UGCNET Questions

Vyāpti is the logical glue of inference because it states that wherever the hetu occurs under relevant conditions, the sādhya also occurs. It is established by observing many positive and negative instances until a stable pattern is recognised. This invariable concomitance justifies moving from the presence of the hetu in a new case to the presence of the sādhya. Without vyāpti, inference would be guesswork rather than a pramāṇa.

Option A:
Option A reduces vyāpti to a single coincidence, which could be accidental and cannot ground a reliable inferential rule. Vyāpti demands a general regularity, not one case.

Option B:
Option B correctly defines vyāpti as the invariable hetu–sādhya relation across relevant cases, which is exactly what supports sound inference.

Option C:
Option C confuses vyāpti with the subject’s mental confidence; psychological certainty may arise even when there is no objective invariable relation between hetu and sādhya.

Option D:
Option D refers to merely restating the thesis, which adds no new information about the connection between hetu and sādhya and therefore cannot constitute vyāpti.

Anumāna is defined as mediate or indirect knowledge that arises after the cognition of a sign (hetu) that is invariably related to the thing to be known (sādhya). It presupposes prior establishment of vyāpti, the invariable concomitance between hetu and sādhya. When we infer fire from smoke, our knowledge of fire is mediated by the sign of smoke and the known relation between them. Thus, anumāna is distinct from direct perception and is grounded in a sign–signified structure.

Option A:
Option A describes pratyakṣa, immediate sense perception, which does not involve a mediating sign–signified relation. It lacks the inferential step that characterises anumāna.

Option B:
Option B refers to śabda, testimony, where knowledge comes from a trustworthy speaker’s words, not from observing a sign in the locus of inference.

Option C:
Option C correctly captures the indirect character of inference and the dependence on a previously known connection between hetu and sādhya. It emphasises that cognition of the sign leads to cognition of what is signified.

Option D:
Option D reduces inference to memory, but recollection alone does not constitute anumāna; inferential knowledge may use memory, yet it crucially depends on recognising a logical relation, not merely recalling past experiences.

Vyāpti is the backbone of inference because it guarantees that wherever the hetu is present under relevant conditions, the sādhya is also present. It is not just a chance association in one example but an invariable relation established through observation of sapakṣa and vipakṣa cases and often supported by tarka. When smoke is known to be invariably associated with fire, we can reliably infer fire from smoke. Thus, vyāpti expresses a law like regularity between middle and major terms.

Option A:
Option A is too weak; a single example cannot establish invariable concomitance and may be accidental. Vyāpti requires a stable pattern across many appropriate instances.

Option B:
Option B describes a psychological state of certainty, which may or may not be justified; vyāpti is an objective relation, not merely a feeling in the reasoner’s mind.

Option C:
Option C correctly defines vyāpti as the invariable concomitance of hetu and sādhya across suitable cases, which is exactly what supports sound inference.

Option D:
Option D reduces vyāpti to a mere verbal assertion of the thesis; simply stating a claim does not amount to establishing the necessary connection between reason and probandum.