UGC NET Questions (Paper – 1)

Upamana is the pramana by which one comes to know something by recognising its similarity to a described, already known object. For example, after hearing that a gavaya is like a wild cow, one later identifies the gavaya by comparing it with cows one has seen. This process centrally involves grasping resemblance rather than direct perception or inference from a sign. Hence the comparative knowledge mentioned in the stem is called upamana.

Option A:
Option A, sabda, is testimony received from a reliable speaker or scripture. Although a description initiates the process of upamana, the decisive cognition of the new object occurs through comparison, not mere acceptance of words.

Option B:
Option B, smriti, is memory, which recalls past experiences but does not by itself introduce a new, previously unknown object through comparison. It is therefore not the pramana described.

Option C:
Option C, pratyaksha, is direct perception produced by sense-object contact. In the example of recognising a gavaya, the senses do perceive the animal, but the crucial knowledge that “this is that described animal” arises through comparison, which is upamana.

Option D:
Option D is correct because upamana highlights similarity as the operative factor in this new cognition. Indian logicians treat it as a distinct and important source of knowledge about unfamiliar entities.

Upamāna is typically defined as the means of knowing the relation between a word and its denotatum through similarity, often illustrated by the gavaya (wild ox) example. One first hears “a gavaya is like a cow but lives in the forest,” and later, on seeing such an animal, recognises “this is a gavaya” by comparison. This involves neither straightforward perception alone nor ordinary inference; it is a special comparison based cognition.

Option A:
Option A describes inference (anumāna) from smoke to fire, not comparison, so it does not exemplify upamāna.

Option B:
Option B correctly presents the classic gavaya case, where comparison between a known cow and a new animal allows us to fix the meaning of the word “gavaya.”

Option C:
Option C concerns śabda pramāṇa, where valid testimony from scripture or a trusted person produces knowledge.

Option D:
Option D involves smṛti, or memory, which is recollection of a past event rather than fresh knowledge gained by comparison.

Upamāna is the means of knowing the relation between a word and its object through similarity or comparison. The classic case is where someone hears “a gavaya is like a cow but lives in the forest,” and later on seeing such an animal, recognises “this is a gavaya.” The cognition depends on comparing the new object with the known cow and linking it to the word. This process is neither mere testimony nor ordinary inference.

Option A:
Option A is a case of inference from smoke to fire and does not involve learning a new word’s reference by comparison.

Option B:
Option B correctly captures the gavaya example where similarity between the seen animal and a cow enables identification through upamāna.

Option C:
Option C exemplifies śabda pramāṇa, where scripture gives knowledge through verbal testimony, not through comparison.

Option D:
Option D is an instance of memory, which recalls a past event rather than generating new word–object knowledge via similarity.

Upamana is recognised in Nyaya as a distinct pramana in which knowledge arises by comparing an unfamiliar object with a known one based on a description of similarity. For example, learning what a gavaya is by comparing it to a cow one already knows involves upamana. This process relies on grasping relevant likenesses rather than direct perception or inference from a sign. Hence the comparison-based source of knowledge described in the stem is called upamana.

Option A:
Option A is correct because upamana literally points to “knowing through similarity,” and Nyaya explicitly lists it as separate from perception, inference and verbal testimony. It captures a common way in which people identify new things by reference to familiar ones.

Option B:
Option B, anumana, is inference based on a sign and its invariable concomitance with the probandum, such as inferring fire from smoke. It does not operate primarily through comparison of similarities.

Option C:
Option C, pratyaksha, is direct perception arising from contact between sense organs and objects, not mediated by comparison with previously known cases.

Option D:
Option D, sabda, is verbal testimony, particularly the words of reliable persons or scriptures, where knowledge comes from trusted reports rather than from recognising similarity.