UGCNET Questions

Vyāpti is the logical glue of inference because it states that wherever the hetu occurs under relevant conditions, the sādhya also occurs. It is established by observing many positive and negative instances until a stable pattern is recognised. This invariable concomitance justifies moving from the presence of the hetu in a new case to the presence of the sādhya. Without vyāpti, inference would be guesswork rather than a pramāṇa.

Option A:
Option A reduces vyāpti to a single coincidence, which could be accidental and cannot ground a reliable inferential rule. Vyāpti demands a general regularity, not one case.

Option B:
Option B correctly defines vyāpti as the invariable hetu–sādhya relation across relevant cases, which is exactly what supports sound inference.

Option C:
Option C confuses vyāpti with the subject’s mental confidence; psychological certainty may arise even when there is no objective invariable relation between hetu and sādhya.

Option D:
Option D refers to merely restating the thesis, which adds no new information about the connection between hetu and sādhya and therefore cannot constitute vyāpti.

Vyāpti is the technical term in Nyāya logic that refers to the universal, invariable relation between the reason (hetu) and the probandum (sādhya). It is the guarantee that wherever the hetu is present, the sādhya is also present, as in the relation between smoke and fire in proper cases. This invariable concomitance is what justifies moving from the presence of the sign to the conclusion about what it signifies. Without established vyāpti, inference would lack logical force.

Option A:
Option A refers to nigamana, the concluding statement of the five-membered inference, not the relation between reason and probandum.

Option B:
Option B points to the middle term, hetu, which is the sign in the minor term, but vyāpti concerns the relation involving this term, not the term itself.

Option C:
Option C correctly identifies vyāpti as the pervading relation, often described as “wherever smoke, there fire,” which underlies the possibility of anumāna.

Option D:
Option D is dṛṣṭānta or udāharaṇa, the example that illustrates the universal relation, distinct from the relation itself.

Nyāya insists that vyāpti between hetu and sādhya must be grounded in both positive and negative correlated instances. For smoke and fire, this means repeatedly seeing smoke accompanied by fire in similar loci (sapakṣa) like kitchens, and not finding smoke where there is no fire in dissimilar loci (vipakṣa) such as lakes or open spaces. This combined pattern supports the conviction that wherever there is smoke there is fire, establishing invariable concomitance.

Option A:
Option A is too weak, because mere repetition of a single example may be accidental and does not rule out exceptions.

Option B:
Option B confines observation to a single type of positive instance and ignores negative cases, so it cannot eliminate possibilities of smoke without fire elsewhere.

Option C:
Option C captures the need for both anvaya (co-presence) and vyatireka (co-absence), which together underpin robust knowledge of vyāpti in Nyāya epistemology.

Option D:
Option D overstates the role of scripture; while śabda is an accepted pramāṇa, vyāpti for empirical inference like smoke–fire is not usually taken from testimony alone.

Vyāpti is the backbone of inference because it guarantees that wherever the hetu is present under relevant conditions, the sādhya is also present. It is not just a chance association in one example but an invariable relation established through observation of sapakṣa and vipakṣa cases and often supported by tarka. When smoke is known to be invariably associated with fire, we can reliably infer fire from smoke. Thus, vyāpti expresses a law like regularity between middle and major terms.

Option A:
Option A is too weak; a single example cannot establish invariable concomitance and may be accidental. Vyāpti requires a stable pattern across many appropriate instances.

Option B:
Option B describes a psychological state of certainty, which may or may not be justified; vyāpti is an objective relation, not merely a feeling in the reasoner’s mind.

Option C:
Option C correctly defines vyāpti as the invariable concomitance of hetu and sādhya across suitable cases, which is exactly what supports sound inference.

Option D:
Option D reduces vyāpti to a mere verbal assertion of the thesis; simply stating a claim does not amount to establishing the necessary connection between reason and probandum.