’s contribution in other contexts. The presence of C introduces a clear error, making A, B, C, D and F only an unacceptable choice.

Sabda is the pramana based on meaningful statements issued by a reliable speaker or preserved in authoritative texts. It underlies much of our everyday knowledge, such as historical facts or distant events, that we cannot verify directly. Nyaya conditions its validity on the competence and honesty of the source. Hence the testimony-based knowledge in the stem is properly called sabda.

Option A:
Option A is correct because sabda explicitly denotes verbal testimony as a distinct source of valid cognition. By treating sabda separately, Nyaya acknowledges our dependence on linguistic communication for large portions of what we legitimately know. It also allows detailed analysis of when testimony is trustworthy or defective.

Option B:
Option B, pratyaksha, delivers direct sensory knowledge and does not involve reliance on someone else's words. While perception and testimony can sometimes co-operate, the question focuses on knowledge based primarily on statements.

Option C:
Option C, smriti, is memory, which recalls previously acquired knowledge but does not itself introduce new information from another speaker. It presupposes earlier pramanas such as perception or testimony.

Option D:
Option D, anumana, is inference based on signs and vyapti and does not require an authoritative speaker; its justification lies in logical relations, not in the reliability of testimony.