UGCNET Questions

Nyāya defines perception as a non verbal, non erroneous cognition that arises from proper contact between the sense organ, its object and the mind. The emphasis is on immediacy (not mediated by another pramāṇa) and on freedom from defects that would generate illusion or doubt. This marks off genuine perception from hallucination and inferential thought.

Option A:
Option A incorrectly insists that perception must be verbalised at the moment it occurs; Nyāya allows for pre-linguistic perceptual awareness.

Option B:
Option B correctly captures Nyāya’s lakṣaṇa: non erroneous cognition produced by appropriate sense–object–mind contact.

Option C:
Option C restricts perception to universals, but Nyāya holds that particulars are also perceived, especially in earlier stages of cognition.

Option D:
Option D makes perception dependent on inference, whereas Nyāya regards perception as an independent pramāṇa that does not require inferential support to be valid.

Classical Indian thinkers, especially Nyāya, distinguish ordinary worldly perception (laukika) from extraordinary modes (alaukika). When the senses operate in their normal range to apprehend objects like pots, trees or tables, the resulting cognition is laukika pratyakṣa. It involves direct contact between a sense organ, its object and the mind, yielding fresh, non-mediate knowledge.

Option A:
Option A, yogaja pratyakṣa, refers to a special kind of perception said to arise in yogic states, not to ordinary sensory cognition of common objects.

Option B:
Option B, alaukika pratyakṣa, covers extraordinary forms such as sāmānyalakṣaṇa or jñānalakṣaṇa perception, which go beyond simple sense contact.

Option C:
Option C correctly locates the perception “This is a pot” within laukika pratyakṣa, since it arises from normal sense engagement with a gross object.

Option D:
Option D, smṛti, is recollection based on past impressions rather than a fresh perceptual event, so it is not pratyakṣa in the strict epistemic sense.

Nyāya defines pratyakṣa as non erroneous, non verbal cognition arising from the conjunction of sense organ, object and mind. The emphasis is on immediacy (it is not mediated by another pramāṇa) and on freedom from defects that would generate illusion or doubt. This causal structure and non erroneous character are central to Nyāya’s lakṣaṇa of valid perception.

Option A:
Option A is incorrect because perception need not be verbalised at the moment it occurs; mental awareness can arise before any linguistic formulation.

Option B:
Option B correctly highlights both the causal requirement of proper contact and the epistemic requirement of being non erroneous, matching Nyāya’s account of valid perception.

Option C:
Option C mistakenly restricts perception to universals; Nyāya allows perception of particulars as well, especially in the early stage of cognition.

Option D:
Option D makes perception dependent on inference, reversing Nyāya’s view that perception is an independent and often primary pramāṇa.