UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Nyāya holds that anumiti (inferential cognition) arises when the mind apprehends the hetu in the pakṣa along with the remembered vyāpti. This focused grasping of the middle term as pervaded by the major term in that locus is called liṅga parāmarśa and is treated as the immediate psychological cause of inferential knowledge.

Option A:
Option A describes nigamana, the final verbal statement of the conclusion in a parārthānumāna, not the internal mental state that produces anumiti.

Option B:
Option B correctly identifies liṅga parāmarśa as the mental apprehension of the middle term in the pakṣa under the universal concomitance with the sādhya, which Nyāya treats as the direct cause of inference.

Option C:
Option C refers to dṛṣṭānta, the illustrative example used to convince others, which is part of external argumentation, not the inner cause of anumiti.

Option D:
Option D reduces liṅga parāmarśa to mere perception of the pakṣa; simple perception without relating the hetu to vyāpti is not yet inferential cognition.

Nyāya holds that anumiti (inferential cognition) arises when the mind apprehends the hetu in the pakṣa under the remembered vyāpti with the sādhya. This focused relational awareness is called liṅga parāmarśa. It is the immediate internal cause of inferential knowledge: only when the middle term is seen as pervaded by the major term in that particular subject does the inferential conclusion arise.

Option A:
Option A refers to nigamana, the expressed conclusion in parārthānumāna, which is a verbal product, not the inner causal cognition.

Option B:
Option B correctly characterises liṅga parāmarśa as the mental grasp of the middle term in the pakṣa along with its universal relation to the sādhya, which directly produces anumiti.

Option C:
Option C describes udāharaṇa, the illustrative example (like “a kitchen where there is smoke and fire”) used to communicate vyāpti, not the specific mental act in the pakṣa.

Option D:
Option D is merely the initial perception of the subject and does not yet relate the hetu to the sādhya through vyāpti, so it cannot by itself generate inference.