UGCNET Questions

Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā expands the list of pramāṇas beyond Nyāya’s four by adding arthāpatti (postulation) and anupalabdhi (non perception as a means to know absence). These two are treated as independent because they are thought to provide knowledge not reducible to perception, inference, comparison or testimony.

Option A:
Option A includes upamāna and śabda, which Nyāya already recognises; they are not additional in Mīmāṃsā relative to Nyāya.

Option B:
Option B correctly identifies arthāpatti and anupalabdhi as the characteristic additions that lead to a six pramāṇa scheme in Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā.

Option C:
Option C mentions memory and imagination, which are psychological functions rather than distinct pramāṇas in standard classifications.

Option D:
Option D highlights yogic and dream perceptions, which may be treated as special modes of perception but are not the canonical “extra” pramāṇas in Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā.

Dignāga and Dharmakīrti defend a two pramāṇa theory in which perception and inference exhaust the basic ways of knowing. Other proposed pramāṇas, such as testimony, are analysed as reducible to these two. Testimony, for example, is explained through inference from the speaker’s reliability combined with prior perceptions. This twofold scheme contrasts with the richer lists of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā.

Option A:
Option A overlooks the role of inference, which Buddhists clearly acknowledge as a separate pramāṇa alongside perception.

Option B:
Option B correctly states that Buddhist logicians typically count exactly two fundamental pramāṇas: perception and inference.

Option C:
Option C reproduces the Nyāya four pramāṇa list, not the Buddhist view.

Option D:
Option D corresponds to the six pramāṇa scheme of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and many Advaitins rather than to Buddhist epistemology.