UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

A, B and E are correct; C and D are false. Some schools accept anupalabdhi as a distinct pramāṇa for absence cognition under suitable perceptual conditions. It is not unanimously rejected, and it concerns absence rather than presence.

Option A:
Option A is correct because it includes the true statements (A, B, E) and excludes C and D (false).

Option B:
Option B is incorrect because it includes C (false unanimous rejection).

Option C:
Option C is incorrect because it includes D (false focus on presence).

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it includes D (false) and omits the correct focus of anupalabdhi.

B, C, D and E are correct; A is false. Arthāpatti is explanatory postulation (e.g., Devadatta’s night-eating) and is treated as an independent pramāṇa by some Mīmāṃsā/Vedānta authors. UGC NET may test examples and school-acceptance. It is not accurately described as always having a directly perceived “middle term” in the pakṣa.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete because it omits E (exam relevance), which is true.

Option B:
Option B is incomplete because it omits C (core conceptual characterisation), which is true.

Option C:
Option C is correct because it includes all true statements (B, C, D, E) and excludes A (false).

Option D:
Option D is incorrect because it includes A (false).

Statements A, B, C, E and F are correct, while D is false. Upamāna is indeed characterised as comparison, with the gavaya example being widely cited in textbooks. Nyaya treats it as an independent pramāṇa, although some other schools attempt to reduce it to combinations of perception and verbal testimony. UGC NET questions sometimes embed such scenarios and ask which source of knowledge is being used. D is wrong because it overstates the agreement among schools and ignores Nyaya’s insistence on a distinct process.

Option A:
Option A is incomplete since it omits E and F, which acknowledge both the reductionist view of some schools and the examination pattern. While A, B and C describe Nyaya’s standpoint and example, they do not cover inter-school debate or test relevance. Hence A, B and C only is not a complete answer.

Option B:
Option B is also incomplete because it still leaves out F and includes only A, B, C and E. Without F, the answer does not mention how upamāna-based questions appear in UGC NET. Therefore A, B, C and E only cannot be regarded as fully adequate.

Option C:
Option C is correct because it collects all the true statements, presenting Nyaya’s independent-pramāṇa view, other schools’ criticisms and the exam angle, while excluding D, which falsely merges upamāna completely with inference. It thus reflects the nuanced treatment of upamāna in Indian epistemology. Consequently, A, B, C, E and F only is the right combination.

Option D:
Option D is incorrect as it leaves out A and includes only B, C, E and F. Without A, the general translation and role of comparison are not clearly set out, and the omission makes the description less complete. Therefore B, C, E and F only cannot be the correct choice.

Arthāpatti is invoked when two accepted facts seem inconsistent unless a new, unobserved fact is assumed. For example, if a person is known to be alive and yet never seen eating in the day, one postulates that they eat at night. This postulated connecting fact is not straightforwardly perceived or inferred in the usual way but is taken as a distinct mode of valid cognition. Thus, arthāpatti is treated as an independent pramāṇa by schools that accept it.

Option A:
Option A would make arthāpatti indistinguishable from perception, which contradicts the emphasis on postulating something not directly seen.

Option B:
Option B resembles upamāna, where similarity between things gives new knowledge, but arthāpatti resolves clashes between known facts rather than relying on likeness.

Option C:
Option C correctly characterises arthāpatti as a special kind of reasoning where an unobserved fact is posited to maintain coherence among accepted data.

Option D:
Option D associates the pramāṇa with purely negative instances, which is more relevant to certain inferences or to absence cognition than to arthāpatti specifically.